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The three chapters in this thesis explore different parts of the active investing debate. I would 
like to start by summarizing the historical development of the area in order to put the research 
findings in context.  
It all started with the capital asset pricing model (CAPM); whenever a security would offer 
positive expected returns it would also be accompanied by a proportional rise in market beta. 
However, not long after the initial development of the model, researchers discovered the first 
generation of asset pricing anomalies; that is, portfolios sorted on certain characteristics, such as a 
companies’ book to market ratio, had realized returns that cannot be explained by the model.  
Researchers initially attempted to adjust the CAPM to subsume the anomalies. However, these 
early modifications were largely unsuccessful. All the while, the set of discovered characteristics 
that generate “abnormal” performance continued to expand. 
 
Figure 1: Anomaly research.  This figure summarizes the historical development of active 
investing and the strands of anomaly research.  
 
 
Failure to resuscitate the CAPM has split the literature into three directions. On the left of 
Figure 1, we have stories regarding the existence of anomalies. They are grouped into error in 
estimation stories, rational stories, and behavioral stories. Error in estimation stories claim that 
anomalies are the result of “research errors” (such as data mining) and do not in fact exist. Rational 
stories claim that portfolios that offer higher returns are risky as they offer poor performance in 
high marginal utility states. In Chapter 1, I delve further into this issue. The literature has proposed 
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a plethora of alternative rational asset pricing models to account for the anomalies, but these 
models seem to be (over)fit to explaining the performance of a single anomaly. Just like the CAPM, 
alternative models need to explain or reduce the pricing errors across assets. Consequently, 
Chapter 1 argues for testing rational asset pricing models on alternative anomalies or portfolios of 
premiums as an out-of-sample test and shows how popular anomaly explanations fail this test.  
The behavioral stories claim that investors are irrational, constrained, or have non-standard 
preferences. Resultantly, asset prices can deviate from fundamental values. Behavioral explanations 
are often combined with “a limits to arbitrage” story. For example, if a certain subset of investors 
is irrational, why is it not the case that rational arbitrageurs exploit the “mispricing” and correct 
prices in the process. Limits to arbitrage explanations suggest that arbitrageurs face obstacles and 
prohibitive costs in executing price correcting trades.  
In Chapter 2, I explore short selling costs and restrictions as a potential limit to arbitrage 
explanation for anomalies. I find that investors can profitably exploit anomalies without short 
selling. Moreover, investors can further enhance performance with a market short which is cheap 
to execute. Finally, I show that the cost associated with borrowing stocks is small relative to the 
alpha associated with short anomaly positions. Summarized briefly, short selling costs cannot fully 
explain stock anomalies.  
Moving to the middle of Figure 1, we have personal asset pricing. This encompasses 
methodologies such as spanning tests on a personal predefined benchmark and portfolio theory. 
These approaches try to prescribe investment recommendations to a specific investor.  
Finally, on the right-hand side of Figure 1, we have the data reduction techniques. Data 
reduction techniques try to reduce the number of predictive signals. Their goal is to reduce 
dimensionally and improve out-of-sample prediction.  
In Chapter 3, I test two new signals, shareholder meetings and shareholder support and find 
that they are associated with positive alphas relative to both the CAPM model with an equity proxy 
and popular data reduction techniques. In other words, voting data can be used for the creation 
of new asset pricing anomalies. Moreover, the chapter tests and discusses the viability of the 
rational, behavioral, and error in estimation explanations for the voting anomalies.  
The chapters that follow delve further into the details. Readers interested more in the 









Chapter 1: Testing rational asset pricing models 
 
Abstract 
New rational explanations are often developed and tested only on a single asset pricing anomaly. 
This approach of “testing in isolation” can lead to idiosyncratic findings as rational pricing should 
hold across assets. The paper empirically demonstrates the problem by showing how recession 
and crash risk can be relevant for a specific subset of stand-alone anomalies while at the same time 
being diversifiable in portfolios of premiums. Resultantly, the paper argues for raising the hurdle 
when assessing new rational models.  
 
1. Introduction 
Our inability to explain the returns of ‘anomalous’ portfolios via CAPM modifications has 
motivated a widespread search for a better rational model. One of the basic rules of the search is 
that the new rational model should explain the returns of all valid assets. Or at the very least, the 
new rational model should extensively reduce overall model-mispricing of anomalous portfolios 
before being widely accepted as the best available option.  
While this approach has become standard practice when testing data reduction techniques, the 
same hurdle is seldom applied to the development of new rational models. On the contrary, 
researchers often develop rational models to explain the returns of a single anomaly. One of the 
testing methods associated with this approach is to regress the performance of a single anomaly 
on the new rational benchmark. The new model is considered successful if it reduces alpha. An 
analogous approach is to suggest that an anomaly has significant alphas but that it performs poorly 
across alternative assessment metrics (such crash risk) or that it underperforms in specific high 
marginal utility states of the world (such as recessions). These forms of ‘testing in isolation’ (testing 
on a single anomaly) have produced an ‘overabundance’ of rational explanations, whereby multiple 
risks can explain the same anomaly.  
The problem can be traced back to isolated testing. Researchers can explain the performance 
of an anomaly using the new model. However, the same model needs to also explain alternative 
anomalies or portfolios of premiums to be considered a rational model. Reasoning more 
intuitively, a priced risk should not be diversifiable. Anomalies can have crash risk but if crashes 
occur in different states of the world, then the portfolio of premiums will diversify the risk. In the 
extreme case, a new rational model may make things worse if it prescribes returns for alternative 
anomalies that are further from observation. Therefore, for existing ‘rational’ explanations, a valid 
out-of-sample test is their ability to explain alternative anomalies or portfolios of premiums.  
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The paper uses two examples to empirically illustrate the point: (1) recession risk, and (2) crash 
risk. More specifically, when it comes to cross-sectional stock momentum, it is often argued that 
it is subject to extreme crashes (Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015; Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016) or that 
it performs poorly in recession states (Chordia & Shivakumar, 2002). Multi-premium portfolios 
that contain both passive and active bets manage to curtail crash risk to passive investing levels 
and to significantly improve recession performance. In other words, crash risk is diversifiable while 
recession risk makes anomalies even more anomalous. The empirical investigation demonstrates 
the effectiveness of portfolios as a simple universal tool for reducing idiosyncratic premium risks. 
More importantly, it shows the importance of out-of-sample testing for assessing new rational 
explanations. While testing on out-of-sample anomalies is common when assessing new data 
reduction techniques, we should put the same hurdle when assessing rational asset pricing models.  
The most closely related paper is Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013); they argue that the 
combination of value and momentum can diversify a set of risks (such as liquidity risk). In this 
paper, it is argued that the combination of active and passive premiums (premium investing) can 
diversify recession and crash risk and should be routinely used as one of the first steps for the 
assessment of rational anomaly explanations.  
  
2. Understanding anomalies  
2.1. Anomalous in relation to what? 
Over the past four decades, researchers have uncovered a variety of profitable rule-based active 
investment strategies. These strategies have been given a multitude of names depending on the 
setting in which they appear; anomalies, return predicting signals, factors, active bets, and, smart 
beta are just a few well suited and widely used names that this paper will also interchangeably 
adopt. And when it comes to academic work, these anomalies are truly widespread (Green, Hand 
& Zhang, 2013; Harvey, Liu & Zhu, 2015).  
The historical development of anomalies is inexorably intertwined with the empirical testing of 
the conditional CAPM. The returns to portfolios created by sorting assets on some specific 
characteristic were considered anomalous because they were not associated with a commensurate 
rise in risk. In the CAMP, the beta of a security with respect to aggregate wealth is synonymous 
for risk. Consequently, the absence of beta was considered anomalous (Cochrane, 2011). In this 
respect, the first generation of anomalies was initially developed as CAPM (with equity proxy) 
anomalies. Whenever researchers ‘test’ the CAPM with a proxy, they are testing if adding anomalies 
to the equity premium improves performance. Intuitively, time-series alphas imply that the 
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inclusion of anomalies will increase the risk-adjusted performance of a portfolio consisting of the 
right-hand side assets in a regression (Ferson, & Lin, 2014).  
 
2.1. CAPM failures and the rising acceptance of data reduction techniques 
Early tests of the CAPM discovered a wide variety of characteristic-sorted portfolios that 
provide significant equity beta-adjusted returns (Ball, 1978; Stattman, 1980; Banz, 1981; Basu, 
1983; Rosenberg, Reid, & Lanstein, 1985; Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok, 1991). This collection of 
first-generation anomalies was eventually subsumed by two characteristics: (1) book to market 
(value) and (2) market capitalization (size) (Fama & French, 1992). Not long after, momentum 
joined center stage (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993; Grundy & Martin, 2001) to form the Fama-French 
(FF)-Carhart model (Carhart, 1997).  
Regardless of Roll’s critique (Roll, 1977) and the inherent non-testability of the CAPM, over 
the years, researchers have used a variety of approaches in the hope that they will resurrect the 
underlying logic and intuition of the CAPM. Their hope was to obtain a positive coefficient on 
market betas and insignificant coefficients (alphas) for all the other factors (anomalies) in cross-
sectional (time-series) tests. This strand of work has mainly centered on better Bayesian estimates 
of betta (Vasicek, 1973; Karolyi, 1992), better proxies for the portfolio of aggregate wealth 
(Stambaugh, 1982; Jagannathan & Wang, 1996) and beta conditioning (Ferson & Harvey, 1999; 
Avramov & Chordia, 2006; Lewellen & Nagel, 2006).  
Even when successful at resurrecting the significance of beta, most studies failed to account for 
the anomalous alphas associated with core anomalies. For example, Avramov and Chordia (2006) 
find that the conditional CAPM cannot explain size, book to market, and momentum. Similarly, 
Lewellen and Nagel (2006) show that if the conditional CAPM truly holds, then deviations from 
the unconditional CAPM should be smaller than the ones observed empirically.  
 
2.2. Data reduction techniques 
Since early tests of the conditional CAPM failed to convincingly account for the main factors 
(size, value, and momentum), they became accepted in the literature and formed a new benchmark. 
Later studies had to face a higher hurdle; they needed to remain significant after controlling for 
the FF+ Carhart factors.  
The resulting empirically motivated FF+ Carhart model did not last long. An extensive second 
generation of anomalies soon followed (Sloan, 1996; Pontiff & Woodgate, 2008; Ang, Hodrick, 
Xing & Zhang, 2006; Asness, Frazzini, & Pedersen, 2015) and their excess returns could not be 
explained by a proportional rise in value, size, market or momentum betas. Consequently, they 
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were considered anomalous also in relation to the benchmark anomalies. And the ink was not yet 
dry on the five-factor model (Fama & French, 2015), when a third generation of anomalies started 
to appear and gain in prominence. Even more disturbingly, the ability of the five-factor model to 
subsume or even dominate the existing multitude of anomalies remains highly questionable 
(Green, Hand, & Zhang 2014).  
Empirically motivated models often do a reasonable job at data reduction, but they do not 
explain the underlying causes of anomalies. Resultantly, failure to resuscitate the CAPM has 
separated investigations into data reduction techniques that summarize signal information in a 
concise format useful for out-of-sample prediction and assessing new anomalies but devoid of 
economic content (such as the Fama-French models or models based on principal component 
analysis); and investigations that try to explain anomalies. The next section summarizes the later 
strand of work which is of more interest in this paper (Figure 1).  
 
2.3. Revisiting anomaly explanations  
Our inability to subsume anomalies via CAPM modifications has driven the emergence of four 
strands of anomaly explanations. They are broadly grouped into (1) errors in estimation stories, 
(2), rational stories (3) behavioral stories and (4) implementation stories.  
Error in estimation stories focus on faults with the data or construction process. In effect, 
errors in estimation stories do not explain anomalies but question their existence. Consequently, 
the validity of error in estimation concerns can eliminate the predictive significance of anomalies 
and cast doubt on their true historical population relevance. To deal with error in estimation, out-
of-sample tests in other markets (Fama & French, 2012), asset classes (Asness, Moskowitz, & 
Pedersen, 2013) or time frames (Davis, 1994; Chabot, Ghysels, & Jagannathan, 2014) are often 
employed. Alternatively, to account for extensive data-mining, it is also possible to adopt the 
complementary multiple hypothesis testing approach which requires profitable strategies to pass a 
higher t-statistic hurdle (Harvey, Liu, & Zhu, 2015). Assuming the evidence is strong enough to 
pass the existence hurdle, a key issue that needs to be examined is why the average investor prefers 
a particular side of a bet. Behavioral and rational stories are competing explanations for anomaly 
existence.  
Rational stories rely on the key concept of high marginal utility states. Investors prefer a 
particular side of an active bet because it has positive realizations in periods of high marginal utility. 
In a sense, the CAPM is the ultimate rational story and it designates periods of low aggregate 
wealth as high marginal utility states. 
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 Behavioral stories on the other hand, claim that the average investor chooses a particular side 
of the bet because: (1) he derives non-monetary utility from his bet (non-standard preferences), 
(2) is subject to some bias that leads him to wrongfully assess the probabilities of the bet (errors 
in expectations) (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) 
or (3) prefers a particular side of the bet due to constraints (rational but constrained; segmented 
markets) (Frazzini & Pedersen, 2013; Blitz & Vilet, 2007). Behavioral stories suggest that 
mispricing is a source of excess income for unconstrained investors that do not share the same 
non-standard preferences. 
When it comes to non-standard preferences, the distinction between rational and behavioral 
becomes blurred. Is a preference for ‘moral dividends’ irrational? In a sense, all preferences are 
behavioral; people prefer safer cash flows over riskier cash flows. Having mentioned this caveat, 
it is useful to keep the accepted terminology ‘rational’ to refer to a commonly accepted set of 
normative preferences. The distinction between rational and behavioral is particularly relevant 
when normative preferences are ‘tested’ against behavioral explanations in which investors make 
errors.    
Assuming we have established that an anomaly exists, and we have a good story to justify its 
existence, an important question to consider is anomaly implementation. Even if anomalies exist 
and have a behavioral explanation, can they still be traded profitably? Implementation stories 
examine if executing an anomaly bet is impossible due to (1) transaction costs (Frazzini, Israel & 
Moskowitz, 2012; Novy-Marx & Velikov, 2016), (2) shorting and leverage constraints (Bekjarovski, 
2018), or (3) an inability to execute in real time (Lewellen, 2015). In this respect, implementation 
stories do not explain why anomalies arise, which is what the rational-behavioral debate tackles. 
Rather implementation stories can motivate why anomalies persist. For example, following a price 
distorting demand shock induced by irrational investor behavior, market prices do no adjust as 
shrewd investors face difficulty placing offsetting bets.  
When trying to explain anomalies we can take one of two routes. We either claim a rational 
explanation and test if it can explain a multitude of anomalies; or alternatively, we test a behavioral 
explanation which we combine with limits to arbitrage. The behavioral explanation, unlike the 
rational explanation, need not be common across anomalies. The next section lays out some 
general concerns about existing rational and behavioral theories.  
 
2.4. Common problems with rational and behavioral theories 
A commonly expressed concern with behavioral theories is that they have difficulty explaining 
the comovement between stocks in portfolios sorted on anomalous characteristics (Cochrane, 2011). 
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Comovement and behavioral explanations are not inconsistent. Nevertheless, as Cochrane (2011) 
points out, theoretical behavioral models that motivate both alpha and the comovement pattern 
are rare.   
Rational models, on the other hand, have difficulty accounting for the lack of comovement 
across anomalies. The various active bets seem unrelated (or even negatively correlated) which 
makes fitting a single rational model difficult. To understand the intuition of this statement, 
consider the extreme case whereby two tradable portfolios with positive excess returns are 
perfectly negatively correlated. Such a setting would lead to an arbitrage opportunity which cannot 
be explained by any rational asset pricing model. More generally, the more independent anomalies 
researchers discover the closer we are moving from model mispricing to violations of the law of 
one price; that is, developing a rational model becomes more difficult as we move from a single 
anomaly with extensive idiosyncratic risk to uncorrelated multi-premium combinations.  
This reasoning is well understood through the Hansen-Jagganathan bound which places a high 
hurdle on rational theories (Appendix A develops the argument formally). If we find the magnitude 
of the equity premium puzzling (Mehra & Prescott, 1985), consider fitting something four times 
as large, which is what the passive-active combination in this paper implies. Yet, the literature is 
filled with papers claiming they can rationally explain anomalies; usually by matching individual 
anomalies with specific environment mapping variables. The next section turns to pitfalls in 
reasoning and testing which can cause this overabundance of rational explanations.   
 
2.5. Pitfalls in the empirical testing of rational models 
Empirical investigations of rational models can have two issues: (1) risk model mining and (2) 
isolated risk model testing. Risk model mining occurs when a researcher looks at anomaly 
performance to identify loss periods and then proceeds to test environment mapping variables 
that would define them as high marginal utility states. The anomalies aren’t arbitrage opportunities. 
Inevitably there will be periods in which losses are made. What is needed is a clear normative a 
priori argumentation as to why a variable is used. We want to test explanations rather than forming 
them ex-post for each premium by conveniently splitting the sample. Analogous to the standard 
arguments against data mining (Harvey, Liu & Zhu, 2015), testing for an array of rational anomaly 
explanations will inevitably lead to a significant finding by chance.  
The problem of model mining is exacerbated by the second issue which is the tendency to test 
risk explanations in isolation. In the absence of market segmentation, pricing needs to hold for all 
valid assets (‘for all assets i’ in asset pricing models). We do not have one model to price stock A 
and another to price stock B. Consequently, rational explanations ought to explain all valid 
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anomalies and portfolios of anomalies (as the HJ bound also implies). At the very least, new 
rational models should not make other anomalies even more anomalous; that is, they should not 
prescribe expected returns for other anomalies that are even further from observation.   
Resultantly, a valid out-of-sample test for existing premium specific rational explanations is 
their ability to explain alternative anomalies. To demonstrate the relevance of the approach, the 
paper empirically shows that recessions and crashes are anomaly specific which invalidates their 
use as risk stories (Chordia & Shivakumar, 2002; Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015; Daniel & 
Moskowitz, 2016).  
 
3. Methodological issues and methods to assess performance 
3.1. Benchmark choice and bond-anomaly independence 
The performance of anomalies will be assessed relative to a passive benchmark consisting of 
the equity, term structure, and default premium.  The choice to use the term structure and default 
premium is grounded in the work of Fama and French (1993) who find that they capture, along 
with the equity premium, most of the bonds return variation1. Bond premiums were included to 
raise the hurdle and show the diversification potential of anomalies above and beyond the impact 
of simple bond-stock combinations. 
 
3.2. The Sharpe and Sortino Ratio 
Sharpe ratios are the most well-known metric for assessing portfolio performance and they take 
center stage. The statistical significance of Sharpe ratio differences is estimated using the Ledoit & 
Wolf (2008) bootstrap test2. The paper also shows the annualized Modigliani & Modigliani (M2) 
performance measure which volatility matches strategies to a benchmark3. M2 has intuitive appeal, 
which is why it accompanies the results; however, it cannot qualify as a new measure as it is simply 
a restatement of the Sharpe ratio.   
                                                          
1 Investors can get exposure to these premiums by buying (long term) corporate (and government) 
bonds.  
2 Previous drafts arrived at equivalent conclusions using the Jobson & Korki’s (1981) statistic 
augmented with Memmel’s (2003) adjustment as well as Opdyke’s tests (2007). Ledoit & Wolf’s 
bootstrap test is preferred as it better accounts for non-normality and serial correlation in Sharpe 
ratios. Memmel (2003) does not account for either non-normal returns or serial correlation while 
Opdyke (2007) does not account for serial correlation. Serial correlation can be an issue for the 
denominator in the Sharpe ratio due to volatility clustering (Ledoit & Wolf, 2008).  
3 M2 is defined as: M2 = R  .Where R  and σ  are the annualized return and volatility of the 
portfolio and σ  is the annualized volatility of the benchmark. 
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Anomalies are notorious for having highly asymmetric distributions (Figure 2) (for performance 
evaluation under asymmetric returns see Eling & Schuhmacher, 2007). To corroborate conclusions 
in the presence of non-normally distributed returns, the paper also uses higher moments as well 
as the Sortino ratio which is an alteration of the Sharpe ratio that uses downside deviation as the 





∑ (min(0, 𝑅 − 𝑇))
 
Where R is the average period return, T is the ‘target’ return, and 𝑅  is the return in period t. 
With downside deviation, only returns falling below a certain threshold are considered risky. Since 
the paper investigates the performance of zero-cost portfolios, the natural target for downside 
deviation is zero. Sortino ratios also indicate how close investment strategies are to an arbitrage 
opportunity. Intuitively, a zero-cost portfolio that provides positive returns without downside 
deviation is the definition of arbitrage. Moreover, large Sortino ratios also indicate the absence of 
large losses which is especially relevant for compounded performance. These characteristics make 
Sortino ratios particularly well suited to the assessment of anomalies.  
 
3.3. Recession Performance 
Finally, the paper investigates anomalies’ recession performance. The choice is intuitive as 
recessions lead to a drop in labor income which is a noteworthy risk for most investors. Moreover, 
consumption falls in recessions (closer to habit; Campbell and Cochrane, 1995), which makes good 
returns particularly valuable (Cohrane, 2017). Consequently, recessions have a reasonably strong 
prior. It is therefore interesting to examine if they are a valid out-of-sample explanation or a 
premium specific risk.  
 
3.4. Anomaly construction method 
The most common methods for constructing and examining anomalies are (1) portfolio sorts 
and (2) Fama-MacBeth regressions. Fama-MacBeth regressions produce a time-series of cross-
sectional estimates (Fama & MacBeth, 1973) which have an interpretation of mean long-short 
hedge portfolios returns (Fama 1976, Chapter 9; Campbell 2014). The sorting approach on the 
other hand, places securities in portfolios based on the value of a specific characteristic. An 




Fama-MacBeth regressions and portfolio sorts have subtle differences, such as the effect of 
small stocks on the estimates (Fama & French 2008), nevertheless, they are conceptually equivalent 
given that portfolio sorts are the same as nonparametric cross-sectional regressions (see Cochrane 
(2011) for a visual illustration). It is common practice to apply both approaches when developing 
new anomalies and they generally provide equivalent conclusions (see the consistency of results 
across approaches in Fama & French, 2008). There is a very simple way to think about anomaly 
construction. All approaches make use of a panel data set containing an array of forecasting signal 
(Cochrane, 2011). These signals can be used to select securities and construct active portfolios. 
The paper will use value-weighted decile sorts, where applicable, as the focus is placed on the 
performance of tradable portfolios. On average, equally weighted sorts provide stronger results 
(Green, Hand & Zhang, 2013) given that anomalies are often more pronounced in microcaps 
(Fama & French 2008). However, equally weighted (EW) portfolios are costlier to execute as they 
require rebalancing back to equal weights following monthly return realizations. Moreover, EW 
portfolios require a disproportionately high trading volume in small stocks. In fact, empirical 
studies show that EW portfolios have two to three times the transaction costs of VW portfolios 
(Novy-Marx & Velikov, 2015).  Fama-MacBeth estimates have similar issues. They can be 
influenced extensively by microcaps, which are plentiful in the population and tend to take more 
extreme values in the characteristics (Fama & French 2008). Furthermore, the approach would 
also be inappropriate for anomalies such as betting against beta (Frazzini & Pedersen, 2014) which 
require further transformations before application.  
The use of quintile rather than decile portfolios is another modeling alternative. Quintile 
portfolios have lower average idiosyncratic volatility due to the larger number of stocks per 
portfolio. However, quintile sorts have higher anomaly correlations due to the presence of a larger 
number of overlapping stocks. It is worth noting that overlapping stocks do not negatively 
influence the results above and beyond their impact on correlations. In fact, they can reduce the 
transaction costs of the overall portfolio when they give opposite trading recommendations.   
 
3.5. Data Description 
The main investigation uses US monthly return series for 13 zero-cost long-short decile 
portfolios constructed from 07/1963 until 12/2014. The paper gives all zero-cost long-short 
portfolios the general designation ‘premiums’, given that they all have positive average realized 
returns. The shorthand notation for the premiums used throughout the paper is as follows, MKT 
is the equity premium, GOV is the term structure premium (Asvanunt & Richardson, 2016), 
CORP is the default premium (Asvanunt & Richardson, 2016), SMB is the size (Banz, 1981; Fama 
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& French, 1992, 2008, 2015), BTM is value (Rosenberg, Reid, & Lanstein, 1985; Chan, Hamao, & 
Lakonishok, 1991, Fama & French, 1992, 2008, 2015), RWM is profitability (Cohen, Gompers, & 
Vuolteenaho, 2002; Fama & French, 2008, 2015), CMA is investment (Fairfield, Whisenant, & 
Yohn 2003; Titman, Wei, & Xie, 2004; Fama & French, 2015), WML is momentum (Jegadeesh & 
Titman, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 2008), IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility (Ang, 
Hodrick, Xing & Zhang, 2006), QUAL is quality (Asness, Frazzini & Pedersen, 2015), BAB is 
betting against beta (Frazzini & Pedersen, 2014), AC is accruals (Sloan, 1996; Fama & French, 
2008) and NI is net share issuance (Daniel & Titman, 2006; Pontiff & Woodgate, 2008; Fama & 
French, 2008). Return series were taken as given from previous work to enable ease of result 
replicability4. The construction procedure for each premium follows the specifics determined by 
the last paper cited. Interested readers can see the original papers for the details on anomaly 
construction. For ease of communication, the paper refers to MKT, GOV and CORP as the 
traditional premiums or passive bets. Remaining premiums are referred to as anomalies or active 
bets. All the anomalies, except betting against beta, are value-weighted; betting against beta is 
constructed using the methodology of Frazzini & Pedersen (2013) whereby weights are assigned 
based on beta ranks. In later sections, the paper demonstrates that the conclusions are not sensitive 
to the choice of anomalies. Recession data was obtained from the US national bureau of economic 
research (NBER). Recessions are defined as periods between peak and trough.  
 
4. Results 
4.1. Understanding the data: the premiums as stand-alone investments 
Table 1 summarizes premium information and reveals several interesting patterns. First and 
foremost, the results show that premiums have highly asymmetric return distributions consistent 
with claims in the literature (Barroso & Santa-Clara, 2015; Daniel & Moskowitz, 2016). Skewness 
and kurtosis tend to be quite large and the Jarque-Bera test rejects all the normality hypothesis.  
However, skewness does not seem to have a universal sign deviation as five of the examined 
premiums have negative skewness while eight of them have positive skewness. Consequently, if 
skewness was a valid anomaly explanation, more than half of the active bets would become even 
more anomalous. Similarly, when it comes to kurtosis, it is difficult to explain why a premium goes 
in a particular direction as the opposite short-long bet can crash as well. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, higher moment explanations also assume that higher moment risks are not 
diversifiable. In the case of kurtosis, they assume that the multitude of premiums experience 
                                                          
4 Special thanks to Fama, French, Frazzini, Pedersen, Asness, Asvanunt and Richardson for 
providing public access to their data.  
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crashes simultaneously. This paper argues that the reduction of crash and skewness risk resulting 
from multi-premium combinations, along with the absence of a singular sign deviation of 
individual anomalies when it comes to skewness, are strong indications of the irrelevance of higher 
moment explanations for anomalies.  
Second, except for the equity premium, all remaining portfolios have positive average returns 
in recessions. In fact, value, quality, idiosyncratic volatility, investments and net issuance, have 
higher than average returns during recessions (Table 1). This finding is in fact intuitive. In a crisis, 
most stocks will lose in value. But highly volatile junk stocks can be expected to have an above 
average plunge. Since these stocks form the short positions in the respective anomaly portfolios, 
it is only natural that the accompanying anomalies do well in recessions. However, recessions are 
also accompanied by an increase in volatility (see SD recessions in Table 1). Therefore, with 
investment being the exception, recession performance is not statistically significant.  
Table 2 shows that average correlations among the various strategies are remarkably low which 
implies significant diversification potential. The choice of Pearson or Spearman correlations does 
not meaningfully alter the results. Among the strategies, the equity premium has the lowest average 
correlation. Bond premiums are also uncorrelated with each other and on average with the rest of 
the anomalies. In fact, relative to the equity premium, the correlation matrix suggests that 
anomalies show greater diversification potential than the bond premiums.   
Concerning recession performance, plotting the data illustrates a noteworthy preliminary 
pattern (Figure 3). The equity premium has contrasting performance relative to anomalies such as 
idiosyncratic volatility and quality specifically during recession periods.  
 
5. Premium Portfolios 
5.1. Portfolio choice 
The investigation turns to multi-premium portfolios. The main objective is to investigate 
performance improvement across alternative performance dimensions such as recessions and 
crashes. The analysis makes use of five equally weighted portfolios. The traditional portfolio (TP) 
is a combination of the equity, term structure and default premiums. It proxies for investors’ long-
short version of a passive bond-stock investment. Size-value-momentum (SVM) represents a basic 
anomaly portfolio. The factor portfolio (FP) is an EW portfolio of all anomalies. It represents 
factor investing with an expanded anomaly universe. The mixed portfolio (MP) is a per premium 
EW portfolio. It represents a passive-active portfolio benchmark tilted towards active premiums. 
Finally, the balanced portfolio (BP) is a classification EW portfolio. It represents a balanced 
investment in active and passive investments.  
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An alternative to equal weights is the use of dynamic weights as prescribed by optimization 
techniques. However, past research indicates that alternative optimization methods underperform 
a naïve equally weighted benchmark out-of-sample due to estimation error (De Miguel, Garlappi 
& Uppal, 2009). Moreover, using equal weights is conservative as optimization techniques 
(especially in-sample) can further enhance the performance of an expanded universe and therefore 
even further corroborate the conclusions.  
 
5.2. The risk-adjusted performance of passive-active combinations 
The multi-premium portfolio investigation suggests that passive-active combinations work well 
across all performance measures (Table 3). Both the premium portfolio (PP) and the balanced 
portfolio (BP) offer an economically sizable improvement in Sharpe ratios relative to the 
traditional portfolio (TP). M2 intuitively captures the magnitude of this improvement. The M2 of 
the balanced portfolio is 20.08% compared to only 7.83% for the traditional portfolio. The 
improvement in Sharpe ratios is statistically significant at the 1% level for the balanced portfolio 
and at 2% level for the premium portfolio. Transitioning from a factor portfolio to a balanced 
portfolio also results in an economically large and statistically significant improvement in Sharpe 
ratios.  
 
5.3. Higher moments and the Sortino ratio 
When it comes to skewness, we can see that multi-asset portfolios do not significantly deviate 
from normality. Excess kurtosis is an issue for the factor portfolio. However, in relative terms, the 
balanced portfolio has the smallest kurtosis. As figure 4 illustrates, and as the downside deviation 
statistic corroborates, the balanced portfolio does not have any large losses. The crash risk of 
individual premiums seems to be idiosyncratic.  
The Sortino ratio provides an equivalent performance ordering as the Sharpe Ratio (Table 4). 
In fact, the Sortino ratio for passive-active portfolios is exceptionally high (0.69 for the balanced 
portfolio relative to 0.22 for the traditional portfolio). The improvement can be attributed to both 
an increase in returns and a decrease in downside deviations. In fact, as we move from the 
traditional to the balanced portfolio, downside deviations fall by more than a half.  
The results show that the momentum crashes considered in Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) 
and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) are in fact premium specific. Complicated methods are not 
required to deal with crashes. Multi-premium portfolios are a simple universal tool that can be 




5.4. Recession performance 
The high recession returns of the factor portfolio suggest that active premiums have a role to 
play in improving recession performance. The factor portfolio itself does not have significant 
recession returns. However, the premium and balanced portfolios have positive and statistically 
significant raw recession returns (t-statistics above 2). This suggests that passive-active 
combinations are specifically well suited to reducing recession volatility (and volatility in general) 
(Table 3). Overall, the result suggests that investors that hold passive-active portfolios can improve 
recession performance and even diversify recession risk.  
 
5.5. Rolling betas and performance persistence 
The strong performance of the balanced portfolio can be attributed to the strong negative 
relation between active and passive strategies. The unconditional lambda of the factor portfolio, 
with respect to the traditional portfolio, stands at surprising -0.41 (see Figure 5). There is a valid 
concern that correlations among asset classes and markets can increase over time (Bekaert, 
Hodrick, & Zhang, 2009) and rise sharply in recessions. However, rolling least squares estimates 
suggest that this is not the case when it comes to active and passive bets. The beta of the factor 
portfolio on the traditional portfolio does not rise during crisis; in fact, it takes a favorable turn 
and sharply falls during the dot-com bubble before bouncing back close to unconditional levels. 
Despite the use of a limited set of observations for estimation, all the rolling beta estimates are 
reliably smaller than zero at a 99% confidence level; this implies a strong persistence to the negative 
relationship between active and passive bets. When it comes to outperformance persistence, Figure 
6 illustrates that the outperformance of the balanced portfolio does not come from a sub-period.  
 
6. Robustness Check: Performance ordering with anomaly exclusion 
6.1. Performance as a function of the number of anomalies 
The previous section showed that anomalies, as a group, can improve upon passive portfolio 
performance across an array of performance measures. To investigate the sensitivity of the results 
to the specific choice of anomalies, Table 5 shows simulation results whereby all possible equally 
weighted sets of balanced portfolios are progressively constructed. The simulation has two goals: 
(1) to discover the cut-off point, in terms of the number of anomalies utilized, where the worst 
performing balanced portfolio still outperforms the traditional portfolio and (2) to investigate the 
sensitivity of the results to the anomaly choice.   
The results reveal that the average Sharpe ratio of the balanced portfolios is always economically 
larger than that of the traditional portfolio (Table 5). For example, a balanced portfolio constructed 
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using four anomalies has an average Sharpe ratio that is twice as large as the Sharpe ratio of the 
traditional portfolio. As the number of anomalies increases, the improvement in performance 
becomes stronger (Figure 7). As expected, the use of more anomaly assets improves the 
distribution of achievable performance by removing premium specific risk.  
The inclusion of any set of three anomalies to the traditional portfolio always offers a better 
Sharpe ratio relative to the traditional portfolio. This means that even if seven of the most 
performance enhancing anomalies were excluded from the analysis, the balanced portfolio would 
have still outperformed in terms of Sharpe ratios. 
 Sortino ratios provide equivalent conclusions (Table 5). The maximum, average and minimum 
Sortino ratio, are monotonically increasing with the set of invested anomalies. Adding the three 
worst performing anomalies to the balanced portfolio provides a better Sortino Ratio relative to 
the traditional portfolio.  
Given that time is fixed across portfolios, t-statistics represent scaled Sharpe ratios. 
Consequently, focus can be shifted from recession raw returns and Sharpe ratios to recession t-
statistics. The goal is to investigate the proportion of balanced portfolios that offer statistically 
significant recession performance. 
The results reveal that recession return t-statistics display an even stronger pattern than Sharpe 
and Sortino ratios (Table 5). The inclusion of any anomaly would improve the recession Sharpe 
ratio of the balanced portfolio above the level achieved by the traditional portfolio. Above and 
beyond that, recession return t-statistics larger than 2 are quite common. More than 30% of 
portfolios containing at least six anomalies exhibit robustness to recession performance (t-statistics 
larger than 2). The average t-statistics of recession performance is monotonically increasing from 
1.16 for one anomaly, to 1.85 for six anomalies. The improvement can be considered sizable given 
that the recession return t-statistic of the traditional portfolio is only 0.37. Again, the improvement 
in recession performance is on top of the favorable recession effect of bond premiums. Overall, 
the simulation results show that the conclusions are not dependent on the anomaly choice.  
 
6.2. Compounded performance  
Passive-active combinations perform significantly better than passive portfolios across all three 
dimensions: (1) Sharpe Ratio, (2) crash metrics and (3) recession performance. The results do not 
seem to suggest that this outperformance is limited to a sub-period or that it depends strongly on 
the choice of anomalies. As Figure 8 shows, the magnitude of risk-adjusted performance 
improvement is substantial. This improvement comes in addition to the fact that passive-active 
portfolios do specifically well in recessions. Figure 8 also shows the performance of the 
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counterparty portfolio and the high hurdle that rational explanations face. Equilibrium rational 
risk theories would have to explain the huge spread between the balanced portfolio (M2 = 20%) 
and the counterparty portfolio (M2 = -3.7%) whilst taking also into account the fact that the 
balanced portfolio does better in recessions and does not experience large crashes. For future 
work, it would be interesting to examine if variants of models based on long-run risk (Bansal, & 
Yaron 2004), consumption growth, and alternative preference structures (Barberis, Huang, & 
Santos, 2001) are better suited for explaining the cross-section of premiums. This paper showed 
why in general, raising the hurdle on rational tests is important.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The facts are simple. Adding anomalies to your passive portfolio diversifies recession risk and 
helps control crash risk. The reduction of these risks suggests that they cannot account for 
anomalies and are not valid risk explanations. In short, not only are anomalies profitable but they 
also hedge. Robustness checks reveal that the conclusions are not sensitive to the choice of 
anomalies. 
The empirical findings show why rational anomaly explanations should be tested out-of-sample. 
Trying to rationally explain the performance of a single anomaly is likely to lead to idiosyncratic 
findings. Consequently, one of the first steps for assessing rational asset pricing models should be 
to test their “out-of-sample” explanatory power on portfolios of premiums.  
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Figure 1: Anomaly research.  This figure summarizes the historical development of active 




Figure 2: Momentum returns. This figure displays the frequency of monthly realized returns for 





Figure 3: Panel A: Performance of Demeaned Characteristic Bets. This figure displays the 
average demeaned 12-month rolling performance of the equity premium (MKT) and quality 
(QUAL). Panel B: Rolling Sharpe Ratios. This figure displays the 12-month rolling Sharpe ratio 
for the equity premium (MKT) and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). Gray rectangles indicate 





Figure 4: Balanced portfolio returns. This figure displays the frequency of monthly realized 




Figure 5: Rolling betas. This figure shows the 10-year rolling beta of the factor portfolio on the 
traditional portfolio with the corresponding 99% confidence intervals. The full sample 
unconditional estimate is shown in red. (TP) is constructed as an EW portfolio of equity (MKT), 
term structure (GOV) and default (CORP) premiums. The factor portfolio (FP) is constructed as 
an equally weighted portfolio of size, value, profitability, investment, momentum, idiosyncratic 













Figure 6: Outperformance persistence. This figure displays the 12-month rolling Sharpe ratio 
for the traditional portfolio (TP) and the balanced portfolio (BP). The traditional portfolio (TP) is 
constructed as an EW portfolio of equity (MKT), term structure (GOV) and default (CORP) 
premiums. The balanced portfolio is constructed as an EW combination of the traditional (TP) 





Figure 7: The distribution of Sharpe ratios as a function of the number of anomalies. This 
figure displays the distribution of balanced portfolios’ Sharpe ratios as the number of anomalies 
included in the factor portfolio increases. The Sharpe ratio of the traditional portfolio is 0.14 and 
is displayed with a red dotted line. The Sharpe ratios of portfolios constructed with a lower (higher) 





Figure 8: Compounded performance: dollar cost averaging the volatility matched 
portfolios. This figure displays end of sample compounded performance of volatility-matched 
dollar-cost-averaged portfolios that invest 100$ monthly and reinvests the proceeds. Dollar cost 
averaging reduces the impact of early investing months. Portfolios are leveraged to have an 
equivalent full sample annual volatility as the equity premium (equivalent logic as M2). The dotted 
line represents the ‘no investment’ portfolio, which in the case of zero-cost investing is the size of 
the position. MKT is the equity premium. TP is the traditional portfolio which is an equally 
weighted combination of the equity (MKT), terms structure (GOV) and default premiums 
(CORP). The balanced portfolio (BP) is an EW combination of the traditional (TP) and factor 
portfolio (FP) (comprised of SMB, BTM, RMW, CMA, WML, IVOL, QUAL, BAB, ACC and 
NI). The counterparty portfolio (CP) takes the opposite bet by buying the traditional portfolio and 





Table 1: Data summary. This table shows summary statistics for anomalies constructed using 
monthly US data from 07/1963 until 12/2014. MKT is the equity premium, GOV is the term 
structure premium, CORP is the default premium, SMB is the size, BTM is value, RWM is 
profitability, CMA is investment, WML is momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, QUAL is 
quality, BAB is betting against beta, AC is accruals, NI is net share issuance and μ is the average 
value. The target for the Sortino ratio and downside deviation is zero. ‘M2’ is the annualized 
Modigliani & Modigliani measure which volatility matches strategies to the equity premium. ‘JB’ is 
the Jarque-Bera test for normality. The critical values for the test are 4.38 (10%), 5.88 (5%), 10.53 
(1%). Maximum drawdown (‘Max DR’) is the maximum percentage drop from a peak. T-statistics 
for the mean are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors of White (1980). 
Statistical significance of differences in Sharpe ratios is calculated using the Ledoit-Wolf bootstrap 
test (with equity premium as benchmark).   
  MKT GOV CORP SMB BTM RMW CMA 
R 0.51% 0.24% 0.13% 0.33% 0.51% 0.21% 0.46% 
t-stat 2.83 2.01 2.49 1.68 2.72 1.29 3.57 
R recession -0.35% 0.45% 0.28% 0.15% 0.67% 0.19% 0.89% 
t-stat -0.51 0.98 1.09 0.27 1.04 0.43 2.30 
SD 4.46% 2.99% 1.34% 4.83% 4.63% 3.97% 3.23% 
SD recessions 6.43% 4.38% 2.44% 5.31% 6.11% 4.32% 3.69% 
M2 6.26% 4.39% 5.39% 3.68% 6.02% 2.80% 7.87% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.14 
p-val Bootstrap  0.58 0.78 0.37 0.94 0.43 0.67 
Skew -0.54 0.34 -0.13 0.74 0.55 0.22 0.34 
t-stat -5.5 3.5 -1.3 7.5 5.6 2.3 3.4 
Ex. Kurtosis 1.94 2.29 9.16 4.22 2.41 2.81 2.06 
t-stat 9.9 11.6 46.5 21.4 12.2 14.2 10.5 
JB test 127 147 2162 515 181 208 131 
Max DR 56% 56% 21% 83% 52% 60% 32% 
Target DD 3.08% 1.92% 0.90% 2.99% 2.82% 2.66% 1.96% 
Sortino Ratio 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.24 
        
Continued WML IVOL QUAL BAB AC NI Μ 
R 1.32% 0.47% 0.42% 0.83% 0.40% 0.43% 0.48% 
t-stat 4.73 1.49 2.37 6.36 3.50 3.34 2.95 
R recession 0.40% 1.30% 0.88% 0.18% 0.11% 0.69% 0.45% 
t-stat 0.35 1.27 1.50 0.40 0.29 1.58 0.84 
SD 6.92% 7.85% 4.44% 3.24% 2.88% 3.18% 4.15% 
SD recessions 10.9% 9.8% 5.6% 4.3% 3.5% 4.2% 5.45% 
M2 10.9% 3.3% 5.2% 14.3% 7.7% 7.4% 6.56% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.19 0.06 0.10 0.26 0.14 0.13 0.12 
p-val 
Bootstrap  
0.34 0.53 0.83 0.03 0.69 0.79 0.58 
Skew -1.51 -0.32 0.02 -0.61 0.55 0.22 -0.01 
t-stat -15.3 -3.3 0.2 -6.2 5.6 2.2 -0.10 
Ex. Kurtosis 8.30 3.00 1.38 3.61 2.36 0.93 3.42 
t-stat 42.1 15.2 7.0 18.3 12.0 4.7 17.4 
JB test 2006 242 49 374 175 27 488 
Max DR 80% 84% 56% 52% 26% 36% 53% 
Target DD 4.94% 5.53% 2.91% 2.08% 1.71% 1.95% 2.73% 
Sortino Ratio 0.27 0.09 0.15 0.40 0.24 0.22 0.18 
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Table 2: Correlation. This table reports Spearman correlation coefficients. Numbers below 
(above) the diagonal are the correlations (p-values). MKT is the equity premium, GOV is the term 
structure premium, CORP is the default premium, SMB is the size, BTM is value, RWM is 
profitability, CMA is investment, WML is momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, QUAL is 
quality, BAB is betting against beta, AC is accruals and NI is net share issuance. 
 
Rho/Sig. MKT GOV CORP SMB BTM RMW CMA WML IVOL QUAL BAB AC NI 
MKT  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
GOV 0.15  0.41 0.00 0.14 0.21 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.51 0.27 
CORP 0.27 0.03  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.01 
SMB 0.16 -0.13 0.11  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BTM -0.03 -0.06 0.15 0.34  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.45 
RMW -0.37 0.05 -0.17 -0.54 -0.38  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.40 0.00 
CMA -0.22 -0.03 0.01 0.12 0.46 -0.14  0.87 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
WML -0.12 0.03 -0.14 -0.07 -0.16 0.15 -0.01  0.04 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.07 
IVOL -0.61 0.17 -0.15 -0.57 -0.01 0.58 0.20 0.08  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QUAL -0.46 0.04 -0.18 -0.61 -0.42 0.78 -0.07 0.15 0.66  0.70 0.01 0.00 
BAB -0.08 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.27 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.27 0.02  0.22 0.00 
AC -0.14 0.03 0.01 -0.15 0.06 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.05  0.01 
NI -0.38 0.04 -0.10 -0.45 -0.03 0.44 0.30 0.07 0.60 0.56 0.15 0.10   
Average -0.15 0.04 0.00 -0.14 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.11 
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Table 3: Portfolios. The traditional portfolio (TP) is an EW combination of the equity, term 
structure and default premiums. The size-value-momentum portfolio (SVM) is an EW portfolio 
of size, value and momentum. The factor portfolio (FP) is an EW portfolio of the size, value, 
profitability, investments, momentum, idiosyncratic volatility, quality, betting against beta, accruals 
and net issuance.  The mixed portfolio (MP) is a per premium equally weighted portfolio 
containing all active and passive premiums. The balanced portfolio (BP) assigns an EW weight to 
the traditional and factor portfolio (per classification EW). The target for the Sortino ratio and 
downside deviation is zero. ‘M2’ is the annualized Modigliani & Modigliani measure which 
volatility matches strategies to a benchmark (the equity premium). ‘JB’ is the Jarque-Bera test for 
normality. The critical values for the test are 10% (4.38), 5% (5.88), 1% (10.53). Maximum 
drawdown (‘Max DR’) is the maximum percentage drop from a peak. T-statistics for the mean are 
computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors of White (1980). Statistical 
significance of differences in Sharpe ratios is calculated using the Ledoit-Wolf bootstrap test (LW 
Bootstrap p-val). The p-value for the Ledoit-Wolf Bootstrap TP and BP test is calculated with 
respect to the traditional portfolio (TP) and the balanced portfolio (BP) respectively (and the equity 
premium for the traditional portfolio). 
 Traditional  Factor Investing Premium Investing 
 Passive  Active  Passive-Active  
 TP SVM FP MP BP 
R 0.29% 0.72% 0.54% 0.48% 0.42% 
t-stat 3.58 5.65 6.38 8.05 9.12 
R recession 0.13% 0.41% 0.55% 0.45% 0.34% 
t-stat 0.37 1.03 1.74 2.10 2.01 
SD 2.05% 3.15% 2.09% 1.49% 1.13% 
SD recessions 3.29% 3.76% 2.99% 2.04% 1.59% 
M2 7.83% 12.64% 14.14% 17.79% 20.08% 
Skew -0.11 0.19 0.10 0.13 0.04 
t-stat -1.07 1.95 1.04 1.36 0.38 
Excess Kurtosis 1.32 3.36 6.40 6.40 1.31 
t-stat 6.71 17.06 32.47 32.48 6.67 
JB test 44.8 288.4 1035.4 1036.8 43.3 
Max DR 28.3% 25.0% 21.8% 14.9% 8.3% 
Target DD 1.32% 1.84% 1.27% 0.85% 0.60% 
Sortino Ratio 0.22 0.39 0.42 0.56 0.69 
Sharpe Ratio 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.37 
LW Bootstrap p-val (with TP) 0.225 0.173 0.149 0.016 0.000 
LW Bootstrap p-val (with BP) 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.222 / 
TP Beta / -0.08 -0.41 -0.08 0.30 
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Table 4: Expanding anomaly universe. This table displays the results for a simulation which 
calculates the Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio and recession return t-statistics for all possible balanced 
portfolio combinations. The balanced portfolio contains an equal weight in the traditional 
portfolio (MKT+GOV+CORP), which is fixed, and an equal weight in the factor portfolio, which 
contains a varying number of anomalies. The number of included anomalies in the factor portfolio 
is increased at every step without replacement and every possible combination of the investigated 
measure is calculated. The table displays the maximum, minimum and average of the distribution 
of the investigated measure.  ‘% (<Base)’ shows the percent of balanced portfolios that fall under 
the traditional portfolio. ‘% (<2)’ shows the percent of recession return t-statistics that are larger 




) given a universe of anomaly assets.  
 Number of Included Anomalies 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Max Sharpe 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.39 
Average Sharpe 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.33 
Min Sharpe 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 
TP Sharpe 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
% (<Base) 30.0% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
       
Max Sortino 0.48 0.55 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.69 
Average Sortino 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.51 0.55 0.59 
Min Sortino 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.28 0.35 0.43 
TP Sortino 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
% (<Base) 30.0% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
       
Max Recession Return 2.56 3.20 2.80 2.91 2.89 2.84 
Average Recession Return 1.16 1.43 1.59 1.70 1.78 1.85 
Min Recession Return  0.39 0.53 0.61 0.74 0.86 1.08 
TP Recession Return  0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
% (<Base) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
% (<2) 20% 16% 24% 25% 28% 30% 
       












Appendix A – Hansen-Jagganathan bound 
This section derives the Hansen-Jagganathan bound formally and discusses its intuition for 




𝐸 (𝑅 , )
𝜎 (𝑅 , )
 
Where 𝐸   is conditional expectation on today’s information 𝜎  is the standard deviation, 𝑀  is 
the stochastic discount factor and 𝑅 ,  is excess returns over the risk-free rate for asset i. The 
Hansen-Jagganathan (HJ) bound states that the portfolio of assets with the highest Sharpe ratio 
puts a lower bound on the volatility of the SDF (Shiller, 1982; Hansen & Jagannathan, 1991; 
Campbell, 2000). Decomposing a portfolio’s standard deviation gives further insights. 
𝜎 (𝑀 )
𝐸 (𝑀 )
 ≥  
𝐸 (𝑅 , )
∑ ∑ 𝑤 𝑤 𝜎 𝜎 𝑝
 
Where 𝜎  and 𝜎  is the standard deviation of comprising assets and 𝑝  is their correlation. Holding 
all else constant, as the correlation among premiums falls, the maximum Sharpe ratio of the 
combined strategy rises, which increases the difficulty of fitting a discount factor in the HJ bounds. 
Furthermore, if we assume absence of correlation between assets in an equally weighted portfolio, 
the bound reduces to: 
𝜎 (𝑀 )
𝐸 (𝑀 )
 ≥  





Where 𝜎  is the average standard deviation of comprising portfolio assets. As N goes to infinity 
the variance of the portfolio goes to zero. The HJ bound gives a good intuition as to why the 
existence of many uncorrelated positive excess return bets makes rational pricing more difficult.  
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Appendix B- Time-series regressions 
In this section, the paper examines if the term structure and default loadings are economically 
relevant and statistically significant and if anomalies have alphas in recessions controlling for their 
co-movement with bond premiums. The results and specifications are shown in Table 5. 
The first specification (Table 5) contains the traditional premiums as benchmark assets. The 
loadings on these assets represent a portfolio replicating anomaly performance. Exact replicability 
would imply the absence of alpha and the mean-variance efficiency of a portfolio constructed with 
the passive benchmark assets (Gibbons, Ross & Shanken, 1989). Insignificant alphas would imply 
substitutability between the passive and active bets. 
The first specification provides several noteworthy results. Looking at anomalies as a group, 
average loadings on all benchmark assets are very small.  The average loading is -0.27 for the equity 
premium, 0.1 for the term structure premium and 0.03 for the default premium. Surprisingly, the 
average loading on the market is lower than the average loading on bond premiums. In other 
words, stock anomalies comove more with bond premiums than the equity premium.  
As a group, anomalies are highly statistically significant as suggested by the high average alpha 
t-statistic of 3.86. This implies that loadings are not sufficiently large to annul anomaly significance. 
In fact, negative average loadings make average alphas (0.64%) larger than average anomaly excess 
returns (0.54%). 
Looking at the individual regressions, we can see that between anomaly variation in loadings is 
considerable. The average loading for the equity premium is negative; in fact, except for size, all 
anomalies have negative equity loadings. For seven of the ten examined anomalies, equity loadings 
are statistically smaller than zero.  
Anomalies based on characteristics associated with safety should comove more strongly with 
bonds. This hypothesis is supported by the data. As expected, IVOL has the strongest loading on 
the term structure premium. Similarly, quality, profitability and big (the reverse of size) have a 
statistically significant term structure loading. The result is in line with Baker and Wurgler (2012) 
who find that safe, large and profitable firms are more bond-like.  
Default loadings are on average very small and are only economically and statistically significant 
for value and momentum (0.63 and -0.84 respectively). However, the sign of the loadings is 
opposite. Momentum looks more profitable while value looks less like an anomaly when default 
loadings are considered. For six of the anomalies examined, the term structure and default loadings 
go in the opposite direction. Overall, the out-of-sample model tests show that the equity, term 
structure and default premium are irrelevant for explaining anomaly returns.  
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The second specification expands the benchmark regressions with a dummy variable for 
recessions. The end goal of this modification is to examine whether anomaly alphas are negative 
or reliably smaller during recessions after controlling for the term structure and default loadings. 
Intuitively, positive alpha should be even more important during recessions if they are high 
marginal utility states. Controlling for bond loadings is relevant as we already know that bond 
premiums have good recession performance (Table 1). Consequently, it is prudent to rule out the 
possibility that recession alphas cannot be attributed to anomalies’ bond-like features.  
Alpha (ά) can be interpreted as benchmark-adjusted expansion returns, while ά - r represents 
benchmark-adjusted recession returns (Table 5). The second specification reveals that anomaly 
alphas on average are not reliably lower in recessions (the average t-statistic on the recession 
dummy is -0.47). The exception is betting against beta. The recession alpha of BAB is lower than 
its expansion alpha and the result is marginally significant with a t-stat of -1.97. It seems that all of 
BAB’s alpha is outside recessions. Stated alternatively, during recessions, BAB returns are 
replicated well by the passive benchmark assets.  
The estimated recession dummies, despite being generally insignificant, do suggest that anomaly 
alphas are meaningfully lower in recessions (approximately 43% lower than outside recession). 
However, there is no evidence that recession alphas are negative. In other words, anomalies still 
outperform in recessions but not as much.  
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Appendix C - Fama-French benchmarks 
Benchmarking against anomalies that comprise the three-factor (Fama & French, 1993) or the 
five-factor model (Fama & French, 2015), also gives economically large and statistically significant 
alpha estimates that easily pass the new data mining adjusted t-statistics hurdles (Table 6). Even 
profitability passes the higher t-statistic hurdle of 3 when benchmarked against the FF3 premiums. 
In fact, the average alpha t-statistic of non-benchmark anomalies increases considerably when size 
and value are used as benchmarks (average alpha t-statistic of 5.35) instead of the term structure 
and default premiums (average alpha t-statistics of 4.34). This is intuitive as second-generation 
anomalies were developed as violations of the Fama-French three factor model. Overall, the result 
suggests that the use of a passive benchmark is not particularly lenient when it comes to assessing 
anomaly significance. Above and beyond that, it shows that non-benchmark anomalies are not 
linear combinations of benchmark anomalies. Conducting this specific robustness check has its 
merits but there are several notable drawbacks specific to this approach. First and foremost, 
anomaly alpha when benchmarked against other anomalies is meaningless if investors do not 
already hold the benchmark anomalies to begin with. In other words, if investors do not already 
hold size, value, investment, and profitability in their portfolio, benchmarking against them does 
not make much sense. Second, assessment with anomaly benchmarks is highly sensitive to the 
arbitrary choice of initial anomalies to be included in the benchmark. For example, if quality is first 
included in the benchmark, then the alpha of size becomes significant (Asness, Frazzini & 
Pedersen, 2015). Stated alternatively, the order of adding anomalies to the benchmark can matter. 
Finally, anomaly benchmarking is a data reduction technique and not a rational model. Having 
mentioned these caveats, the academic tradition of showing anomaly alpha with respect to other 
anomalies, as a complement to the regressions with passive proxies, is a good starting point for 
assessing between anomaly substitutability. 
 
Appendix D- Alpha decay and the use of excess returns for anomaly assessment 
 
Using equilibrium reasoning, and in the absence of frictions, the performance-enhancing 
potential of anomalies should be eroded by the price readjustment pressure induced by investors 
who arrive at equivalent conclusions. If investors have a subset of the benchmark and evaluation 
criteria proposed in this paper, they will assess anomaly attractiveness in an equivalent manner and 
commit to premium investing. In the process, they will put price pressure on anomalies and re-
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price assets until passive-active combinations are no longer attractive. In the context of time-series 
regressions, anomaly alphas should disappear.  
The question of decay has received some attention recently. McLean and Pontiff (2016) find a 
degree of post-publication raw return decay for an extensive array of anomalies5. While the 
significance of raw returns may indeed be relevant for the assessment of anomalies as stand-alone 
investments, it is not the right approach from an investment perspective. The assumption 
underlying the use of raw returns is that the evaluated asset is the only one in the investment 
universe. Alternatively, in the presence of other securities, the procedure assumes that betas with 
respect to benchmark assets are zero. The argument is best understood looking back at Figure 9. 
The only setting in which alpha and excess returns are equivalent, is when an asset’s beta to passive 
assets is zero.  
Having this reasoning in mind, it is easy to see that anomalies can offer value even in the absence 
of significant raw returns if they have sufficiently high diversification potential as captured by their 
low betas to existing invested assets. Stated alternatively, distance to the zero-cost security market 
line is more relevant than distance from zero. In fact, if return decay is coupled with a strong 
enough decline in betas, then alphas could theoretically become larger. Alternatively, alpha decay 
can also come via an increase in benchmark betas (this can also be understood via Figure 3 as a 
shift in observations to the right). Therefore, raw return decay is only a proxy for the true measure 
of anomaly profitability decay. As Figure 5 suggests, there has been a significant reduction of the 
factor to traditional beta in the past two decades (mainly concentrated during the dot com bubble). 
Consequently, researchers looking at excess return in this period, when betas declined sharply, 
could have derived erroneous conclusions regarding the profitability enhancing potential of 
anomalies. 
To assess anomaly alpha decay, the paper implements a two-step approach. In the first step, 
five year rolling anomaly alphas are estimated using the bond-stock benchmark. In the second 
step, anomaly alphas are regressed on a time trend. Since alphas are the explained variables in the 
second regression, potential measurement error will not cause bias and inconsistency in the time 
trend estimates. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 7. The sign for the time trend is negative 
for six and positive for four of the examined anomalies. However, only two of the positive time 
trend coefficients are associated with a t-statistic above 2. More specifically, the alphas of quality 
                                                          
5 Focusing on raw returns (or Sharpe ratios) is not limited to investigations of anomaly persistence. 
For example, Hou, Xue & Zhang (2014) declare 38 out of 80 anomalies to be insignificant based 
on the absence of raw returns. Similarly, Bali & Cakici (2008) criticize IVOL, among other issues, 
on its insufficient raw returns. 
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and profitability have increased over time. Overall, the results do not support the existence of strong 
alpha decay across anomalies.  
Finally, the paper estimates the rate of anomaly decay that would annul the usefulness of 
passive-active combinations. The procedure subtracts each month a constant from the raw returns 
of the factor portfolio. Following this modification, two tests are made: (1) an alpha significance 
test in a time-series regression of the factor portfolio on the passive benchmarks (MKT, GOV, 
CORP) and (2) a bootstrap test on the difference between the decay adjusted balanced portfolio 
and the traditional portfolio. Results for both procedures are displayed in panel B of Table 7. 
Subtracting a constant from raw returns is equivalent to alpha decay as it holds betas fixed. 
Intuitively, in the time-series regressions, subtracting a constant from the left-hand side variable 
has no effect on the slopes but it reduces the intercept by an equivalent amount. Consequently, 
modeling raw return decay in this manner is equivalent to alpha decay.  
The Sharpe ratio significance test reveals that the cutoff point above which anomalies no longer 
add value is close to a 3.5% percentage point decrease in anomaly returns and alphas. Such a 
decrease would yield a significant improvement in Sharpe ratios only at the 5% confidence level. 
The alpha significance test is even less strict. The inclusion of the factor portfolio spans the 
efficient frontier constructed by the benchmark assets by a statistically significant amount even 
following a 4.5% decay in alpha and returns. Overall, the results suggest that a 50% drop in alphas 
is required to lose the statistical significance of the risk-adjusted improvement resulting from 
passive-active combinations. The results mean that either (1) wrongly assessed historical alphas by 
50% or (2) future anomaly alpha decay of 50%, would make the passive-active strategy no longer 
statistically superior in terms of risk-adjusted performance relative to the passive benchmark.     
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Appendix F – Supplementary tables and figures 
Figure 9: Anomaly alphas. This figure displays the alpha of anomalies relative to the traditional 
portfolio (TP). Lambdas (λ) are calculated using constant coefficient unconditional time-series 
regressions of anomalies on the traditional portfolio Alpha t-statistics are calculated using the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980) and are reported in brackets. Asterisk 





Table 5: Bond-Anomaly independence and recession alphas. This table reports the alphas 
and loadings from constant coefficient unconditional time-series regressions: 
 
(1) R , = α + ß MKT + γ GOV + η CORP + ε , . 
 
(2) R , = ά + b MKT + ɣ GOV + ή CORP + r Recession + έ , . 
 
where R ,  is the return of strategy i in month t. MKT is the equity premium, GOV is the term 
structure premium, CORP is the default premium, SMB is size, BTM is value, RWM is profitability, 
CMA is investment, WML is momentum, IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility, QUAL is quality, BAB 
is betting against beta, AC is accruals and NI is net share issuance. Recession is a dummy variable 
(1 for recession) obtained from NBER. T-statistics are computed using the heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors of White (1980). 
 
 α  ß γ η    ά R 
SMB 0.26% 0.19 -0.24 0.20  0.26% 0.01% 
BTM 0.46% -0.05 -0.08 0.63  0.46% 0.05% 
RMW 0.35% -0.34 0.16 -0.11  0.41% -0.38% 
CMA 0.55% -0.20 -0.02 0.16  0.51% 0.28% 
WML 1.49% -0.19 0.16 -0.84  1.66% -1.17% 
IVOL 0.89% -1.14 0.60 0.07  0.94% -0.33% 
QUAL 0.66% -0.49 0.17 -0.23  0.66% 0.04% 
BAB 0.81% -0.09 0.12 0.24  0.95% -0.93% 
AC 0.43% -0.10 0.04 0.09  0.50% -0.49% 
NI 0.54% -0.30 0.11 0.09  0.55% -0.03% 
μ 0.64% -0.27 0.10 0.03  0.69% -0.29% 
        
t-stat (HC se) t (α) t (ß) t (γ) t (η)  t (ά) t (r) 
SMB 1.37 3.62 -4.17 1.32  1.27 0.02 
BTM 2.56 -0.77 -1.08 3.35  2.40 0.08 
RMW 2.33 -7.50 3.54 -0.99  2.55 -0.87 
CMA 4.23 -5.25 -0.41 1.42  3.69 0.75 
WML 5.73 -2.01 1.56 -2.07  6.38 -1.03 
IVOL 3.71 -15.22 7.40 0.29  3.66 -0.42 
QUAL 4.40 -10.69 3.00 -1.56  4.01 0.08 
BAB 6.23 -1.67 1.97 1.46  7.07 -1.97 
AC 3.58 -3.12 1.08 0.91  4.17 -1.31 
NI 4.50 8.72 2.81 0.94  4.57 -0.07 




Table 6: Fama-French Benchmark regressions. This table reports alphas and loadings from 
constant coefficient unconditional time-series regressions on the Fama-French anomalies: 
 
(FF3)           R , = α + β MKT + υ SBM + ι HML + ε ,  
(FF5) R , = ά + ß MKT + ύ SMB + ί HML + θ RMW  + ζ CMA +  έ ,  
 
where R ,  is the return of strategy i in month t. T-statistics are computed using the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of White (1980).  
 FF3  FF5 
 α β υ ι   ά ß ύ ί θ Ζ 
RMW 0.51% -0.26 -0.38 -0.10        
CMA 0.38% -0.19 0.01 0.34        
WML 1.60% -0.26 0.05 -0.34  1.34% -0.13 0.12 -0.46 0.19 0.42 
IVOL 1.08% -0.91 -0.88 0.28  0.60% -0.67 -0.62 0.23 0.69 0.32 
QUAL 0.90% -0.42 -0.43 -0.25  0.56% -0.24 -0.22 -0.25 0.56 0.15 
BAB 0.77% -0.06 0.00 0.18  0.52% 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.34 0.21 
AC 0.44% -0.07 -0.10 0.06  0.45% -0.07 -0.14 0.01 -0.10 0.12 
NI 0.59% -0.22 -0.30 0.09  0.35% -0.10 -0.23 -0.01 0.21 0.36 
μ 0.79% -0.30 -0.25 0.03  0.64% -0.19 -0.16 -0.06 0.31 0.26 
            
 t-stats  t-stats 
 t(α)  t(β) t(υ) t(ι)  t(ά) t(ß) t(ύ) t(ί) t(θ) t(ζ) 
RMW 4.11 -6.41 -10.25 -2.15        
CMA 3.56 -6.74 0.24 10.65        
WML 6.09 -3.08 0.48 -2.93  4.58 -1.48 1.18 -3.32 1.62 2.57 
IVOL 5.58 -13.3 -17.65 3.42  3.45 -11.22 -11.45 2.47 7.87 3.61 
QUAL 8.15 -12.37 -16.97 -8.06  6.48 -9.82 -9.38 -10.1 16.4 3.94 
BAB 5.91 -1.24 -0.06 3.82  4.10 1.50 3.23 2.46 7.47 3.18 
AC 3.87 -2.34 -3.12 2.12  3.83 -2.36 -3.64 0.26 -1.77 2.34 
NI 5.50 -7.31 -13.06 3.04  3.44 -3.38 -8.55 -0.43 5.75 8.45 





Table 7: Time trend estimates and alpha decay projections. Panel A shows the sign and 
significance of the time trend coefficient (λ) on rolling alphas.  
(1) R , = â , + ß , MKT + γ , GOV + η , CORP + ἕ , . 
(2) â , = а + λ t + e ,  
where i are the active premiums. T-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors. 
 Panel B shows the rate of alpha decay that would annul the validity of passive-active 
combinations. Holding beta constant, each month a fixed rate is subtracted from the return of the 
factor portfolio. Following the adjustment, two tests are executed: (1) the adjusted factor portfolio 
is EW with a traditional portfolio and the improvement and statistical significance of the combined 
portfolio relative to the traditional portfolio is calculated, and (2) a time-series regression is 
executed of the adjusted factor portfolio on the passive benchmarks (MKT, GOV and CORP): 
(3) R , = ά + ß MKT + γ GOV + η CORP + ε , . 
where ά is the intercept in the regression. Standard errors for the regression estimates are 
calculated using either heteroskedasticity-consistent (t-stat (HC se)) or Newey-west standard errors 
(t-stat (NW se)). Δ Sh is the difference between the monthly Sharpe ratios of the balanced portfolio 
constructed with a decay adjusted factor portfolio and the traditional portfolio. The associated p-
value is calculated using the Ledoit-Wolf bootstrap test.  
 Panel A  Panel B 
















SMB - -0.82  No decay  0.22 0.00  7.8% 9.29 8.13 
BTM - -1.10  -1.0% 0.19 0.00  6.7% 8.00 7.00 
RMW + 3.56  -1.5% 0.17 0.00  6.2% 7.43 6.50 
CMA - -0.13  -2.0% 0.15 0.00  5.8% 6.86 6.00 
WML - -1.86  -2.5% 0.13 0.00  5.3% 6.29 5.50 
IVOL + 0.10  -3.0% 0.11 0.01  4.8% 5.71 5.00 
QUAL + 2.02  -3.5% 0.09 0.04  4.2% 5.00 4.38 
BAB - -0.33  -4.0% 0.08 0.09  3.7% 4.43 3.88 
AC - -0.89  -4.5% 0.06 0.19  3.2% 3.86 3.38 








Chapter 2: How do short selling costs and restrictions affect the 
profitability of stock anomalies? 
 
Abstract 
Short selling frictions cannot explain the persistence of seven prominent stock anomalies. Long-
only investing is robust and profitable and can be further enhanced by a synthetic short. Moreover, 
portfolios restricted to stocks that are easy to short sell continue to have large and significant 
alphas. The paper obtains cost bounds for switching between implementation methods and shows, 
using a proprietary database of borrowing fees, that the cost of short positions is small relative to 
their profitability. Overall, the evidence doesn’t support the implications of arbitrage asymmetry 
that mispricing is concentrated in short positions where it is too costly to exploit. 
 
1. Introduction 
Historical tests of the CAPM have given rise to an abundance of anomalously priced 
characteristics in the cross-section of stock returns (Cochrane, 2011). These characteristics can 
also be used as return predicting signals in the construction of profitable rule-based active 
investment strategies. Their success in empirical work has drawn the attention of practitioners and 
motivated a proliferation of anomaly replicating funds and smart beta indexes.  
The focus in academic work has been placed on the performance of zero-cost long-short 
portfolios. In practice, investment vehicles that provide anomaly exposure tend to be long-only. 
Evidence on the impact of short selling frictions on anomaly profitability is scarce. The goal of 
this paper is to fill this gap and explore the effect of short selling costs and short selling restrictions 
on the viability of anomaly investing.  
From the point of view of practitioners, the impact of short selling frictions is relevant as it can 
help determine the optimal approach to anomaly investing. Should strategies be executed long-
only or long-short? Alternatively, can shorting the market, rather than short selling individual 
securities, be used to improve between anomaly fit and the performance of anomaly combinations? 
From the point of view of academics, the impact of short selling frictions is relevant because 
mispricing explanations to anomalies require some form of limits to arbitrage. Intuitively, 
mispricing can persist if savvy investors are unable to profitably execute offsetting trades following 
a price distorting demand shock. In the specific case of short-selling, investors may not be able to 
exploit security overpricing because short-selling is prohibited or costly. This results in an asymmetry 
in arbitrage as buying is easy and short selling can be difficult (Stambaugh, Yu & Yuan, 2015).  
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An explanation of anomalies grounded on arbitrage asymmetry implies two key hypotheses: (1) 
anomaly profitability should be concentrated in short positions and (2) capturing this profitability 
should be too costly to be exploited. The paper finds evidence against both claims for seven 
prominent stocks anomalies. Extensive model mispricing exists in long positions and short selling 
costs are avoidable and low relative to short position profitability. In other words, short selling 
costs explain only a small fraction of anomaly alphas. The evidence is as follows. 
Time-series alphas are large and statistically significant for long-only anomaly portfolios. 
Moreover, the inclusion of long-only anomalies improves Sharpe ratios by 32% out-of-sample and 
60% in-sample relative to traditional passive investment in the market. The improvement is 
significant at the 1% level. The significant profitability in long-positions is evidence against the 
first implication of arbitrage asymmetry that anomaly profitability should be concentrated 
exclusively in short positions. From the point of view of investors, the large profitability of long 
positions implies that improvements in performance can be achieved even without short selling.    
Is it necessary to short sell individual securities to exploit security overpricing and to capture 
negative alphas? If short selling individual securities is impossible, how can we further improve 
upon long-only investing? In the presence of all-encompassing prohibitive shorting frictions on 
individual securities, the paper proposes the use of a synthetic-short strategy. The synthetic bet 
goes long the highest alpha decile whilst shorting the market. The synthetic-short approach aims 
to achieve two objectives. First, it removes overexposure to the equity premium which otherwise 
dominates long-only investing. Second, the synthetic-short approach exploits negative alphas in 
overvalued securities. Ideally, investors want to buy positive alpha whilst short selling negative 
alpha securities. In practice, investors can often only easily short sell the market. In other words, 
investors can only easily short securities in their value-weighted proportions (via futures for 
example). A long position in a positive alpha decile combined with a market short implies a net 
short position on all nine remaining decile portfolios. Taking a short position on the lowest 
negative alpha decile portfolio is beneficial. This is the standard approach in the unrestricted long-
short setting. However, short positions in intermediate portfolios can be suboptimal. The results 
show that using a synthetic-short improves Sharpe ratios by 40% out-of-sample and 80% in-
sample relative to long-only investing. Improvements are statistically significant at the 2% level. 
The findings suggest that long-only investing can be extensively improved by using only a market 
short. The evidence goes against the second hypothesis as it suggests that short position 
profitability can be partly exploited using a cheap execution method such as a market short. From 
the point of view of practitioners, the results imply that executing with a synthetic short is superior 
to long-only investing.  
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Short selling individual securities in the short leg of anomalies is profitable in the absence of 
shorting costs. Short alphas capture 63% of average long-short profitability. In addition, portfolio 
analysis shows that short selling individual securities improves the Sharpe ratio by 64% out of 
sample and 24% in-sample relative to the synthetic-short approach. Improvements are statistically 
significant at the 2% level (4% in-sample). The finding suggests that short selling individual 
securities is profitable in the absence of short selling costs. Overall the results suggest that short 
selling restriction, on either individual securities or the market, can severely reduce the profitability 
of anomalies. However, they do not completely annul their investment potential. But how high are 
short selling costs and can they be easily reduced?  
For investors that do not face regulatory or self-imposed short selling restrictions, it is 
important to get a sense of the magnitude of short selling costs on individual securities relative to 
their profitability contribution. Towards this goal, the paper uses a proprietary cross-sectional 
database of borrowing fees to estimate short selling costs. The value-weighted borrowing cost is 
46 basis points (BPS) annually which is close to the general collateral (GC) rate of 35 BPS in the 
data. In contrast, the equally weighted borrowing fee is 416 BPS. This is nine times larger. Even 
though 37.3% of stocks in the data are on special (not on GC and expensive to borrow), they 
account for only 2.9% of market capitalization. The evidence suggests that high borrowing costs 
are concentrated in small market capitalization firms.  
The borrowing costs of anomaly short positions are small relative to their alphas. On average, 
borrowing costs are only 15.4% of the average short anomaly alpha. The highest borrowing costs 
are for the unprofitable (116 BPS annually) and loser portfolio (110 BPS annual). However, their 
short selling cost is only a fraction of their gross short alpha which is 504 BPS for profitability and 
1124 BPS for momentum. For the remaining five anomalies, costs are below 65 BPS. In fact, size, 
value, investments and accruals have a higher shorting cost for stocks that fall in the long position 
than for stocks that fall in the short position. Overall, the results suggest that short selling costs 
are small relative to anomaly profitability. This goes against the second hypothesis of arbitrage 
asymmetry which suggests that exploiting short position profitability is too costly.  
The approach to anomaly construction can have a large impact on borrowing cost estimates. 
Throughout the analysis, the paper relies on value--weighted portfolios with NYSE breakpoints 
for anomaly construction. This method is common in the literature and aims to reduce the impact 
of small stocks. However, researchers often use equally weighted sorts without NYSE breakpoints 
to make statements about the population of equities without placing special emphasis on firms 
with large market capitalization. Conclusions change extensively with this alternative approach to 
anomaly construction. The average borrowing cost associated with equally weighted anomaly sorts 
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is 974 BPS which is fourteen times larger than its value-weighted counterpart. The difference arises 
due to the large cross-sectional differences in borrowing costs between small and large market 
capitalization stocks.  
Equally weighted anomalies also have higher alphas but only in long positions; in fact, long 
positions are even more profitable than short positions in small stocks. More importantly, 
however, short selling costs can be easily and extensively reduced using value weights and NYSE 
breakpoints without forgoing any significant short position profitability. Empirical investigations 
of shorting costs that rely on methods which emphasize small market capitalization stocks can 
severely overstate the relevance of shorting costs in practice. Moreover, investment strategies that 
make extensive use of small stocks for short positions can have prohibitive short selling costs. 
However, costs for strategies that are based on large caps seem to be low relative to profitability. 
The analysis relies on cross-sectional differences between borrowing costs. However, costs can 
also vary considerably over time and more importantly, between lender borrower relationships 
(Kolasinski, Reed & Ringgenberg, 2013). The market for borrowing securities is decentralized and 
opaque. Prices are not centrally determined, competitive or publicly observable. Therefore, the 
conditions available to one borrower may not be applicable to another. Nevertheless, short selling 
costs can be known in advance. Interested arbitrageurs can estimate their own concurrent shorting 
costs before committing to an anomaly execution approach. Towards this goal, the paper estimates 
the bound at which investors should switch between execution methods. Based on their 
concurrent shorting costs, investors can dynamically decide whether to execute with a synthetic-
short or a security-short. The results show that investors can no longer be confident that a security-
short approach will outperform synthetic-short execution when additional short selling and 
transaction costs for a portfolio of anomalies exceed 125 basis points annually. Constructing a 
synthetic short becomes more profitable than a security-short when costs exceed 300 basis points 
annually. The bounds for switching to a synthetic-short are an order of magnitude larger than the 
estimated average value-weighted anomaly borrowing cost of 68 BPS.  
To sum up, there is significant profitability in the long leg of anomalies and additional 
improvements in performance can be achieved through a synthetic-short. Short selling costs on 
individual equities are small relative to their profitability contribution if investors do not extensively 
rely on small market capitalization firms in portfolio construction. Overall, the evidence does not 
support the view that short selling frictions can account for the persistence of anomalies.  
The paper has three key contributions: (1) it develops the synthetic-short approach which 
successfully improves upon long-only investing, (2) it derives cost bounds for different methods 
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of anomaly execution and compares them to cost estimates derived from borrowing cost data, and 
(3) shows the effect of anomaly construction choices on the magnitude of borrowing costs.  
 
2. Short selling and anomalies 
2.1. Understanding the market for short selling 
Before a stock can be sold short, it must be borrowed. The US market for lending and borrowing 
stocks is decentralized and opaque. Deals are often made between brokers and institutions and 
prices are not centrally determined or publicly observable. Resultantly, proprietary datasets from 
security lenders are routinely used as sources of information in the literature (D’Avolio, 2002; 
Jones & Lamont, 2002; Cohen, Diether & Malloy, 2007). Alternatively, various proxies for shorting 
demand (e.g. short interest) and shorting supply (e.g. institutional ownership) are often employed 
for analysis (Nagel, 2005). 
Short sellers are a diverse group. From market makers and options traders to long-short hedge 
funds. When it comes to mutual funds, only a third can short sell by their charters and only 2% 
do so in practice (Almazan, Brown, Carlson, & Chapman, 2004). Practitioners often cite regulatory, 
cultural and client-imposed constraints as common motivators for an underlying reluctance to 
short sell. Since short sellers do not obtain the proceeds from a sale, there is little benefits from 
short selling in terms of liquidity. Rather, short sellers are more likely to be motivated by superior 
information (Diamond & Verrechia, 1987) and hedging needs (Bohemer, Jones & Zhang, 2008).  
Lenders are usually custodian banks that clear and hold positions for large asset owners, such 
as pension funds and mutual funds. Custodian banks enter into revenue sharing contracts with 
beneficial owners as compensation for their services (Reed, 2013).  
The US market for short selling has become relatively more active recently. The market started 
slowly, with total short interest as a percent of NYSE shares outstanding period being less than 
1% in the 1929-1931 (Meeker, 1932). More recent data (2000-2004) suggests that short selling is 
up to 13% of NYSE share volume (Bohemer, Jones & Zhang, 2008). Estimates of equity loans 
from 2010 suggest that 15% of stocks available for lending are utilized (Prado, Saffi & Strugess, 
2016). However, not all stocks borrowed are used for short selling; they may also be used for 
voting or tax-arbitrage (Christoffersen, Getzy, Musto & Reed, 2005). 
 
2.2. The mechanics of the short sale 
Loans are often intermediated by brokers in order to reduce search costs and enable ease in 
collateral management. Upon receiving a request to borrow shares, the broker seeks out a willing 
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lender who agrees (but does not commit) to deliver shares in three days. Large institutions can 
circumvent the process and negotiate directly.  
The obligations of share borrowers are simple. Dividends need to be transferred to back to 
the lender. However, share borrowers do attain the right to vote on shareholder meetings. 
Consequently, lending involves a trade-off between obtaining the lending fee and the right to 
express dissent through voting6.  
Short sellers must post collateral for borrowed shares. For US equities, collateral is set at 102% 
of the value of the stock. Lenders can use posted collateral to close a position if borrowers fail to 
deliver shares three days after a recall. Cash is used as collateral for 98% of the cases and T-bills 
for the rest (D’Avolio, 2002). When collateral takes the form of a security, fees are directly arranged 
by the parties. 
The rebate rate is the interest rate that borrowers receive on their collateral. The difference 
between the rebate rate and the prevailing market rate is the borrowing cost (also known as the 
loan fee). Intuitively, the market rate is the opportunity cost; it captures the income that the short 
seller could have obtained if he used his money to invest in a safe market instrument such as the 
Federal Funds Rate. Therefore, the borrowing fee, which is the difference between the market and 
rebate rate, is the cost of short selling.  
Stocks that are hard to borrow are on ‘special’ and have higher borrow fees. In contrast, stocks 
with a baseline fee are on ‘general collateral’ (GC). Together, GC and specialness equilibrate supply 
and demand in the market for stock borrowing. Theoretically, borrowing costs would be zero if 
every asset owner was willing to lend shares in a perfectly competitive market. For positive short 
selling costs to arise, some investors must hold (overpriced) stocks that they are not willing to lend 
(Dufee, 1996; Krishnamurty, 2002).  
Retail investors who want to short sell receive zero interest on their collateral which usually 
accrues to the broker. In addition, stocks on special are usually traded by large proprietary trading 
desks; brokers tend to deny short sales for stocks on special to small investors (Reed, 2013). 
Resultantly, retail investors or small players are disadvantaged in this marketplace. 
Loans are typically on a continuous basis (open-term); this implies that every day they can be 
renegotiated or terminated by either party. The variability of costs adds some dynamic risk to short 
selling as investors need to be mindful of fee variance (Engelberg, Reed & Ringgenberg, 2016). 
The value of the collateral is marked to market daily which ameliorates counterparty risk. In case 
                                                          
6 In practice, institutional investors often restrict share lending and recall loaned shares in firms 
with poor performance and weak governance in order to vote (Aggarwal, Saffi & Sturrgess, 2015). 
This tend to raise borrowing fees around voting record dates.  
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of unfavorable price movements, short sellers are asked to update collateral (Mitchel, Pulvino & 
Stafford, 2001; Jones & Lamont, 2001). Investors without liquid assets to post collateral may need 
to close a position early. Moreover, under a call to terminate from a counterparty, borrowers will 
need to either close the position permanently or find another willing lender. Borrowers have three 
days to return recalled borrowed shares and the average time to re-establish a short is estimated at 
23 trading days (D’Avolio, 2002). Due to reputation effects however, recall rates tend to be quite 
low (2% per month) (D’Avolio, 2002). As with most financial contracts, there is some flexibility 
in the design. Recall risk can be ameliorated with the use of a fixed term loan which cannot be 
renegotiated before an agreed upon date. Nevertheless, term loans tend to be infrequent in 
practice, arguably, due to the low incidence of recalls.  
Return swaps or options are an alternative to short selling. Studies show that the use of options 
increases when short selling is constrained (Evans, Geczy, Musto & Reed, 2008; Battalio & Schultz, 
2011). However, sellers tend to transfer short selling costs and risks to the derivative buyer. For 
example, short sale constraints tend to be reflected in option pricing (Ofek, Richardson & 
Whitelaw, 2004). This is intuitive as sellers would want to have the choice to hedge positions 
cheaply. In fact, derivative contracts often contain fee provisions in case of a rise in the underlying 
loan fees. In a sense, loan prices, derivative conditions and spot prices are jointly determined 
(D’Avolio, 2002).  
 
2.3. Theoretical links between short selling and mispricing 
There is a flourishing literature on the theoretical link between short selling and security prices. 
Given that anomalies came about as tests of the CAMP, it is important to first note that short 
selling frictions do not change the predictions of the CAPM. As an equilibrium model, the CAPM 
predicts that all homogeneous investors hold the market portfolio. Given that short positions 
cannot be part of this equilibrium, short selling frictions are immaterial for the model’s predictions 
(Elton, Gruber, Brown & Goetzmann, 2009, Ch. 14). Intuitively, the representative investor 
cannot be short on average just like he cannot be a net lender.  
Under investor heterogeneity however, overpricing can occur as a combination of differences in 
opinion and short selling restrictions. The mechanism is simple, short sale constraints prevent 
negative opinions from being incorporated into prices (Miller, 1977). Reasoning more generally, 
short leg overpricing can remain persistently strong and reflect the views of primarily optimistic 
(or irrational) investors if savvy arbitrageurs are unable to profitably execute offsetting trades due 
to short selling costs. This can lead to prices being biased by the view of optimists for securities 
with high short selling fees. Relying on similar forms of reasoning, theoretical models often use 
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short selling constraints to sustain differences between prices and fundamentals (Duffie, Garleanu 
& Pedersen, 2002).  
More generally, limits to arbitrage, such as short selling costs, are a fundamental building block 
of mispricing explanations of anomalies. If investors experience a demand shock that pushes prices 
away from fundamental values, arbitrageurs will not be able to correct security prices if they face 
difficulties trading. The demand shock causing price divergence is often modeled in the literature 
as the result of irrational investor behavior. Limits to arbitrage is, therefore, a key ingredient to 
behavioral explanations (Barveris & Thaler, 2003). Since demand shocks can also arise for a variety 
of different reasons, such as institutional frictions relating to contracting and agency (Gromb & 
Vayanos, 2010), the relevance of short selling frictions for asset pricing is even more 
comprehensive.  
 
2.4. Arbitrage asymmetry 
Exploiting model mispricing in an undervalued security is easy as arbitrageurs can simply make 
a purchase. In the process, they will cause price pressure until mispricing corrects. However, if 
short selling frictions are extensive, arbitrageurs will face difficulty profiting from security 
overpricing. This causes an asymmetry in arbitrage. For anomalies to be explained by arbitrage 
asymmetry we need to confirm two hypotheses: (1) anomaly profitability is concentrated in short 
position and (2) it is too costly to profitably exploit.  
We need both hypothesis to be confirmed by the data to be able to claim that the persistence 
of anomalies is explained exclusively by short selling frictions. If only the second hypothesis holds, 
then arbitrage asymmetry explains the profitability of short positions and we would need to 
develop a completely different explanation for the profitability of long positions.  
The details matter. We are not interested if short selling costs are higher than long-short 
profitability; even though this is often done in the literature. When long-only investing works, 
investors can always simply choose not to short sell. Consequently, we need to investigate two 
implications of arbitrage asymmetry: (1) is there profitability in long positions and (2) how high 
are costs in short positions relative to their profitability. Finally, we need to understand if there are 
methods to avoid high short selling costs that do not result in a commensurate drop in profitability.  
It is important to note that short selling frictions only have the potential to explain the 
persistence of anomalies. They cannot account for anomaly existence. In other words, short selling 
frictions can suggest that trading against model mispricing may be unprofitable for an array of 
investors, but they do not explain why there is model mispricing in the first place. To motivate 
why anomalies arise in the first place we would need to model the pricing process of the 
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representative investor. The intuition of this argument can be easily understood through the 
following simple example. Suppose an agent is willing to sell a 10-dollar bill for 5 dollars in coins. 
The mispricing of the bill is not tradable if entering the transaction requires a 10-dollar fee to a 
third party. In this case, the persistence of mispricing can be explained by limits to arbitrage. 
However, limits to arbitrage will not explain why one of the agents is improperly pricing the 10-
dollar bill in the first place. We need either behavioral or rational story to model the initial 
divergence of prices. 
 
2.5. Anomalies and short selling: the assumptions for frictionless anomaly trading 
Papers examining anomaly performance in frictionless markets are implicitly making two 
assumptions: (1) the size of the collateral posted on borrowed assets is equivalent to their value 
and (2) the rate paid on borrowed cash is equivalent to the rate received on collateral. Both 
assumptions are required for long-short anomaly investments to require no initial money outlay 
and to have no short selling cost.  
How would the zero-cost trade work under these two assumptions? First, you borrow 100$ 
dollars from the market at the borrowing rate (R) and post them as collateral on the short position. 
On this collateral, you receive an interest rate (r) from the counterparty. This makes you effectively 
a lender of cash to the security lender; at the same time, you are a borrower from the market. Once 
you have the asset, you can sell it on the market and obtain 100$ for its sale (assumption 1). Finally, 
you can use the 100$ from the short sale to buy the long asset. In the final portfolio, you get a 
rebate rate (r) on your cash collateral and you pay the borrowing rate on your cash borrowings (R). 
These two rates cancel out (assumption 2) and portfolio performance is determined by the 
difference between the long and short stock position.  
Both assumptions are violated in practice. The market rate is different from the rebate rate. 
This difference is effectively the short selling cost. Second, the size of the collateral for short 
positions is higher than the value of the asset (102% for US equities). Consequently, taking a long-
short anomaly bet via physical short selling cannot be without an initial money outlay7 or a short 
selling cost. This raises the question as to how high are short selling costs in practice and whether 
they can explain the profitability of short positions in well-known anomalies? 
 
                                                          
7 We can also view the addition collateral as a cost and assume that the long position is scaled 
down to account for the higher collateral requirement.  
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2.6. Short selling costs: what do we know? 
Early evidence on the magnitude of short selling costs comes from Jones & Lamont (2001). 
Using data on 80 actively traded NYSE stocks in the 1926-1933 period, they find substantial time-
series and cross-sectional variation in short selling costs. In their sample, most large-cap stocks are 
inexpensive to short. In addition, expensive to short stocks have lower subsequent returns.  
Using data from an institutional lender in a sample covering the 2000-2001 period, D’Avolio 
(2002) finds that the cost of borrowing a value-weighted loan portfolio is 25 basis points annually. 
Around 16% of CRSP stocks in his sample can’t be borrowed but they account for less than 1% 
of the market capitalization. Stocks on special represent 9% of the sample and cost around 4.3% 
annually; they also tend to be small with low institutional ownership. The remaining stocks have 
loan fees of around 20 basis points annually. For most stocks, there is excess lendable supply 
(D’Avolio, 2002). D’Avolio argues that shorting fees are not high enough to explain return 
anomalies or an underlying reluctance to short sell.  
An early attempt to estimate the shorting cost of anomalies was made by Geczy, Musto & Reed 
(2002). Using a year of equity loans data, they find that the short selling costs of big, growth and 
low momentum firms are small relative to the documented excess returns of the strategies. 
Nagel (2005) uses institutional ownership as a proxy for short-selling constraints. Consistent 
with the view that short selling constraints reduce price efficiency and anomaly performance, Nagel 
(2005) finds that lower instructional ownership implies more overpricing of short leg securities in 
equally weighted sorts.  
Cohen, Diether & Malloy (2007) use proprietary lending data from a large institution and find 
an average loan fee of 4% for small stocks and 0.4% for large stocks for the 1999–2003 period. 
The median holding time for a stock loan position is 3 weeks in their sample. Cohen, Diether & 
Malloy (2007) find that outward demand shifts, which signal an increase in the amount of negative 
information coming to the borrowing market, lead to negative future stock returns.   
Boehmer, Jones & Zhang (2008) construct a proprietary NYSE panel data of short sales and 
find that short selling constraints are not widespread. In their 2000-2004 sample, they find that 
heavily shorted stocks underperform stocks low levels of shorting over a 20-day period.  
Drechsler & Drechsler (2015) argue that anomalies disappear for stocks with low lending fees. 
Their result is contrary to findings by Getczy, Musto & Reed (2002) but in line with the results of 
Nagel (2005) who finds that (proxied) short selling constraints are associated with more short 
position overpricing.  
Chu, Hirshleifer & Ma (2016) use regulation SHO as a natural experiment to examine the 
impact of limits to arbitrage on ten stocks anomalies. The examined regulation relaxed constraints 
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on short selling execution for a random pilot of NYSE/AMEX stocks. They find that profitability fell 
by 77 basis points per month for anomaly short positions following the adoption of the regulation. 
The authors argue that their estimates capture the causal effect of limits to arbitrage. They interpret 
the findings as being more consistent with mispricing explanations to anomalies.  
Overall, short selling investigations give ambiguous evidence on the potential relevance of 
borrowing costs for anomalies. On the one hand, studies find low average borrowing fees (Jones 
& Lamont, 2001; D’Avolio, 2002; Cohen, Diether & Malloy, 2007), low shorting costs to anomalies 
(Getczy, Musto & Reed, 2002) and weak short-selling constraints (Boehmer, Jones & Zhang, 
2008). On the other hand, some authors argue that shorting costs are high for anomalies (Drechsler 
& Drechsler, 2015), that price inefficiency is high when short selling costs are high (Nagel, 2005) 
and that removing constraints on shorting execution reduces short anomaly profitability (Chu, 
Hirshleifer & Ma, 2016).  
Short selling costs are measured differently across conflicting studies. However, when it comes 
to the magnitude of short selling costs, this paper reconciles the literature by showing that choices 
in anomaly construction can have a large impact on the results. More specifically, strategies relying 
on small stocks (by using equal weights without NYSE breakpoints for example) have much larger 
borrowing cost. The results show that the difference across construction methods is so large that 
it can extensively alters the conclusions of the analysis. 
 
2.7. Transaction costs 
Investigations of trading and short selling costs tend to be undertaken separately in the literature. 
Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz (2012) show that the price impact of short selling is not statistically 
different from the price impact of selling long. Israel and Moskowitz (2012) find little evidence 
that variation in the size, value and momentum premiums can be explained by variation in trading 
costs. Novy-Marx and Velikov (2015) study an array of anomalies and find positive net spreads 
after incorporating simple transaction cost mitigation techniques into the strategies. Research also 
suggests that despite the incredible growth rates experienced by smart beta ETFs over the past 
few years, well known active strategies can still accommodate extensive supplementary growth 
before the market impact of large fund turnover can annul smart beta profitability (Novy-Marx & 
Velikov, 2016; Ratcliffe, Miranda, & Ang, 2016). In short, extensive research supports the view 
that transaction costs cannot account for anomalies. More recently, however, Chen and Velikov 
(2019) find that anomaly profits after trading costs are small in the period following their 
publication. While this paper does not explicitly account for transaction costs, the bounds derived 
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in Table 12 can also be interpreted as the total cost (both short selling cost and transaction cost) 
needed to induce investors to switch from one execution method to another.  
 
3. Anomaly construction and short selling data 
3.1. Anomaly construction 
Similarly to Fama and French (2008), the paper constructs seven anomalies using CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT data on US common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 
07/1963 until 12/2016. Data before the examined time frame is not used as it can be biased 
towards large successful firms (Fama & French, 1992). To avoid forward-looking bias, 
fundamental data from the previous fiscal year is conservatively assumed to be available at the end 
of June. Firms without market capitalization at the period of portfolio formation are excluded. 
Delisting returns are included whenever available in CRSP to minimize potential biases.  
Baseline anomalies are constructed using value-weighted decile sorts with NYSE breakpoints 
(equal number of NYSE firms across portfolios). Equally weighted portfolios are also considered. 
However, equally weighted sorts require additional trading each month following return 
realizations in order to rebalance back to equal weights. Equally weighted sorts also overweight 
small stocks by construction. As a result, they have two to three times the transaction costs of 
value-weighted portfolios (Novy-Marx & Velikov, 2015). Similar problems will occur if we do not 
use NYSE breakpoints or if we assign weights based on the strength of the signal; top and bottom 
portfolios will end up being overpopulated with small firms as they tend to have extreme values 
of the characteristics. Intuitively, a small firm is more likely to have extreme characteristics, such 
as low profitability or investments, relative to a large firm which can be diversified over projects, 
region, and divisions.  
Seven anomalies are reconstructed: size, value, profitability, investment, momentum, accruals, 
and net issuance. These anomalies also appear in Fama & French (2008). Anomaly portfolio 
rebalancing is annual except for momentum which is rebalanced monthly. Stocks are excluded if 
they lack the information to be included in a sort.  
Size (SMB) is constructed following Fama & French (1993) whereby portfolios are constructed 
at the end of June using market capitalization as the sorting signal. The ‘me’ signal is the log of 
market capitalization recorded in million. The size anomaly goes long on low market capitalization 
firms and short on high market capitalization firms.  
Value (BTM) follows Fama & French (1993). The signal is formed by dividing book equity with 
market equity whereby negative book to market firms are excluded. Value goes long on the high 
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book to market firms and short on the low book to market firms. The signal does not take the log 
of the ratio to improve interpretability.  
Operating profitability (OP) follows Fama & French (2015). The operating profitability (OP) 
signal is constructed as revenues minus cost of goods sold, interest expense, and selling, general, 
and administrative expenses divided by book equity. The operating profitability anomaly goes long 
high profitability firms and short low profitability firms.  
Investments (INV) follows Fama & French (2015). The investments signal is constructed as 
the change in total assets between two fiscal years divided by the earlier fiscal year. The investments 
anomaly goes long firms with low investments and short firms with high investments.  
Momentum (WML) is constructed using cumulative returns between t-2 and t-12 as the sorting 
signal (with portfolio formation at t-1) and monthly rebalancing following Jagadeesh and Titman 
(1993). The momentum anomaly goes long on high cumulative return firms and short on low 
cumulative return firms.  











Where dACT is the annual change in total current assets, dCHE is the annual change in total 
cash and short-term investments, dLCT is the annual change in current liabilities, dDLC is the 
annual change in debt in current liabilities, dTXP is the annual change in income taxes payable, 
dDP is the annual change in depreciation and amortization, and (AT+AT−12)/2 is average total 
assets over the last two years. Companies that do not have information for all variables needed for 
constructing the signal (except income taxes payable) are excluded. The accruals anomaly goes 
long on low accruals firms and short high accrual firms.  
Net issuance (NI) follows Fama & French (2008). The net issuance signal is constructed as the 
log ratio of split-adjusted shares outstanding over the two previous consecutive years. Portfolios 
exclude firms with no change in net issuance. The net issuance signal is the difference between the 
highest issuance portfolio and a separate negative issuance portfolio. 
 The market (MKT) is constructed as the value-weighted return in excess of the Treasury bill 
rate of all US common stocks in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ that have valid data in CRSP. 
Long-only anomalies (LSMB, LBTM, LWML, LOP, LINV, LAC, LNI) are constructed by only 
taking the long position in each anomaly. Short-only anomalies (SSMB, SBTM, SWML, SOP, 
SINV, SAC, SNI) are constructed by taking only the short position in each anomaly. Table 1 shows 
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descriptive statistics of the signals in the data. All signals display considerable cross-sectional 
variation. 
 
3.2. Short selling data 
To estimate short selling costs, the paper uses a proprietary cross-sectional database 
(20/04/2017) from a large financial institution containing the borrowing fee on 7435 equities. The 
data capture cost quotes between two large financial institutions; that is, it shows the type of fees 
that a large arbitrageur can expect. Most papers in the literature use proprietary lending databases. 
However, lending and borrowing fees need not be equivalent due to intermediation costs. Since 
arbitrageurs also bear these additional costs, the borrowing fee is a better estimate of short selling 
costs. 
The reference value for borrow cost calculation is the overnight bank funding rate (OBFR; 91 
BPS). The general collateral rate is 35 BPS below the OBFR reference value. The database also 
contains information on the number of stocks available for borrowing. Short selling data is 
matched with accounting data from the previous fiscal year (December). Cost data is available for 
96% of securities with market capitalization information in CRSP/COMPUSTAT. Securities 
without market capitalization information are excluded. 
The borrowing cost data is useful for understanding differences in characteristics between 
cheap and expensive to borrow securities. However, given the opaque nature of the borrowing 
market and the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is prudent to corroborate analysis conclusions 
using a proxy. The empirical analysis suggests that market capitalization is a useful proxy for short 
selling costs. The intuition is that non-lending investors are less likely to dominate the ownership 
of large stocks. Consequently, large stocks are cheaper and easier to borrow.  
Table 2 summarizes information in the short selling database. Around 17.8% of the shares 
outstanding are available for borrowing. Most of them are stocks on GC where 17.2% of total 
shares outstanding are available for borrowing. Using market values rather than shares outstanding 
gives a similar picture; 19.4% of market capitalization is available for shorting. The result suggests 
that the data provider is a large player in the market.  
The most important result is the difference between the value-weighted and equally weighted 
average borrowing cost. The value-weighted borrowing cost is only 46 basis points (BPS) which is 
close to the GC rate of 35 BPS. In comparison, the equally weighted borrowing cost is 416 BPS. 
This is nine times larger!8 Figure 1 illustrates the issue. Most securities above the median market 
                                                          
8 The equally weighted mean borrowing fee is close its full sample counterpart which does not 
exclude firms that are not in CRSP. 
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capitalization (vertical line in Figure 1) are on GC while extreme values for borrowing costs are 
common for small market capitalization stocks. In fact, the smallest stocks are almost never on 
GC. The average cost of stocks above the median market capitalization is 70 basis points (Figure 
1 difference between intercept and above median market capitalization dummy).  
The mean value of stocks on special is 1060 BPS. Even though 37.3% of stocks in the sample 
are on special, they represent only 2.9% of total market capitalization. The most important result 
it is that high borrowing costs are concentrated in small market capitalization firms.  
Portfolio sorts are the same as non-parametric cross-sectional regressions (Cochrane, 2011) and 
they are particularly well suited to give a clear picture of how characteristics vary across different 
levels of short selling costs. Table 3 shows the variation of characteristics across ten portfolios 
sorted on borrowing costs. As expected, portfolios with high borrowing costs are small market 
capitalization firms with relatively fewer lendable shares relative to outstanding. Accruals and 
investments do not seem related to borrowing fees. Moreover, value stocks seem to be associated 
with higher short selling costs than growth stocks. On the other hand, unprofitable loser firms 
that invest extensively and issue shares are associated with high short selling costs. Nevertheless, 
we also need to keep in mind that results can be driven by market capitalization as small firms tend 
to have both high fees and extreme values of the characteristics.  
The important thing to note from Panel B in Table 3 is that stocks above the median market 
capitalization have low equally weighted borrowing fees. The finding that large stocks are 
inexpensive to short is consistent with preceding investigations that use proprietary data (Jones & 
Lamont, 2001; D’Avolio, 2002). This is intuitive as non-lending investors are less likely to absorb 
the entire share issue in larger companies. Moreover, short selling costs for small stocks may also 
be unreliable as a large arbitrageur can move the market. The intuition and empirical findings 
suggest that size is a good proxy for short selling costs. Using this proxy, we can extend the analysis 
for the full sample period. Resultantly, the paper will form portfolios that exclude firms below the 
median market capitalization as a mechanism for excluding hard to borrow securities.  
 
3.3. Portfolio performance 
Table 4 shows summary statistics for long-short portfolios. Net issuance and momentum have 
the highest risk-adjusted performance with an M2 of 11.2 % and 10.5% respectively. On the other 
side of the spectrum are size (SMB) and operating profitability (OP) with the lowest risk-adjusted 
performance as stand-alone investments. In fact, their raw excess returns are not statistically 
significant. On average, anomaly skewness is positive. Excess kurtosis on the other hand, is an 
59 
 
issue for all the strategies. The maximum drawdown measure indicates that extreme crashes are 
especially problematic for size and momentum.  
Table 14 in the appendix shows portfolio statistics for taking a long position in the short side 
of anomalies. As expected, the Sharpe ratio of the short side of anomalies is much lower than that 
of the long side of anomalies. Furthermore, the short side of anomalies experiences even higher 
drawdowns on average than the long side. The drawdown of 99% for low momentum really stands 
out. High drawdowns suggest that undiversified counterparties to individual anomaly bets face 
considerable crash risk.  
Table 5 shows that the average correlation between long-short strategies is very low. The 
highest individual correlation are value-investments (0.51) and operating profitability-net issuance 
(0.38). On average, the equity premium is the least correlated strategy. The result can be expected 
given the historical development of anomalies as tests of the CAPM whereby researchers discover 
anomalies using the equity premium as an aggregate wealth proxy.  
The average correlation among stock strategies rises considerably in the long-only setting (Table 
6). Surprisingly, the market reverses its role and becomes the most correlated strategy. Individual 
correlations between the market and operating profitability, investments, accruals and net issuance 
are all above 0.9. This severely limits the diversification potential of long-only strategies. Intuitively, 
whenever you invest in a stock, whether that stock is a value stock or a low issuance stock, you are 
also investing in the stock market. Therefore, the equity premium is implicitly included in all long-
only anomalies. Correlations among short strategies are even higher than their long-only 
counterparts. Again, the market has the highest average correlation among short strategies.  
Finally, the diagonal in Table 6 shows the correlation between the long and short leg of the 
same anomaly. High correlations are desirable in this case. A perfect correlation would imply 
arbitrage; the long and short portfolio would move together whilst providing different average 
returns. Net issuance has the highest correlation between the long and short leg. This can in part 
explain net issuance’s low variance and drawdown. On the other hand, low and high momentum 
portfolios have a relatively low correlation. Given that the performance of the long and short 
momentum portfolios can significantly diverge, the strategy has a high standard deviation and a 




4. Anomaly alpha and short selling costs 
4.1. Alphas 
Anomaly alphas with respect to the equity premium are positive and statistically significant for 
six out of the seven examined anomalies9 (Table 7). An exception is size, which has an 
economically small and a statistically insignificant alpha. The average alpha t-statistic across 
anomalies is 3.68. Five of the anomalies have a long-short alpha t-statistic larger than 3. 
When it comes to the alphas of long-only anomalies, we see a significant decrease in both 
economic and statistical significance. Average alpha falls by more than half for long-only 
portfolios. Book to market, momentum, investments and net issuance have statistically significant 
long-only alphas. Surprisingly, value’s long-only alpha is more significant than its long-short 
counterpart. While average alphas fall by more than half in the long-only setting, the average t-
statistics of alphas has a much smaller decline. This occurs as the market model is a much better 
fit in the long-only setting (an average R2 of 77% compared to 6% for the long-short setting) 
which reduces the standard errors of anomaly alphas and raises their statistical significance.  
Time-series regressions reveal that 63% of long-short profitability comes from the short side 
using this construction method. Five from the seven examined anomalies have statistically 
significant negative alphas. Statistical significance is even higher than in the long-short setting for 
accruals and operating profitability.  
Momentum, investments and net issuance have significant alphas from both the long and short 
position. Book to market seems to be the only anomaly deriving its alpha primarily from the long 
side. On the other hand, operating profitability and accruals get their alpha primarily from the 
short position. Finally, size portfolios are well explained by the market model and do not have 
significant alphas.  
CAPM alphas are the most relevant assessment metric. Estimating alphas to benchmarks such 
as the Fama-French five factor model would have to assume that investors already hold the 
benchmark anomalies in their portfolio (since alphas imply that the left-hand side asset improves 
risk-adjusted performance when added in a portfolio containing the right-hand side assets). Making 
this assumption is problematic as the goal is to establish whether anomalies that enter the 
benchmark are also tradable after costs.  
 
                                                          
9 A t-statistic threshold of 2 is more appropriate as the data-mining adjusted hurdle of 3 refers to 
new discoveries (Harvey, Liu & Zhu, 2016).  
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4.2. Short selling costs 
Table 8 contains the borrowing fee of stocks in long and short positions. The results broadly 
confirm the intuition obtained from the sorts in Table 3. For size and value there is higher short 
selling cost in the long position. In addition, unprofitable and low momentum portfolios are the 
most expensive to short sell as expected. The annual short selling cost is 110 and 116 BPS for 
momentum and profitability respectively. Investments, accruals and net issuance do not exhibit 
high short selling costs or notable differences between cost in the long and short position. On 
average, short selling costs are only 15.4% of average short alpha and 13.6% of the average 
significant short alpha. Overall, costs are low relative to short anomaly profitability.  
 
4.3. Equally weighted portfolios without NYSE breakpoints 
Researchers often use equally weighted portfolios without NYSE breakpoints to investigate the 
cross-section of securities without a special focus on large market capitalization enterprises. It is 
prudent to consider how this alternative construction method affects the estimates. Table 9 reports 
alphas and shorting costs.  
Equally weighted portfolios have three times the average long position alpha of value-weighted 
sorts. Especially the long position of size becomes strongly significant. This is intuitive as the 
approach emphasizes small stocks which allow the size anomaly to shine. This is further evidence 
that there is significant profitability in long positions. In fact, for small stocks, there seems to be 
more profitability in long than short positions.  
Short alphas in equally weighted sorts are almost equivalent to their value-weighted 
counterparts. In short, all the added profitability from overweighting small caps comes from long 
positions. However, short selling costs for short positions are fourteen times larger! Only 
investments and book to market have short alphas higher than their associated borrowing cost. 
The increase in short selling costs comes from the large cross-sectional difference between the 
short selling costs of small and large market capitalization firms.  
The results also suggest that it might be sensible to execute the long position using equally-
weighted portfolios while the short positions using value-weighted portfolios. In this manner, 
investors can capture the higher positive alphas in small stocks whilst avoiding high short selling 
costs by exploiting negative alphas only in big firms.  
 
4.4 Restricted value-weighted portfolios 
High borrowing costs are concentrated in small stocks (see Table 3 and Figure 1). This section 
investigates how cost and profitability are affected by excluding small stocks from the analysis. 
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More specifically, anomalies are reconstructed without stocks below the market capitalization 
median. Results are shown in Panel B Table 9.  
The average short and long position cost are respectively 4.32% and 4.15% smaller than the -
5.10% cross-sectional average that includes all securities (Table 9 Panel B). The average short alpha 
is reduced by 54 BPS annually relative to the value-weighted approach without size restrictions 
(Table 9). Again, the reduction in profitability from excluding small market capitalization stocks is 
minimal in the short position. Costs also fall by 13 BPS relative to the unrestricted value-weighted 
sort and are only 20 BPS away from the GC rate. Restricting the investment universe by excluding 
small market capitalization firms has a small detrimental effect on profitability and a minor positive 
effect on borrowing costs. Value weights and NYSE breakpoints are already emphasizing large 
enterprises extensively. Consequently, additional restrictions to remove small firms only have a 
limited impact on the results. The regression results that include dummy variables if stocks enter 
the long or short portfolio, also confirm that portfolios constructed using value weights with 




What is the impact of short selling restrictions on the joint profitability of anomalies? To 
investigate this question, several scenarios based on different short selling and investment 
restrictions are considered. Differences in risk-adjusted performance determine constraint 
relevance. There are four base scenarios: (1) market (long market), (2) long-only (includes long-
only anomalies), (3) synthetic short (allows short selling the market portfolio) and (4) long-short 
(allows short selling individual securities).  
Sharpe ratio improvements across scenarios are compared using two portfolio construction 
methods: (1) in-sample maximum Sharpe ratio and (2) equally-weighted. The equally weighted 
approach (EW) can be considered out-of-sample as it does not incorporate any future data for 
execution. In fact, past research suggests that EW is superior to out-of-sample alternatives due to 
the sensitivity of optimization procedures to estimation error (DeMiguel, Garlappi, & Uppal, 
2009). The goal is to not to compare performance between construction methods but between 
scenarios with different assumptions and restrictions. The statistical significance of differences in 
Sharpe ratios is assessed with the Ledoit & Wolf (2008) bootstrap procedure which accounts for 
non-normality and serial correlation. Since we are not constructing a new anomaly and have 
evaluated the merits of each signal individually, we do not have to account for potential biases 
arising from selecting n out of k predictors (Novy-Marx, 2015). 
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Trading anomalies in reverse order, such as long growth short value, is disallowed across 
scenarios as there is no empirical or theoretical justification to motivate a reverse bet. All scenarios 
are dollar positive with weights that sum to 100%. Scenarios with short positions assume 100% 
collateral at the risk-free rate10. The analysis starts without considering short selling costs. Latter 
sections derive the cost bounds that would cause a switch between execution methods.  
 
5.1. Market: traditional investing 
The simplicity of the market scenario makes it the default choice for many investors. In this 
base setting, anomaly investments are not utilized, and investors simply hold a passive long 
position in the market.  
 
5.2. Long-only: including anomalies 
Above and beyond instrument availability, investors often face regulatory or self-imposed 
leverage and short selling restrictions that make long only anomaly investing a valid real-world 
approximation. The widespread availability of long-only smart beta ETFs and anomaly replicating 
mutual funds have made this approach commonplace. The equally weighted approach assigns 
equal weight to all the available investments. In the Max Sharpe approach constraints take the 






10  jw  
where  
 LNILACCLINVLOPLWMLLBTMLSMBLMKTj ,,,,,,,  
 
5.3. Synthetic short 
Ideally, investors want to buy positive alpha whilst short selling negative alpha securities. In 
practice, investors can often only easily short sell the market. In other words, investors can only 
easily short securities in their value-weighted proportions. The paper proposes a synthetic-short 
approach to anomaly investing as a substitute to short selling individual securities. Investors can 
use a market short to remove beta and overexposure to the equity premium. In addition, a market 
short can also help exploit overpricing.  
                                                          
10 Placing a 102% collateral requirement does not materially influence the results.  
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Intuitively, combining a long decile position in the highest alpha portfolio with a market short 
implies a net short position on all stocks in the remaining nine deciles. Shorting securities that do 
not have negative alphas is suboptimal. However, the biggest concern is shorting positive alpha 
securities which can often accompany the second highest alpha decile. To ameliorate the issue, the 
paper uses a synthetic long-short bet which includes a modest purchase of the second highest 
alpha portfolio. The goal is to reduce the strong negative weight in the intermediate portfolio 
relative to a pure long-market-short approach. This can reduce the risk of short selling positive 
alpha securities. Including an intermediate portfolio using this simple method causes an 
improvement of 7% in-sample and 5% out-of-sample relative to a pure market short approach. 












syntheticR is the long-short synthetic position. 
lR is the highest alpha decile portfolio. 
iR  
is a value-weighted intermediate portfolio containing stocks that are in the second decile with the 
highest alpha. 
mR is the (short position) in the market and 
fR  is the risk-free rate capturing the 
interest on market short collateral. Effectively, imposing a 100% collateral requirement makes only 
the short position self-financed. 
In the max Sharpe approach, constraints take the following form (where SMBS, for example, 








 NISACCSINVSOPSWMLSBTMSSMBSLMKTi ,,,,,,,  
5.4. Long-short 
In the long-short scenario, investors can take short positions in anomalies, but they must post 
100% collateral at the risk-free rate. This effectively deleverages the portfolio as investors are 
forced to hold a significant investment in the risk-free asset (like moving down the capital 
allocation line). Moreover, in this scenario, short position must equal long positions in anomalies; 
that is, anomalies cannot be unbundled. This can happen in practice if investors only have access 
to format-fixed long-short investments that attempt to harvest a premium. Removing the 
unbundling constraint does not significantly improve performance. Moreover, removing the 
65 
 
collateral restriction also has a limited impact on Sharpe ratios. The constraint moves the investor 
down the capital allocation line as it forces investment in the risk-free asset. In the in-sample Max-
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6. Scenario Results 
6.1. Sharpe ratios 
Table 10 shows the returns, standard deviation, Sharpe ratios and p-values for portfolios across 
scenarios. Several notable results emerge. First, there is a large improvement in Sharpe ratios when 
we include long-only anomalies. The Sharpe ratio raises by 32% in the EW case and 60% in the 
Max Sharpe approach. Improvements are statistically significant at the 1% level. The result implies 
that anomalies can add to performance even in a long-only setting.  
Second, enabling a market short also improves performance. EW Sharpe ratios rise by 40% 
relative to the long-only setting. The improvement is significant at the 2% level.  Sharpe ratios in-
sample increase by 80% and are significant at the 1% level. Overall, the results suggest that the 
synthetic short approach is superior to long-only investing.  
Third, allowing for the short selling of individual securities whereby investors are forced to hold 
collateral at the risk-free rate leads to a significant improvement. The out-of-sample EW Sharpe 
ratio further increases by 64% and is statistically significant at the 2% level. The in-sample Sharpe 
increases by 24% and is significant at the 5% level. In frictionless markets, short-selling individual 




Table 11 shows the weights assigned to anomalies across scenarios and portfolio construction 
methods. It is first important to note that the market portfolio is redundant in the presence of 
long-only anomalies. This suggests that anomalies and the market are substitutes when anomaly 
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shorting is prohibited. Intuitively, you always want to invest in the outperforming long-only 
anomaly portfolio that already embeds a significant equity premium exposure (Table 7). In fact, 
removing overexposure to the equity premium is the intuition behind the construction of the 
synthetic short. The conclusion that passive investments and anomalies are substitutes does not 
hold in long-short space as long-short anomalies tend to have low or negative market betas (Table 
7).  
As expected, in the long-only scenario, significant weight is assigned to the anomalies with the 
highest long alpha. Book to market, momentum and net issuance are the only strategies receiving 
a positive long-only weight. This can explain why value and momentum are so popular among 
mutual funds and ETF providers while anomalies that require significant short positions, such as 
accruals, operating profitability and investment are yet to gain significant traction as standalone 
products in practice.  
The investment anomaly receives the smallest weight across scenarios. This can be expected 
given its high cross-correlation with other investments (see correlation Table 5 and 6). The finding 
suggests that the investment anomaly is irrelevant from an investment perspective in the examined 
setting. On the other hand, net issuance receives a substantial weight across scenarios.  
 
7. Cost bounds and the limitations  
Investigations of short selling costs face several noteworthy limitations. First, the decentralized 
nature of the borrowing market makes the matching of the universe of anomaly stocks to a 
meaningfully lengthy historical record of borrow fees a futile quest. Proprietary databases are 
inherently brief. This prevents us from drawing conclusions about the time-series variation of 
short selling costs during the anomaly backtest period. Second, the cost of borrowing can vary 
between broker-lender relationships (Kolasinski, Reed & Ringgenberg, 2013). Rebate rates are not 
competitive prices and are thus inherently relationship specific. Consequently, what was available 
to one borrower may not be applicable to another. Finally, even the perfect short selling data would 
only capture the marginal cost of borrowing. The marginal cost can be markedly different from 
the cost faced by large arbitrageurs that move the market for borrowing stocks. These issues are 
common to the literature; the structure of the borrowing market makes the derivation of a ‘true’ 
cost estimate difficult and investor specific.  
Fortunately, shorting costs are known in advance. In addition, the decision to short sell 
individual securities or the market need not be constant. The optimal execution method can 
depend on prevailing market conditions. Interested arbitrageurs can estimate their own concurrent 
shorting costs before deciding how to execute an anomaly trade. Along this line of reasoning, it is 
67 
 
more interesting to estimate the total cost bounds (both trading and short selling costs) at which 
switching from one method of execution to another is optimal.  
It is important to keep in mind that long-short investing can be successfully approximated with 
the use of a synthetic-short which circumvents the entire messy business of short selling individual 
securities. It is therefore prudent to use the synthetic short approach as a benchmark (rather than 
long-only). A conservative annual cost of 45 BPS for shorting the market is assumed based on the 
value-weighted shorting cost in the data (investors would execute a market short via a future for 
example). A useful way to think of the market short is as a value-weighted short on all stocks. 
Alternatively, shorting via derivative contracts or (reverse) ETFs is another easy way to obtain 
short market exposure.  
The alternative to the synthetic-short benchmark is the leverage constrained long-short method 
with 102% rebate bearing collateral. Adding the market collateral level of 102% additionally 
reduces the attractiveness of shorting in the presence of costs. Demanding additional collateral 
magnifies shorting costs as it induces rebate bearing collateral on a larger position. 
Table 12 shows the results. First, it is evident that at low levels of borrowing costs, there is 
undeniably a lot of benefit to short selling. Improvements are statistically significant both in-
sample and out-of-sample for GC and value-weighted (VW) short selling costs. The statistical 
significance of improvements disappears at the 5% level when shorting costs exceed 125BPS 
annually. The economic usefulness of shorting individual equities disappears at an annual shorting 
cost of approximately 300BPS. The cost bound is large relative to the average anomaly short selling 
cost of 68BPS. This implies that in normal times the cost of short selling is small relative to the 
profitability of short positions in individual anomaly securities. Alternatively, the bound in Table 
12 can be interpreted as the total cost bound (sum of all anomaly trading costs). 
 To conclude, investors have a high degree of confidence that they should execute an anomaly 
trade using a security-short approach when annual short selling costs are below 125 basis points 
annually. Executing a market short becomes economically more viable when annual shorting costs 
exceed 300 basis points annually. Estimates of average anomaly borrowing costs imply that they 
are small relative to the profitability contribution of security-short selling.  
 
8. Final remarks 
The short selling cost associated with anomaly strategies can be partly offset by revenue 
received via the lending of stocks in long positions. The analysis assumed that investors are unable 
to use this income as incorporating lending fees requires information on lending utilization rates. 
Moreover, for a fair comparison, any income from the lending market would also need to be 
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incorporated in the passive benchmark. In other words, the relevant question is whether stocks in 
long anomaly positions can deliver higher lending income than stocks in a passive value-weighted 
index. This auxiliary question is left for future research.  
For future work, it would also be interesting to investigate the short selling costs of the betting 
against beta anomaly (Frazzini & Pedersen, 2014). More specifically, in the spirit of Hong and 
Sraer (2016), it would be interesting to examine how short selling costs vary with aggregate 
disagreement. 
 
9. Conclusion  
An explanation of anomalies grounded on arbitrage asymmetry implies two hypotheses: (1) 
anomaly profitability should be concentrated in short positions and (2) exploiting this profitability 
should be too costly. The paper finds evidence against both claims. Long-only investing is 
profitable and can be further improved via a synthetic short. High short selling costs tend to be 
concentrated in small stocks and can be easily avoided through the use of value-weighted sorts 
with NYSE breakpoints. The profitability of security-short positions that do not overweigh small 
market capitalization securities is large relative to their borrowing cost; that is, costs are only a 
small fraction relative to short position alphas. Short selling costs are only large enough to annul 
short position profitability of small stocks. Nevertheless, small stocks are not necessary for 
obtaining large short anomaly alphas.   
Arbitrageurs interested in anomaly investing can compare their concurrent borrowing costs to 
estimated cost bounds for switching between execution methods. If short selling individual 
securities takes more than 125 BPS annually, investors are no longer confident that a security-short 
will outperform a synthetic short. Synthetic-short investing becomes economically more profitable 
when short selling costs exceed 300BPS. The cost bounds are much larger than the estimated 
borrowing cost associated with value-weighted anomalies.  
The paper makes three contributions: (1) it shows that long only investing works and can be 
significantly enhanced using a synthetic short (2) it demonstrates how overreliance of small stocks 
in anomaly construction can overstate short selling costs to the extent that it alters analysis 
conclusions and (3) it derives cost bounds for switching between execution methods and 
compared them to recent borrowing fees. Overall, the results suggest that short selling frictions 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Characteristics. This table shows the mean and dispersion of anomaly signals for the 
07/1963-12/2016 period. me is the signal for size (in million and log). Mom is the cumulative 
momentum signal for momentum. bm is the book to market signal for value. prof is the signal for 
profitability. inv is the signal for investment. acc is the signal for accruals. ni is the signal for net 
issuance. Average (ew) is the timef series average of the equally weighted cross-sectional average 
of the characteristic. High signal portfolio (vw) is the time-series average of the value-weighted 
cross-sectional average in the decile sorted portfolio with the highest value of the characteristic. 
Low signal portfolio (vw) is the time-series average of the value-weighted cross-sectional average 
in the decile sorted portfolio with the lowest value of the characteristic. CS dispersion is the time-
series average of the cross-sectional standard deviation of characteristics. 
Time-series average of characteristics (07/1963 - 12/2016) 
  me mom bm prof inv acc Ni 
High signal portfolio (vw) 9.87 1.91 2.25 0.85 0.76 0.10 0.32 
Average (ew) 4.49 1.14 0.94 0.17 0.17 -0.03 0.04 
Low signal portfolio (vw) 3.61 0.64 0.19 -0.29 -0.15 -0.14 -0.02 
                
Time-series average of cross-sectional dispersion 
CS dispersion 1.93 0.57 1.26 8.61 0.98 0.11 0.14 
 
Table 2: Borrowing costs and share availability. This table shows summary statistics for 
borrowing costs and the shares available for borrowing. Borrowing costs are annual. Firms without 
market capitalization in CRSP are excluded. VW Mean is the value-weighted mean of borrow costs. 
% on special is the number of stocks that are not on general collateral (GC) relative to the total. 
Available/Outstanding is the average total number of shares available for borrowing relative to 
the total number of shares outstanding. Available GC/Outstanding is average the total number of 
shares on general collateral relative to total shares outstanding. Capitalization Special/Market is 
the total market capitalization of stocks on special relative to the total market capitalization of 
stocks in the sample. 
Borrow Costs 
Number of stocks 3497  Max -0.35% 
GC -0.35%  10th percentile -8.37% 
VW Mean -0.46%  1st percentile -87.6% 
Mean -4.16%  Min -99.9% 
Median -0.35%  S.D. 13.2% 
Mean (Specials) -10.6%   % on Special 37.3% 
       
Available 
Shares  $ 
Available/Outstanding  17.8%  Available/Market 19.4% 
Available GC/Outstanding 17.2%  Available GC/Market 19.3% 
        Capitalization Special/Market  2.9% 
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Figure 1: Borrowing costs and market capitalization. This table shows borrowing costs (y-
axis) and market capitalization (x axis-log scale recorded in million). The dotted vertical line is the 
median of market capitalization. The table shows a regression of short selling costs on an intercept 





Table 3. Borrow costs and characteristics. This table shows the equally weighted average of 
characteristics in ten portfolios sorted on borrow costs with market capitalization as a secondary 
sort (when borrow costs are equivalent) in Panel A and sorted on market capitalization in panel B. 
Includes stocks for which anomalies are constructed. Cost is the annual borrowing cost. A/O is 
average of the firm values of shares available for borrowing relative to shares outstanding. Mc is 
market capitalization recorded in million. Bm is the book to market ratio. Mom is cumulative 
momentum. Op is operating profitability. Inv is investments. Acc is accruals. Ni is net share 
issuance.  
Panel A-Sort on cost 
Decile Securities Cost Mc A/O Bm Mom Prof Inv Acc Ni 
1 350 -31.78% 247 2% 1.07 0.87 -1.32 0.18 -0.04 0.18 
2 349 -5.07% 269 4% 1.06 0.99 -0.18 0.17 -0.04 0.08 
3 350 -1.85% 576 6% 1.17 1.05 0.59 0.11 -0.05 0.07 
4 350 -0.80% 858 10% 0.75 1.09 0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.04 
5 350 -0.35% 749 16% 0.82 1.26 0.21 0.07 -0.05 0.02 
6 349 -0.35% 1521 21% 0.61 1.20 0.22 0.15 -0.05 0.03 
7 350 -0.35% 2122 24% 0.62 1.25 0.24 0.13 -0.05 0.02 
8 350 -0.35% 3537 27% 0.64 1.20 0.30 0.08 -0.05 0.01 
9 349 -0.35% 7230 28% 0.65 1.23 0.30 0.13 -0.05 0.02 
10 350 -0.35% 46733 23% 0.61 1.21 0.35 0.06 -0.05 0.00 
μ 3497 -4.16% 6401 16.1% 0.79 1.14 0.10 0.12 -0.05 0.04 
p-val (10=1)   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.48 0.00 
 
Panel B-Sort on market capitalization 
Decile Securities Mc Cost A/O Bm Mom Prof Inv Acc Ni 
1 350 286 -21.85% 1% 1.71 0.99 -0.63 0.08 -0.05 0.11 
2 349 400 -10.90% 4% 0.96 1.01 0.43 0.18 -0.06 0.09 
3 350 346 -3.40% 8% 0.80 1.05 -0.27 0.14 -0.03 0.07 
4 350 619 -2.37% 12% 0.77 1.11 -0.05 0.17 -0.04 0.05 
5 350 950 -0.92% 16% 0.70 1.14 0.09 0.09 -0.05 0.03 
6 349 1567 -0.58% 21% 0.58 1.18 0.19 0.19 -0.05 0.05 
7 350 2168 -0.44% 24% 0.62 1.24 0.19 0.11 -0.05 0.02 
8 350 3533 -0.38% 27% 0.64 1.20 0.29 0.10 -0.05 0.01 
9 349 7146 -0.37% 28% 0.66 1.22 0.29 0.13 -0.05 0.02 
10 350 46806 -0.35% 22% 0.61 1.21 0.35 0.06 -0.05 0.00 
μ 3497 6401 -4.16% 16.1% 0.79 1.14 0.10 0.12 -0.05 0.04 
p-val (10=1)   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.95 0.00 
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Table 4: Data summary for long-short portfolios. This table shows the summary statistics for 
long-short anomalies for the period 07/1963-12/2016. D.D. is downside deviation with zero as 
the target. M2 is the annual volatility matched (to the equity premium) return. μ is the average 
across anomalies. MKT is the equity premium, SMB is size, BTM is value, WML is momentum, 
OP is profitability, INV is investment, ACC is accruals and NI is net issuance. 
  MKT SMB BTM WML OP INV ACC NI μ 
R 0.50% 0.28% 0.38% 1.34% 0.30% 0.38% 0.31% 0.55% 0.51% 
t-stat 2.84 1.46 2.26 4.87 1.69 2.86 2.44 5.12 2.96 
σ 4.44% 4.81% 4.22% 6.93% 4.44% 3.30% 3.23% 2.69% 4.23% 
Sharpe 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.20 0.12 
M2 6.3% 3.2% 5.0% 10.5% 3.9% 6.4% 5.5% 11.2% 6.5% 
Skew -0.53 0.74 0.49 -1.46 0.37 0.35 0.19 0.07 0.11 
t-stat -5.43 7.63 5.11 -15.11 3.82 3.62 1.93 0.75 1.11 
Ex. Kurt. 1.94 4.41 1.76 7.81 4.20 1.83 1.74 0.75 3.21 
t-stat 10.05 22.79 9.10 40.39 21.71 9.44 8.98 3.90 16.62 
Max  16% 32% 21% 23% 26% 17% 13% 10% 20% 
Min -23% -21% -15% -46% -23% -13% -12% -9% -20% 
Drawdown 56% 84% 53% 81% 65% 36% 34% 29% 55% 
D.D 3.05% 2.99% 2.59% 4.96% 2.92% 2.04% 2.05% 1.58% 2.73% 
Sortino 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.35 0.19 
 
Table 5: Correlations long-short. This table shows the correlations between long-short 
portfolios. Numbers below the diagonal are Pearson correlation coefficients. Numbers above the 
diagonal are p-values. 
Rho/P-val MKT SMB BTM WML OP INV ACC NI 
MKT  0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SMB 0.17  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BTM -0.06 0.33  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.98 
WML -0.18 -0.08 -0.17  0.00 0.17 0.33 0.00 
OP -0.39 -0.54 -0.18 0.16  0.94 0.11 0.00 
INV -0.24 0.15 0.51 0.05 0.00  0.00 0.00 
ACC -0.17 -0.20 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.21  0.00 
NI -0.39 -0.34 0.00 0.21 0.38 0.30 0.20   
μ -0.18 -0.07 0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.14 0.03 0.05 
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Table 6: Correlations long only and short only. Numbers above the diagonal are the cross 
correlations between short only anomalies. Numbers below the diagonal are correlations between 
long only anomalies. Numbers in the diagonal are correlations between the short and long leg of 
the same anomaly. μ (L) is the average correlation for long anomalies. μ (S) is the average 
correlation between short anomalies. The intersection of μ (L) and μ (S) is the average long 
correlation divided by the average short correlation. 
Correlation Long only/Short only 
RhoL/Rho
S MKT SMB BTM WML OP INV ACC NI μ (S) 
 
MKT  0.98 0.93 0.79 0.88 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.91  
SMB 0.78 0.66 0.93 0.74 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.88 0.87  
BTM 0.83 0.78 0.67 0.72 0.82 0.92 0.90 0.84 0.86  
WML 0.85 0.76 0.69 0.55 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.77  
OP 0.93 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.76 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.83  
INV 0.90 0.82 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.94 0.92 0.90  
ACC 0.90 0.74 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.85 0.88 0.88  
NI 0.95 0.70 0.83 0.77 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.88 0.87  
μ (L) 0.88 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.84 0.94  
 
Table 7: Anomaly alphas. This table shows the slope and the monthly intercept from time-series 
regressions of value-weighted anomaly portfolios on the equity premium. T-statistics are calculated 
using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
LS SMB BTM WML OP INV ACC NI  μ 
ά 0.19% 0.42% 1.42% 0.53% 0.48% 0.39% 0.67% 0.59% 
β 0.18 -0.06 -0.28 -0.40 -0.18 -0.12 -0.23 -0.16 
         
t (ά) 1.02 2.52 5.41 3.15 3.72 3.15 6.79 3.68 
t (β) 3.52 -1.09 -3.24 -8.36 -4.99 -3.92 -9.40 -3.93 
R2 2.9% 0.4% 3.2% 15.3% 5.7% 2.9% 15.0% 6.5% 
                  
Long LSMB LBTM LWML LOP LINV LACC LNI  μ 
ά 0.16% 0.31% 0.48% 0.11% 0.19% 0.04% 0.23% 0.22% 
β 1.11 1.00 1.17 0.96 1.09 1.14 0.91 1.05 
         
t (ά) 1.01 2.70 3.78 1.58 2.05 0.38 4.46 2.28 
t (β) 25.7 26.0 32.0 47.6 41.8 42.3 63.1 39.79 
R2 60% 70% 72% 86% 81% 80% 91% 77% 
                  
Short SSMB SBTM SWML SOP SINV SACC SNI  μ 
ά -0.03% -0.11% -0.94% -0.42% -0.29% -0.35% -0.44% -0.37% 
β 0.93 1.06 1.45 1.35 1.27 1.26 1.14 1.21 
         
t (ά) -0.85 -1.47 -4.98 -3.24 -3.60 -3.74 -5.35 -3.32 
t (β) 88.8 49.7 23.0 39.1 59.8 51.8 51.5 51.98 
R2 95% 86% 63% 78% 89% 84% 86% 83% 
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Table 8: Short selling costs. This table shows the annual borrowing costs associated with long 
and short value-weighted anomaly positions. Borrowing cost calculations are made on sorts that 
exclude firms without borrowing cost data. Short/Long ά is the average annualized alpha where 
bolded coefficients are the statistically significant gross alphas. 
VW SMB BTM WML OP INV ACC NI μ 
Cost Short  -0.38% -0.42% -1.10% -1.16% -0.47% -0.64% -0.61% -0.68% 
Cost Long  -3.56% -0.67% -0.53% -0.39% -0.68% -0.67% -0.48% -1.00% 
Short ά 0.38% 1.32% 11.24% 5.04% 3.48% 4.26% 5.28% 4.43% 
Long ά 1.88% 3.71% 5.81% 1.32% 2.28% 0.45% 2.74% 2.60% 
 
Table 9: Market capitalization and anomaly performance. Panel A shows average annual 
alpha and short selling costs for equally weighted portfolios without NYSE breakpoints. Panel B 
shows the annual alpha for value-weighted portfolios that exclude stocks below the median market 
capitalization. Long and Short are the coefficients from regressing costs on dummy variables that 
take the value 1 for stocks that enter long and short portfolios respectively.  
Panel A - EW without NYSE breakpoints 
  SMB BTM WML OP INV ACC NI  μ 
Long ά 12.48% 10.17% 8.52% 3.94% 7.12% 4.92% 7.35% 7.79% 
t (ά) 4.44 4.93 4.23 3.08 2.55 2.06 5.92 3.89 
Short ά 0.27% -6.30% -6.00% -1.27% -7.94% -3.77% -7.26% -4.61% 
t (ά) 0.56 -3.24 -1.71 -0.40 -4.38 -1.93 -3.67 -2.11 
Short EW Cost -0.41% -4.07% -17.32% -17.66% -4.88% -9.15% -14.36% -9.69% 
 Intercept -4.19% -4.78% -4.27% -4.24% -4.47% -4.52% -5.22% -4.53% 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Long   -18.07% -2.58% 0.35% 2.31% -8.67% -5.17% 4.29% -3.93% 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Short 3.78% 0.71% -13.05% -13.43% -0.40% -4.64% -9.14% -5.17% 
p-val 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 0.00   
          
Panel B -VW Size Restricted 
  SMB BTM WML OP INV ACC NI  μ 
Long ά 2.06% 3.56% 5.85% 1.31% 1.75% 0.41% 5.07% 2.86% 
t (ά) 1.40 2.75 3.70 1.55 1.80 0.37 5.25 2.40 
Short ά -0.31% -1.09% -9.53% -4.04% -3.57% -3.76% -4.89% -3.89% 
t (ά) -0.67 -1.18 -4.80 -4.78 -3.65 -3.27 -4.92 -3.32 
Short VW Cost -0.70% -0.39% -0.60% -0.68% -0.44% -0.50% -0.51% -0.55% 
 Intercept -5.08% -5.05% -5.06% -5.05% -5.05% -5.02% -5.40% -5.10% 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Long   4.32% 4.47% 4.57% 4.55% 3.60% 3.77% 4.95% 4.32% 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Short 4.73% 4.05% 3.58% 3.91% 4.23% 4.01% 4.58% 4.15% 
p-val 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
77 
 
Table 10: Scenarios. This table shows monthly performance across scenarios and optimization 
methods. Long-only allows for investments in long anomaly position. The synthetic short 
constrained scenario goes long the highest two alpha portfolios (at different weights) whilst short 
selling the market with a 100% collateral at the risk-free rate. The long-short scenario allows short 
selling but requires 100% interest bearing collateral at the risk-free rate. P–values are based on the 
Ledoit and Wolf (2008) bootstrap procedure and are calculated relative to the previous scenario.  
μ (R) Max Sh EW  Sh Max Sh  EW 
Market 0.9%   Market 0.12  
Long-Only 1.3% 1.1%  Long-Only 0.18 0.15 
Synthetic Short  0.6% 0.6%  Synthetic Short  0.33 0.21 
Long-Short  0.9% 0.9%  Long-Short  0.41 0.35 
       
σ Max Sh EW  p Max Sh EW 
Market 4.4%   Market   
Long-Only 5.0% 4.7%  Long-Only 0.00 0.00 
Synthetic Short  0.7% 1.0%  Synthetic Short  0.00 0.02 
Long-Short  1.2% 1.5%  Long-Short  0.04 0.02 
 
Table 11: Portfolio weights across scenarios. This table shows portfolios weights across 
optimization techniques and scenarios. ‘Max Sh’ is in-sample optimization for the maximum 
Sharpe ratio. ‘EW’ is equally weighted.  
 Long-Only Synthetic-Short Constrained Long-Short Constrained 
  Max Sh EW Max Sh EW Max Sh EW 
MKT 0.0% 12.5% 6.8% 12.5% 21.4% 12.5% 
SMB 0.0% 12.5% 1.5% 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 
BTM 18.3% 12.5% 20.9% 12.5% 6.6% 12.5% 
WML 53.9% 12.5% 5.2% 12.5% 7.8% 12.5% 
OP 0.0% 12.5% 1.0% 12.5% 12.2% 12.5% 
INV 0.0% 12.5% 0.6% 12.5% 0.0% 12.5% 
AC 0.0% 12.5% 3.3% 12.5% 10.6% 12.5% 
NI 27.8% 12.5% 60.6% 12.5% 28.9% 12.5% 




Table 12. Shorting cost variation and performance. This table shows portfolio performance 
for different short selling cost assumptions. Cost is the annual rebate rate. Portfolios are leverage 
constrained and short positions require 102% rebate bearing collateral. Anomaly unbundling in 
optimization is prohibited. The benchmark for the p-values is the market short method with an 
annual market short cost of 45 BPS. 45 VW is the value-weighted cost of short selling in the 
sample. 35 GC is to the general collateral rate in the short selling sample. P–values are based on 
the Ledoit and Wolf (2008) bootstrap procedure.  
Cost (BPS)  
Max Sharpe EW 
Sharpe p-val Sharpe p-val 
Base Long-Short 0.41   0.35   
35 (GC) 0.39 0.00 0.32 0.00 
45 (VW Cost) 0.38 0.00 0.32 0.01 
65 0.37 0.01 0.31 0.01 
85 0.36 0.02 0.30 0.02 
105 0.35 0.02 0.29 0.03 
125 0.34 0.05 0.28 0.04 
150 0.33 0.11 0.27 0.07 
200 0.30 0.32 0.24 0.18 
300 0.26 0.83 0.19 0.70 
Synthetic Short (-45BPS) 0.27   0.18   
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Table 13: Data summary for long-only portfolios. This table shows summary statistics for long 
only anomalies minus the risk-free rate for the period 07/1963-12/2016. D.D. is downside 
deviation with zero as the target. M2 is the annual volatility matched (to the equity premium) 
return. μ is the average across anomalies. LSMB is small, LBTM is high book to market, LWML 
is winners, LOP is profitable, LINV is low investment, LACC is low accruals and LNI is negative 
share issuance. 
  LSMB LBTM LWML LOP LINV LAC LNI μ 
R 0.73% 0.82% 1.08% 0.60% 0.75% 0.62% 0.69% 0.76% 
t-stat 2.91 3.93 4.51 3.34 3.55 2.81 4.18 3.60 
σ 6.33% 5.30% 6.07% 4.55% 5.35% 5.61% 4.20% 5.35% 
Sharpe 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.14 
M2 6.33% 8.60% 10.03% 7.22% 7.75% 6.07% 9.09% 7.87% 
Skew -0.15 -0.02 -0.46 -0.46 -0.39 -0.45 -0.48 -0.34 
t-stat -1.57 -0.23 -4.78 -4.75 -4.05 -4.62 -4.94 -3.56 
Ex. Kurt. 2.47 3.55 1.87 2.29 2.45 1.69 2.16 2.35 
t-stat 12.76 18.35 9.65 11.86 12.69 8.73 11.18 12.17 
Max  29% 30% 21% 17% 21% 18% 16% 22% 
Min -30% -26% -27% -25% -29% -25% -21% -26% 
Drawdown 80% 56% 54% 57% 59% 77% 51% 62% 
D.D 4.20% 3.38% 3.99% 3.06% 3.54% 3.85% 2.77% 3.54% 
Sortino 0.17 0.24 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.22 
 
Table 14: Data summary for short only portfolios. This table shows summary statistics for the 
short leg of anomalies minus the risk-free rate for the period 07/1963-12/2016. D.D. is downside 
deviation with zero as the target. M2 is the annual volatility matched (to the equity premium) 
return. μ is the average across anomalies. SSMB is big, SBTM is growth, SWML is losers, SOP is 
unprofitable, SINV is high investment, SACC is high accruals and SNI is high share issuance. 
  SSMB SBTM SWML SOP SINV SAC SNI μ 
R 0.45% 0.43% -0.19% 0.27% 0.36% 0.29% 0.14% 0.25% 
t-stat 2.68 2.18 -0.61 1.02 1.53 1.22 0.67 1.24 
σ 4.21% 5.04% 8.07% 6.80% 5.96% 6.08% 5.45% 5.95% 
Sharpe 0.11 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 
M2 5.74% 4.66% -1.27% 2.17% 3.27% 2.59% 1.42% 2.65% 
Skew -0.36 -0.25 0.61 -0.56 -0.48 -0.52 -0.35 -0.27 
t-stat -3.77 -2.63 6.35 -5.77 -4.94 -5.33 -3.57 -2.81 
Ex. Kurt. 1.73 1.60 4.22 1.84 1.37 1.74 1.45 1.99 
t-stat 2.68 2.18 -0.61 1.02 1.53 1.22 0.67 1.24 
Max  18% 24% 45% 19% 19% 18% 20% 23% 
Min -20% -23% -26% -33% -28% -31% -25% -27% 
Drawdown 61% 69% 99% 91% 75% 75% 79% 78% 
D.D 2.88% 3.46% 5.54% 4.93% 4.25% 4.36% 3.92% 4.19% 





Chapter 3: The pricing implications of shareholder voting 
 
Abstract 
The paper investigates the pricing implications of shareholder voting using a US sample of 
management and shareholder sponsored resolutions covering environmental, social, and 
governance issues. We uncover two robust asset pricing anomalies: (1) firms with a shareholder 
meeting provide positive risk-adjusted returns in the month of the meeting, as well as the months 
leading up to the meeting and (2) sorts on abnormal shareholder support in the month following 
the shareholder meeting,  have an annualized long short alpha of 15.1%, with high support firms 
experiencing particularly poor stock market performance.  
 
1. Introduction 
Shareholder meetings are a key corporate event relevant to a variety of stakeholders. 
Management relies on meetings to share their corporate vision and to obtain approval for policy. 
For shareholders, meetings offer an opportunity to challenge management and to express dissent 
through the voting process. This paper investigates how shareholder meetings and voting 
outcomes affect stock valuation.  
We investigate the pricing implications of shareholder voting using a US sample of 437,742 
management and shareholder sponsored resolutions covering environmental, social, and 
governance topics from 2003 to 2016. To capture the information content from voting behavior, 
we construct a novel measure of (abnormal) shareholder support: the average of excess vote 
support relative to a historical topic-specific benchmark. This measure enables us to consider the 
full array of resolutions under consideration by all firms, as each resolution is benchmarked against 
a representative sample of proposals. The aim of the measure is to capture ‘abnormal’ shareholders 
support (or disapproval) towards the firm.  
The data reveals two robust and independent asset pricing anomalies: (1) a voting period 
premium, whereby firms that will have a shareholder meeting have positive risk-adjusted returns 
in the month of the vote as well as the months leading up to the vote and (2) an abnormal 
shareholder support premium, whereby firms that had abnormally high shareholder support 
experience negative risk-adjusted returns in the month after the meeting.  
More specifically, using the abnormal shareholder support measure as a signal, we construct 
value-weighted decile portfolios, with monthly rebalancing as a bassline investment strategy, and 
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find that firms with the highest level of shareholder support experience a negative alpha in the 
month following the vote. In other words, abnormally high shareholder support leads to 
abnormally poor stock market performance. The long-short strategy is statistically significant with 
an annualized long-short alpha of 15.1%.  
The profitability of the abnormal shareholder support anomaly is robust to the benchmarking 
method with significant alphas across the CAPM, Fama-French three factor, Fama-French five 
factor and the Fama-French five factor model augmented with momentum. Moreover, robustness 
tests reveal a consistent pattern in subsamples that consider only management and shareholder 
sponsored resolutions, as well as subsamples that use data only from annual general meetings 
(AGM). Since the subsamples have limited overlap in topics, the results also suggest that alphas 
are not topic-specific.  
More sophisticated construction methods, such as increasing the signal-fading frequency (how 
long stocks can remain in a portfolio following the initial vote) or the way abnormal support is 
aggregated across resolutions, yield an even stronger conclusion. For example, using a two-month 
fading signal with maximum aggregation, which implies that abnormal shareholder support in a 
meeting is obtained by averaging the three most extreme votes (rather than the all-resolution 
average), yields an annualized long-short alpha of 16.9% with an associated t-statistic of 4.  
The impact of shareholder support reverses before the vote. Firms that will experience high 
abnormal shareholder support in a forthcoming meeting have positive risk-adjusted return in the 
months preceding the meeting that turn negative in the month following the vote. Alphas 
disappear on longer horizons (more than three months) both before and after the meeting.   
In addition to the stock price response to shareholder support, we investigate the general 
pricing impact associated with the incidence of shareholder meetings. In the period before the 
meeting, the agenda will be revealed and the voting recommendations from management and 
proxy advisory agencies will be distributed to shareholders. Moreover, share ownership for the 
purposes of voting will be established. The data suggest that there are positive and significant 
alphas in the month of the vote as well as the months leading up to the vote regardless of 
shareholder support. The voting period premium is strongest for small companies and special 
meetings but is also present in annual meeting and large stocks. For example, the annualized FF5+ 
momentum alpha of firms with a shareholder meeting in the upcoming month is 6.5% with a t-
statistic of 3.2.  
The voting period premium is broadly in line with findings that examine the within-firm time-
series, whereby predictable events where information is revealed, such as dividend and earnings 
announcements, are associated with positive risk-adjusted returns. A unique feature of the voting 
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period premium is that it is not concentrated exclusively in the month of the vote but also in the 
three months preceding the vote.  
Time-series regressions suggest that the voting period premium and shareholder support 
premium are independent. This is intuitive as the voting period premium selects all stocks that 
have a shareholder meeting and the shareholder support premium selects a subset of those stocks 
in the month after. Time-series regressions suggest that the equity premium is subsumed by the 
voting period premium. This is intuitive as above average performance in the voting period implies 
below average performance in the rest of the year.  
Keeping in mind the inherent non-testability of rational and behavioral explanations 
(Bekjarovski, 2017), we discuss the consistency of the results with a variety of theories. More 
specifically, we consider the extent to which agency theory, strategic information disclosure by 
management, the investor attention hypothesis, and time-varying risk premiums and loadings (to 
unobserved factors) can explain the uncovered price pattern. The behavioral theories are not 
mutually exclusive, and they often provide overlapping predictions that are partially consistent with 
the observed pricing pattern. However, no single explanation seems to account for the full range 
of empirical findings and we speculate that multiple forces are at play. Strategic information 
disclosure by management appears to be the most consistent theory when it comes to the abnormal 
shareholder support premium. On the other hand, the attention hypothesis seems the most 
plausible when it comes to the voting period premium. 
Strategic information disclosure by management suggests that corporate news is 
opportunistically disclosed prior to relevant meeting dates. Intuitively, management has incentives 
to disclose good information before meetings and bad information after meetings to avoid 
dissenting shareholders. The hypothesis implies positive risk-adjusted returns prior to shareholder 
meetings that are stronger for firms that are about to experience high abnormal shareholder 
support. Intuitively, management releases positive information which raises stock prices and 
boosts shareholder approval. Similarly, we can expect negative risk-adjusted returns following the 
vote for companies that have had high abnormal shareholder support. Following the vote, 
management will start to release negative information as shareholders are unable to quickly 
challenge management. The predicted pricing pattern is broadly consistent with the shareholder 
support premium.   
The investor attention hypothesis, combined with Miller’s (1977) theory that investor 
heterogeneity combined with short selling frictions can lead to prices that are biased by the view 
of optimists, suggests that we should see positive risk-adjusted returns for firms in the spotlight. 
The hypothesis is consistent with the voting period premium as well as the increased trading 
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volume we uncover around meeting dates. It is also corroborated by the fact that the voting period 
premium is stronger in small stocks firms which have higher short selling frictions (Bekjarovski, 
2018).  
An alternative explanation for the voting period premium is the hypothesis of downward 
sloping demand curves. Investors interested in influencing voting outcome are going to actively 
acquire shares in the months prior to the vote. For example, we know that (institutional) investors 
recall loaned shares (which are often sold short) prior to proxy dates in order to exercise their 
voting rights (Aggarwal, Saffi, & Sturgess, 2015)11. Similarly, battling for corporate control in proxy 
fights and special meetings with M&A resolutions should induce price pressure prior to record 
dates. The resulting ‘extra’ demand for shares of voting firms may create upward price pressure in 
the presence of slow-moving capital (Duffie, 2010). The hypothesis predicts positive performance 
before shareholder meetings which is consistent with the data. Moreover, the fact that the voting 
period premium is stronger in small firms is also consistent with a supply-demand effect.  
Strategic information disclosure, investor inattention and slow-moving capital should be 
combined with an error in expectations explanation on the part of market participants to account 
for the fact that markets have not formed unbiased expectations of prices. For example, if markets 
anticipated strategic information disclosure they would not be surprised by the inflow of 
asymmetric news. Similarly, providers of capital should be surprised by excess demand on 
seemingly predictable events. An anticipated event should not create a price response. 
Finally, rational explanations would suggest that we are excluding a relevant pricing factor for 
which betas change rapidly between periods. For example, a potential explanation is that the beta 
to an unobserved factor switches abruptly in the month after the vote to obtain the reversal pattern 
for the shareholder support premium. Omitted factors concerns are less problematic for the voting 
period and shareholder support premiums, relative to other anomalies based on persistent 
accounting data, as the explanation requires that the betas to the missing factor change monthly. 
If high abnormal shareholder support firms had a positive beta to an unobserved factor with a 
positive premium before the meeting, it is necessary that the beta to the unobserved factor abruptly 
changes signs for the sign of alpha to switch right after the meeting. This explanation remains a 
possibility and we do observe some modest variation in betas to controlled factors around voting 
dates. While no anomaly paper can definitively exclude risk explanations, the structure of the 
voting anomalies makes a rational explanation excessively convoluted. 
 
                                                          
11 The effect is strongest for firms with poor performance and governance. 
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2. Data and methodology  
2.1. Data  
Voting information comes from the ‘Company Vote Result’ database provided by ISS (formerly 
known as RiskMetrics). The ISS Voting database is merged with CRSP and Compustat using 
CUSIP as a matching identifier to obtain price and financial statement information. The ISS 
database contains vote information on 437,742 US resolutions covering 10767 unique films for 
the period 1/2003 to 12/2016. The data composition is reported in Table 1, whereby infrequent 
data classifications, as well as missing data, are included in ‘other’ for the sake of brevity. As 
expected, most of the resolutions are sponsored by management. Shareholder sponsored 
proposals account for 2.33% of the data and are primarily governance-related. They are relatively 
more common in proxy contests when activist shareholders propose their own candidates for the 
board of directors (Table 3).  
Public companies in the US are required by federal securities law to hold at least one 
shareholder meeting each year. Meetings enable shareholders an opportunity to express their views 
on policy and performance. Most resolutions are tabled in annual general meetings (AGMs) Table 
1). Special meetings, also known as extraordinary meeting, occur infrequently and are usually 
scheduled to address matters that cannot wait until the subsequent AGM, such as resolutions 
regarding mergers and acquisitions (Table 3). State laws and corporate bylaws determine who has 
the right to call a special meeting. In fact, shareholders can vote on this matter.  
A significant proportion of resolutions address the election of directors via plurality voting; 
which implies that the candidate director with the highest number of votes gets elected. Majority 
voting is the second most common requirement for a vote to pass and it applies for approximately 
38.9% (9%) of the management (shareholder) proposals (Table 1). The data also contains a small 
sample of votes that require various degrees of supermajorities.  
Management recommendations are disclosed on the proxy card and stand for the voting 
recommendation given to shareholders by the board of directors. The board of directors supports 
management-sponsored proposals on average in 98.5% of the cases, which entails that in a small 
proportion of the management proposals, the board of directors recommends voting against. In 
general, negative voting recommendations on management resolutions can reflect disagreement 
between the board and CEO, disagreement between board members or disapproval for a 
resolution tabled due to procedural necessity (such as adjourning a meeting).  The most frequent 
management-sponsored topic with a negative recommendation from the board of directors is ‘say 
on pay’.  
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The board of directors is generally hostile towards shareholder proposals, with only 15.6% of 
resolutions receiving a positive voting recommendation. The largest jump in management support 
for shareholder-sponsored proposals came in the crisis year of 2008 and has remained higher ever 
since. The topic behind this rise in positive recommendations is the election of shareholder 
proposed directors. 
Activist shareholders incur a cost when they undertake independent voting research while the 
benefits are dispersed across the shareholder base. The proxy advisory industry arose to tackle this 
free rider problem by reducing the cost of informed voting. Institutional shareholder services (ISS) 
is the most well-known proxy advisory agency and they issue voting recommendations to clients. 
For 84.3% of the management resolutions, ISS recommends voting in support of a proposal. The 
second most common recommendation is to withhold votes (9% of resolutions). ISS is more 
supportive towards shareholder-sponsored resolutions relative to the board of directors, with 
60.2% of resolutions receiving a favorable voting recommendation.  
Calculating the support rate for each resolution requires specifying the votes that will constitute 
the voting base. Information on the appropriate denominator is available in the data. The most 
common method for calculating the voting denominator is to take ‘For + Against’ votes. This vote 
base is used to determine whether a proposal passes in 73.7% (48.4%) of the management 
(shareholder) proposals  (Table 1).  Abstaining votes are also added to the denominator in 22.2% 
(48.0%) of the management (shareholder) proposals. Other denominators, such as shares 
outstanding are rare (1.4% and 2.1% for management and shareholder respectively). When 
constructing the vote support rate, we adopt the company’s choice regarding the voting base (be 
it ‘For + Against’ or ‘For + Against + Abstain’).  
 ‘Frequency on say on pay’ is a management-sponsored resolution whereby shareholders vote 
on how often to vote on executive compensation. This resolution is mandated by the Dodd-Frank 
Act enacted in 2010 which requires companies to hold both an advisory (not binding) vote on 
executive compensation and an advisory vote on the frequency at which shareholder vote on 
executive compensation. Frequency on say-on-pay has the number of recommended years as an 
outcome and this outcome refers to the frequency at which say-on-pay votes should take place. In 
total there are 4963 say-on-pay frequency proposals in the data and we exclude them from the 
analysis due to the unique nature of their outcome (one/two/three years). Consistent with the 
anomalies literature, we also exclude votes for entities that are not US common stocks listed on 
NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ.  
Around 84.4% of management-sponsored proposals pass while the failure rate is only 0.5%. 
Resolutions can also be withdrawn before the vote (neither pass or fail). In contrast, the pass rate 
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for shareholder sponsored proposals is only 20.6% with 67% failing to gather the necessary 
support.  
An ideal vote benchmarking method should allow us to make use of votes with very high or 
low levels of support. This is relevant as most management-sponsored resolutions end up with 
more than 90% shareholder support (Figure 1). In addition to having high support, management 
proposals also have a low standard deviation of shareholder support (Table 2). Shareholder 
sponsored resolutions on the other hand, most frequently end with less than 10% support (Figure 
1), and they have up to three times the standard deviation of support rates relative to management-
sponsored proposals (Table 2). Support for shareholder proposals has varied between 26% and 
45% over the years. Changes in average support rates over time can capture both changes in 
approval and changes in the incidence of topics with varying average support rates.   
Participation rates are high on average for both management and shareholder sponsored 
resolutions (Figure 1). Moreover, participation rates for shareholder-sponsored proposals have 
been stable over the years. On the other hand, participation in management-sponsored proposals 
has decreased extensively since 2010 (Table 2), likely due to increasing restrictions on uninstructed 
broker voting. Brokers can vote on certain items on behalf of their clients if they have not received 
voting instructions within 10 days of the vote (allowed by NYSE)12. Such ‘uninstructed’ broker 
votes are allowed only on ‘routine’ items. The scope of topics that qualify for uninstructed broker 
voting has been reduced over time. For example, brokers can no longer vote on adopting majority 
rules for director elections, providing rights to call a special meeting, eliminating supermajority 
requirements, etc. Bethel and Gillan (2002) show that broker votes tend to be skewed in favor of 
management. Therefore, the growing restrictions on uninstructed voting increase the relevance of 
shareholder views. 
Most resolutions cluster around April, May, and June (Figure 2). This is effectively the US 
‘proxy season’. However, a meaningful proportion of resolutions also occur off-season and 
throughout the year. Resolutions in special meetings tend to be distributed more evenly across the 
calendar year.  
 
2.2. Timeline for annual shareholder meetings 
Share ownership for the purposes of voting is established on the record date (Figure 4). 
Companies must schedule the record date at most 60 days ahead of the annual shareholder 
                                                          
12 A ‘broker-non-vote’ is when brokers did not receive voting instructions from owners and they 
are not allowed to cast uninstructed votes. Along with abstentions they are sometimes used to 
determine if a quorum is present.  
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meeting. SEC Proxy Rules 14a-13 stipulates that companies must also give notice of at least 20 
business days to all brokers before the record date.  
The mail date is when companies dispatch proxy materials. Companies usually allow 7-14 
calendar days between record and mailing date, but they can dispatch material even one business 
day after the record date. The meeting date must be at least 30 days after the mail date. Companies 
usually mail 40 to 45 days in advance for non-routine proposals to ensure participations when 
uninstructed broker votes are unavailable. Corporate bylaws and exchange regulations can add 
addition restriction on the timeline. ISS provides reports to clients between 13 to 30 calendar days 
before the meeting.  
The rules ensure that proxy materials, which reveal the agenda items to be considered during 
the upcoming meeting as well as the recommendation of the board of directors, are distributed to 
shareholders well in advance. Proxy voting, whereby shareowners authorize agents to cast votes 
on their behalf, is a widespread practice in the US. A broad geographic shareholder base implies 
that most shareholder will not attend meetings and can only exercise their rights as beneficial 
owners through proxy voting. The proxy solicitation process taking place before the meetings is 
therefore crucial for high participation. 
Most publicly traded shares in the US are held in ‘streets name’. Approximately 85% of 
exchange-traded shares are held by securities intermediaries (broker-deals and banks) the majority 
of which are deposited in the Depository Trust Company (DTC)13. Usually, this implies that there 
is no specific share directly associated with the beneficial owner. Nevertheless, when intermediaries 
such as DTC receive proxy material, they are obligated to pass on the information to beneficial 
owners reflecting their overall voting rights14.  
Shareholders that hold at least 2000$ worth of securities or 1% of voting stocks (Rule 14a-8) 
can submit their own proposal 120 calendar days before the anniversary of the date when proxy 
materials were delivered to shareholders in the previous AGM. The company can omit proposals 
after this date. Alternatively, when companies wish to exclude shareholder-sponsored proposals 
based on their content, they often ask the SEC for a ‘no-action’ letter which indicates that 
regulatory staff members do not recommend taking legal actions against the company should they 
exclude the proposal.  
                                                          
13 Information available on the SEC website 
(www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm) 
14 Double voting can occur when the beneficial owner does not know that his shares have been 
lent by the broker-custodian; this can result in both the original owner and the share borrower 
casting a vote (Christoffersen, Getczy, Musto & Reed, 2007). 
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Information about the occurrence of a meeting, its content, and even the outcome of upcoming 
resolutions can be approximated well in advance. For example, annual shareholder meetings tend 
to happen 11 to 13 months after the previous annual shareholder meeting (Figure 8). Moreover, 
additional relevant information, such as the voting recommendations of management and ISS, is 
disclosed in advance of meetings. Resultantly, we will also investigate performance in the months 
leading up to the meeting to obtain a complete picture of the market response.  
 
2.3. Defining abnormal shareholder support 
How do we determine if shareholders support a proposal? Routine resolutions have high 
average support rates and will resultantly almost always pass. Consequently, using average support 
rates or vote outcomes as a measure of shareholder support is comparable to selecting resolution 
topics. Adopting this approach will always pick resolutions such as ‘ratifying auditors’ as having 
the highest level of shareholder support (Table 3). Resultantly, an investment strategy would pick 
companies that have a large incidence of high support topics as the companies that have large 
shareholder support. Moreover, simple support rates do not capture how novel information is to 
markets. If the market anticipated 98% voting support for a resolution to ratify auditors, then we 
can expect no reaction following the outcome. 
To summarize, using plain support rates as a measure of shareholder support will simply select 
vote topics without bringing ‘fresh’ information into the analysis. A simple method common in 
the literature when analyzing voting behavior is to omit ‘routine topics’ or even management 
resolutions altogether. This approach results in a needless loss of information. Optimally, we want 
a measure that takes topic-specific effect into account when determining shareholder support 
without placing extreme restrictions on the sample. To achieve this objective, we propose the 
following simple measure of shareholder support: 
s , , =  
V , , − μ ,
σ ,
 
Where s , ,  is shareholder support for vote k, firm i and period t. V , ,  is the vote support rate, 
μ ,  is the average vote support level in previous votes on the same topic j (whereby the topics 
are assigned and classified by ISS) and σ ,  is the standard deviation of vote support in previous 
votes on the same topic j.  
We construct a recursive benchmark whereby we include all previous votes on the same topic 
for constructing the average and standard deviation. The recursive benchmark allows us to build 
a better measure of expected support for infrequent resolutions. In contrast, using a rolling yearly 
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window would exclude most topics that have a limited number of resolutions in an arbitrarily 
defined time frame. Our goal is to provide a simple measure that maximizes the use of the available 
data whilst limiting the set of arbitrary choices that the researcher needs to make.  
The average and standard deviation measures are lagged to avoid forward-looking bias in the 
analysis. This is required to make investable strategies and to capture the information available to 
investors at the time of the vote. We only lose the first month of signal data to make the first topic-
specific average. This helps maximize our sample length. Moreover, since we have a topic-specific 
benchmark, we can use all the eligible resolutions in the sample and therefore obtain more general 
results.  
The measure is intuitive. For a given voting outcome, shareholder support for the resolution is 
low if: (1) average support rates for the same topic were higher in previous years (effect of μ ) 
and (2) standard deviation of support for votes on the same topic was low (effect of σ ).  
Although a lot of the proposals have very high support rates, we still want to use this 
information. If a proposal passes with low support rates relative to past voting on a similar topic, 
shareholders are less pleased with this firm’s corporate policy on this issue. A low standard 
deviation implies that an outcome strongly deviates from past voting observations and should 
therefore not be considered ‘normal’; that is, the signal is stronger since most similar votes in the 
past have clustered around the average.  
Topics explain around 55% of the variation in voting outcomes (Table 10).  We do not use a 
within firm benchmark as we would be averaging across very different proposal types, some of 
which persistently attract either very high or low shareholder support. Alternatively, within-firm 
benchmarking on a specific topic would leave us with too few observations for infrequent 
proposals and we would end up analyzing only a small subset of resolution types.  
The following numerical example illustrates how the measure works. If vote support for an 
elect director resolution was 70% while the average support rate in previous years for similar votes 
was 90% with an associated standard deviation of 10%, then shareholder disproval is -2.  
 




For comparison, a vote such as declassifying the board of directors can have a much lower 
support rate of 55% but if this resolution topic has an average support rate of 80% and a standard 
deviation of 25%, then shareholder disapproval is -1.  






In other words, even though the proposal to declassifying the board of directors has lower 
support, the outcome is less contentious and surprising than the elect director vote. Intuitively, 
support of only 70% for director elections can be considered very contentions given a high 
historical average with little variation across outcomes. Adopting this approach enables us to make 
extensive use of information in routine votes to capture shareholder approval.  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of abnormal shareholder support for management and 
shareholder sponsored resolutions. Since most management-sponsored resolutions have 
shareholder support above 90%, the potential for high negative disruptions (extreme disapproval) 
is larger. This is observable by the skewed distribution of the management-sponsored abnormal 
shareholder support measure (Figure 3).  
 
2.4. Average abnormal shareholder support 
Firms tend to have multiple votes during a single shareholder meeting. To construct a single 
measure of shareholder support per firm-period, we use the firm’s average of all the available 












tiS ,  is our support rate for firm i in period t and we average across the k abnormal support 
measures across resolutions in the same month and firm.  
By using the full array of resolutions under consideration we get a clearer picture of overall 
support for corporate policy. In contrast, unaccounted agenda items are a common concern when 
focusing on a single resolution type. More specifically, markets may be responding to correlated 
but unaccounted resolutions during the same shareholder meeting. We know that firms can be 
subject to (vote no) dissent campaigns (Bach & Metzger, 2016). Consequently, low support in one 
proposal is likely associated with low support across all proposals. Alternatively, high support may 
be resolution specific and not reflective of general views towards the firm. We avoid this issue by 
basing our measure of shareholder support on all the voted resolutions.  
 
2.5. Maximum abnormal shareholder support 
An alternative to averaging abnormal shareholder support across all resolutions is to average 
across the n votes with the ‘maximum’ level of absolute abnormal support: 






where the three resolutions used are the ones with the largest absolute abnormal support. The 
average approach may play down the outcomes of very high disagreement resolutions by placing 
the amalgamated outcome around the middle of the shareholder support distribution. On the other 
hand, high disapproval in a resolution need not reflect an overall negative view of the company. 
For example, high disagreement on a resolution may signal dissatisfaction with the election of a 
specific director rather than general displeasure with corporate policy. We will use the ‘maximum’ 
measure as a robustness check whilst keeping in mind that it can capture a different feature of 
shareholder support.  
 
2.6. Rebalancing frequency and signal fading 
The baseline shareholder support strategy is rebalanced monthly using a one-month fading 
signal. A one-month fading signal implies that firms with vote information can remain in a 
portfolio for one-month following the creation of the signal. A strategy in the literature that uses 
a similar signal fading and rebalancing is short term reversal (Jegadeesh, 1990; Da, Liu & 
Schaumbaug, 2013).  
Reasoning more generally, the optimal frequency should depend on the horizon at which we 
expect markets to incorporate information. As voting is a corporate event, we can expect the 
pricing consequences of events to be incorporate ‘quickly’. With this perspective in mind, the use 
of a one-month fading signal can be considered as ‘long term’ pricing consequences relative to 
event studies which focus on performance in the days around the event. Nevertheless, the strategy 
can be considered high frequency investing relative to anomalies that rely on financial statement 
information with annual rebalancing. We also investigate potential long-run effects by iterating the 
signal fading frequency.  
Companies are required to disclose vote outcomes within four business days of the meeting by 
filling Form 8-K (the form is used to notify shareholders of relevant events). Typically, it is revealed 
during the meeting if a vote has passed the approval threshold. Preliminary support rates are also 
often disclosed during the meeting as significant proportion of votes tend to be cast in advance of 
the meetings. In other words, there is no significant lag between the vote outcome and its 
availability to investors and the public. Therefore, assuming voting results are known to the public 
at the end of the month cannot be expected to induce meaningful forward-looking bias in the 
abnormal support signal. As a robustness check, we also investigate the performance of the 
strategy if we include only firms with a meeting in the first half of the month. With this approach, 




2.7. Anomaly construction 
At the end of each month, we rank securities based on the abnormal shareholder support signal 
and we construct ten value-weighted decile portfolios with NYSE breakpoints (equal number of 
NYSE firms across portfolios) as a baseline strategy. Value weights are more appropriate for 
making tradable portfolios with low transaction costs (Novy-Marx & Velikov, 2015) and short 
selling fees (Bekjarovski, 2018). We also investigate how performance is affected by restrictions on 
the universe based on firm size.   
First, we do a univariate sort on abnormal shareholder support in the full sample. Firms with 
the highest average abnormal shareholder support across resolutions and meetings enter the top 
decile and firms with the lowest are placed in the bottom decile. We then analyze the properties 
of the top and bottom portfolios as well as the long-short strategy. As a robustness check, we split 
the universe into shareholder-sponsored and management-sponsored proposals and reconstruct 
the average abnormal shareholder support signal. Moreover, we check if the pricing pattern 
changes across different meeting types.  
 
3. Abnormal Shareholder Support Anomaly 
3.1. Performance of baseline strategy 
The baseline strategy has a large and significant negative alpha in the low abnormal shareholder 
support portfolio. The alpha relative to the five factor Fama-French model augmented with 
momentum is -1.08% monthly with an associated t-statistic of 3.28. A long-short annual alpha of 
14.4% is large relative to other well-known asset pricing anomalies. The magnitude of model 
mispricing makes statistical significance possible even in a short sample.  
The abnormal shareholder support anomaly is negatively related to the value and momentum 
premium; nevertheless, the statistical significance of alpha is not extensively affected by the 
benchmarking method.  
The effect of abnormal shareholder support is asymmetric with a one-month signal-fading 
frequency. Most of the profitability is concentrated on the short side. Moreover, the relationship 
between risk-adjusted performance and abnormal voting support is not monotonic. Nevertheless, 
alphas for portfolios in the middle are mostly insignificant across benchmarking methods. 
Moreover, some of the performance spikes for in-between portfolios disappear as we account for 
firm size. The absence of a monotonic relationship is more consistent with behavioral explanations 




3.2. Firm sizes and standard error robustness checks 
Excluding stocks below the market capitalization median does not significantly alter the 
conclusions (Table 6). It seems that most of the model mispricing found in the baseline 
shareholder support anomaly is in large market capitalization securities. This is relevant as small 
stocks tend to have very higher short selling costs while large stocks tend to be on general collateral 
(cheap to short) (Bekjarovski, 2018).  
Accounting for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey-West standard errors does 
not meaningfully impact the results. Alternatively, removing early sample years (2004 and 2005 for 
example) to have a better historical benchmark also does not meaningfully impact the results (not 
reported).  
 
3.3. Subsamples based on meeting type and resolution sponsor 
Using the abnormal shareholder support signal only from the annual shareholder meeting still 
yields economically and statistically significant findings (Table 7). This implies that the conclusions 
are not exclusively driven by special meetings and proxy contests; although they evidently 
contribute to the relevance of the baseline anomaly.  
Using signals from meetings only in the first part of the month (first 15 days) yields an 
economically stronger result. This suggests that the findings are not driven by forward-looking 
bias as this approach assumes that each signal is available at least half a month after the meeting.  
 
3.4. Signal fading and the maximum aggregation measure  
Signal fading refers to how long stocks are eligible for portfolio assignment after the vote. Using 
a two-month fading signal has two effects. On the one hand, it reduces the alpha of the high 
shareholder support portfolio. On the other hand, it raises the alpha of the low shareholder 
support portfolio. The two effects partly cancel out and the long-short strategy is still economically 
and statistically significant (Table 5). Overall, the results show that the effect is robust to the 
anomaly construction method. Model mispricing disappears with a six-month fading signal for 
large firms. This is consistent with the idea that voting information is incorporated ‘quickly’ after 
the vote.  
Table 5 also shows alphas if we combine multiple disagreement votes for the same firm in the 
same period using the average of the three most extreme abnormal vote outcomes. Using this 
measure, we still find large and significant model mispricing. The effect is particularly strong with 
two-month signal fading whereby the long short alpha is 1.40% monthly with a t-statistic of 3.96.  
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Using the absolute value of only the extreme abnormal shareholder support resolution within 
a firm-period as a signal does not work (not reported). We need to incorporate at least a few voting 
outcomes in constructing the abnormal shareholder support measure. This is consistent with the 
idea that the alpha is not associated with resolution specific outcomes.  
 
3.5. Abnormal shareholder support before meetings 
To the extent that market participants are anticipating the outcome of shareholder votes, by 
revising their estimates based on ISS and management recommendation, we can expect enterprises 
with high support to experience price appreciation ex-ante. The intuition suggests increases in firm 
value before voting dates with the strongest effect for firms with high approval.  
Table 8 shows the alpha of portfolios sorted on shareholder support across time. The months 
before the vote tend to be associated with significant alphas. As expected, alphas are strongest for 
firms that are about to experience positive abnormal shareholder support during the upcoming 
corporate meeting. The effect reverses after the vote for large firms, with high support stocks 
experiencing negative alpha and low support stocks experiencing positive alpha. It is important to 
note that sorts of abnormal shareholder support before the meeting rely on information revealed 
during the vote and are resultantly not tradable in the months prior to the vote. Nevertheless, the 
result can help us understand the overall pricing reaction around voting dates. We find that in the 
three months preceding the meeting, firms with high shareholder support have positive alphas. 
The effect is most pronounced for large firms (Figure 5) and disappears in periods further from 
the vote.  
 
3.6. Relevant stakeholders 
Table 9 shows the relevant participants in the voting process. ‘Agreement’ occurs when all 
stakeholders are in either support or disapproval of a resolution. When management is against a 
proposal, but ISS and shareholders are for, we define such an outcome as ‘Dissent’. If both 
shareholders and ISS are on the same side, they can challenge management and provide both 
discipline and monitoring through the voting mechanism. When shareholders go against the 
recommendations of the board and ISS we define such an outcome as ‘Disagreement’. This is the 
strongest form of shareholder disapproval of corporate policies. When ISS is against a proposal, 
but shareholders and management are for, we define such an outcome as ‘ISS Dissent’. This 
outcome implies that ISS was not able to sway the opinions of shareholders. ISS often consults 
their largest clients, such as large asset owners, before issuing recommendations. Therefore, to the 
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extent their recommendation contains the opinion of large institutional clients, ISS dissent can be 
viewed as the disagreement between large and small shareholders.   
The intuition of the definitions is not dependent on the sponsor. Shareholders can vote in 
support of a shareholder-sponsored proposal when management and ISS recommend voting 
against. Alternatively, they can vote against a management-sponsored proposal when management 
and ISS are recommending support. Both outcomes capture disagreement.  
Table 10 provides some evidence on the impact of management and ISS recommendations on 
shareholder support (we include only resolutions with valid shareholder support data). Consistent 
with intuition, we find that positive recommendations are correlated with higher support. Voting 
recommendations happen before the vote. Nevertheless, claiming causation here is difficult as the 
recommendations themselves can be influenced by forecasted shareholder support. However, the 
results suggest that votes that receive positive recommendations will tend to end up with higher 
abnormal support while votes that receive negative recommendations will end up in the lower 
abnormal support portfolios. In other words, recommendations can be predictive of shareholder 
support. In the next section, we discuss how performance is affected if we incorporate 
recommendations in the vote benchmarking method for the shareholder support premium.  
 
3.7. Sophisticated forecasts of shareholder support 
Variables which are not utilized in the forecast will affect the firm’s abnormal shareholder 
support signal. For example, if both ISS and management are against a resolution, we can expect 
low abnormal shareholder support relative to the topic benchmark (Table 10). In other words, 
unaccounted variables, such as the management and ISS recommendations, will determine which 
votes end up being classified as high or low shareholder support.  
Relying on topics as a benchmark produces a robust return predictor. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting to examine if performance can be improved if we use more information in the 
formation of an expected voting outcome. For example, an alternative method of constructing 
abnormal shareholder support (𝑠 , , ) is to define it as the deviation of vote support from a 
regression-derived prediction: 
][ ,,,,,, tiktiktik VEVs   
Relative to the topic average, the regression gives more freedom in choosing predictors. 
Moreover, since the panel regression uses additional information in forming the forecast, we can 
expect it will lead to more accurate predictions of vote outcomes. On the downside, the regression 
approach needs a longer sample to estimate the initial coefficients which reduces the length of the 
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time-series. In a sense, we can also think about the historical topic average as a monthly rolling 
panel regression with topic dummies as predictors.  
Sophisticated methods for forecasting vote outcomes can potentially lead to enhanced 
investment results. An important point to consider is the extent to which market participants are 
using the additional variables in forming their forecast. The abnormal shareholder support measure 
is trying to capture the response of market participants to ‘abnormal voting outcomes’. The task 
of the model is not to make the perfect prediction. The task of the model is to give an indication 
of what market participants find abnormal. Resultantly, a more accurate model need not be closer 
to the objective of capturing market expectations of voting outcomes. If market participants are 
not utilizing a sophisticated model, then they may find an outcome abnormal while the model 
classifies it as ordinary given forecasting information. In other words, the model would ‘properly’ 
forecast the outcome and not place it in the extreme portfolios.  
For example, if the low shareholder support is exclusively driven by a negative ISS 
recommendation, and if the market is not using this information when forming the vote forecast, 
then market participants will be surprised by the vote outcome and will resultantly reassess firm 
valuation. If the forecasting model of the econometricians includes ISS recommendations as a 
predictor, then the vote outcome would be classified as normal and will not be placed in the 
investable extreme portfolios. Consequently, it is not clear a-priori whether forecast accuracy will 
result in improved strategy profitability. In this section, we proceed to test the way improved 
forecasts of voting outcomes affect the profitability of strategies.  
In our analysis, we amalgamate the ISS recommendations ‘withhold’, ‘do not vote’, ‘none’, 
‘abstain’, and ‘against’ and treat them as negative ISS signals in the analysis (‘refer’ is omitted as its 
meaning is ambiguous). The same assumption is made for management recommendations. Once 
we obtain the residuals from the in-sample vote forecasting regressions, specifications 1 and 2 
shown in Table 10, we average them within a firm-month. We then use the average abnormal 
residual to form univariate value-weighted quintile portfolios with monthly rebalancing. The alphas 
and t-statistics of the portfolios sorted on the residual of shareholder support are shown in Table 
11. Overall, the alphas are comparable to the alphas in the sorts using a simple rolling topic 
benchmark. High abnormal support leads to positive alphas before the vote and negative alphas 
after the vote. Alphas in the period after the vote for the high support portfolio are negative and 
statistically significant if we use either topics or topics and recommendations as predictors. 
Sophisticated in-sample forecasts of voting outcomes seem not to improve strategy profitability. 




4. The voting period anomaly 
4.1. The within firm time-series  
The literature has documented a general tendency across investigations to find significant 
abnormal returns around recurring predictable events such as earnings and dividend 
announcements. Hartzmark, Solomon and Soltes (2016) advocate for comprehensive investigation 
of anomalies that rely on the within-firm time-series. They show that most of the predictable event 
anomalies are evident in value-weighted portfolios and occur on the long side. For example, 
Hartzmar and Solomon (2013) find a dividend month premium while Barber, George, Lehavy, 
and Trueman (2013) document an earnings announcement premium in multiple countries across 
the world. Similarly, Heston and Sadaka (2006) find seasonality in the cross-section of stock returns 
whereby stocks that outperform in a particular month continue to do so in the same month the 
following year.  
Evidence that returns are not equivalent throughout the calendar year is not exclusive to the 
cross-section of stocks. Ai and Bansal (2018) show that stock returns around scheduled market 
announcements, such as employment reports or Federal Open Market Committee statements, 
capture 55% of the equity premium. They argue that announcements carry information about 
prospects of future economic growth and are consequently the periods in which the equity 
premium gets realized. Similarly, Lucca and Moench (2015) document large excess returns for 
stocks in the period around monetary policy decisions. 
In the following sections, we document the voting period premium by showing that the 
incidence of a predictable event, such as shareholder meetings, is associated with positive risk-
adjusted returns regardless of the voting outcomes. The findings are analogous to the 
investigations to Ai and Bansal (2018) as well as Lucca and Moench (2015), who find a connection 
between the equity premium and macroeconomic announcements, and our results whereby we 
document that a significant proportion of returns at the firm level is earned in the period 
surrounding shareholder meetings.  
 
4.2. Shareholder meetings and valuation 
Since the voting period premium is a long-only strategy that does not require short-selling, we 
can investigate alphas for both the value-weighted and equally weighted portfolios of stocks that 
experience a shareholder meeting in period t (Table 12). The value-weighted portfolio has a 
significant positive alpha in the month of the vote. Moreover, there seem to be positive alphas 
leading up to the meeting (with only t-3 being statistically significant). The pattern reverses after 
the vote with negative, albeit not statistically significant, alphas.  
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Equally weighted portfolios have a stronger positive effect. The alphas leading up to the 
shareholder meeting are economically larger relative to the value-weighted case. For example, the 
FF + Momentum alpha for an equally weighted portfolio of firms with a shareholder meeting in 
two months is 0.89% monthly with a t-statistic of 5.69. The positive alpha for equally weighted 
portfolios remains positive even after the meeting (with only t+3 being statistically significant). 
The results are not extensively affected by the benchmarking method.  
 
4.3. Fama-MacBeth regressions 
Table 13 shows the Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on the voting period dummies. 
Consistent with the portfolio results, we find a voting premium in the month of the vote and the 
months preceding the vote (column 1 Table 13). The results are economically and statistically 
significant.  
We also replicate an array of controls form the literature for the full sample covering the period 
from 07/1963 to 12/2016 (column 2 Table 13). The full sample replication results are in line with 
the original studies. However, the predictors from the literature are not statistically significant in 
the restricted sample for which there is voting data (column 3 Table 13). A drop is significance is 
somewhat expected given that we reduce the number of sample years from 53 to 13 and the 
number of firms from 8285 to 5921. The important thing to note is that when we control for well-
known return predictors, the voting premium becomes even stronger (column 4 Table 13).  
Including all firms in CRSP/Compustat increases the significance of the voting dummies (not 
reported). In this case, the comparison sample includes firms that do not have voting data.  
The regression in column 5 Table 13 splits the sample into AGM, special meetings (3107 in 
total) and proxy contests (309 in total). Returns in the month of the vote are only statistically 
significant in annual general meetings. Interestingly, special meetings and proxy contests have a 
particularly strong performance before the meeting. As special meetings are evenly distributed 
across the calendar year, the results are unlikely to capture a seasonal pattern, such as the January 
effect (Rozeff and Kinney, 1976; Bouman & Jacobsen, 2002). Contrary to AGM, firms with a 
proxy contest or a special meeting have s particularly poor average performance in the months 
after the vote.  
Premiums such as size, which are significant even in the restricted sample, are subsumed when 
we control for the meeting type. This implies that part of the size premium is captured by the 





4.4. Anomaly independence and the equity premium 
Time-series regressions reveal that the shareholder support and voting period premium are 
independent (Table 14). This is consistent with intuition as the two strategies select stocks in dif-
ferent time periods. More specifically, the voting period premium selects all stocks in the month 
of the vote and the shareholder support premium selects a subset of those stocks in the month 
following the vote. Interestingly, the excess return of the voting period premium is considerably 
larger than its alpha as well as the excess return for the value-weighted portfolio of securities (Ta-
ble 14).  
The time-series regressions reveal that the equity premium has a negative alpha when regressed 
on the voting period premium. The fact that the intercept for the equity premium becomes 
negative when we control for the voting period premium is in fact intuitive. The equity premium 
selects all securities in the universe and the voting period premium selects all stocks that have a 
shareholder meeting (see more on sample selection bias in section 5.2). Firms are required to have 
at least one annual shareholder meeting. Consequently, higher than average returns in the month 
of the vote imply lower than average returns in other periods. This reasoning is consistent with 
theories arguing that the risk-reward trade-off is not constant but concentrated in periods when 
uncertainty gets resolved.  
 
4.5. Proxy season and mixed strategy 
Table 14 shows time-series regressions for the mixed voting period and shareholder support 
premium strategy whereby we also include a dummy variable for the proxy season. The dummy 
variable takes the value 1 in April, May, and June. Alphas outside of proxy seasons are still 
economically large and statistically significant. Proxy season alphas can be obtained as the sum of 
the intercept and the season dummy coeffect and they are much smaller across strategies. This is 
supportive of attention narratives as off-season meetings face less competition for the spotlight. 
Nevertheless, given the short sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that alphas in the two 
periods are equivalent.  
Finally, we construct a mixed tradable strategy that goes long firms that will have a shareholder 
meeting next month and short firms that had high abnormal shareholder support in the previous 
month. The information to construct these strategies is theoretically available to investors in real 
time. The mixed strategy has an off-season monthly alpha of 1.86% with a t-statistic 4.61. Again, 






5.1. The rational-behavioral debate 
The rational-behavioral debate is not readily testable without eliciting the preferences and 
valuation process of the representative investor. In other words, market data cannot definitively 
discriminate if model mispricing is compensation for an unaccounted time-varying risk or the 
result of irrational investor behavior. Keeping this limitation in mind, shareholder meetings and 
abnormal shareholder support seem to provide independent return forecasting information and 
we discuss the extent to which various explanation can account for this pricing pattern.  
 
5.2. Sample selection and survivorship bias  
A potential concern is sample selection during data collection. If the data provider is collecting 
voting information only on surviving firms, then we will end up with a biased sample of 
outperforming firms when constructing the voting anomalies. To rule out sample selection during 
data collection, we investigate the performance of firms that have voting data relative to the 
standard anomaly investment universe. We construct a value-weighted portfolio of all securities 
that have at least one meeting in the ISS database and we regress it on a value-weighted portfolio 
of US common stocks in the CRSP/Compustat universe. We subtract the risk-free rate from both 
long-only portfolios for the regression. The intercept, slope, and t-statistics (in brackets) from the 
time-series regression are reported below: 
universevotedata RR 99.00.00021   
        (4.51)      (794)            
The test has a lot of power since the two portfolios have extensive overlap (R2 is high, beta 
almost 1) so the high significance is expected, but a monthly alpha of 0.021% is not economically 
meaningful (especially in comparison to the alphas of the anomalies). The result suggests that the 
data provider has not been systematically omitting historically unsuccessful firms during the vote 
collection procedure.  
Another noteworthy concern is that the abnormal shareholder support anomaly simply selects 
stocks with positive idiosyncratic news before the shareholder meeting. These stocks have higher 
returns due to chance. The high returns induce abnormal voting support. However, this 
mechanical explanation cannot account for the reversal pattern. An arbitrary sample of successful 
firms would not experience a systematic reversal in the month after the vote following multiple 
months of positive performance.  
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We also run a simulation to ensure that the alphas three months before the vote are not driven 
by survivorship bias. Intuitively, investing in firms that will have a shareholder meeting three 
months in the future implies forward-looking bias whereby the algorithm knows which entities 
will continue to exist. All investigation of pre-event performance can bias return estimates upwards 
as the strategy has knowledge which firms will not go bankrupt in the near future. It is usually 
implicitly assumed in empirical work that this bias is negligible. We confirm this with a simple 
simulation.  
We assign a pseudo meeting for 10% of the firms in the 2003-2016 period and we lag this signal 
three months. Consequently, the placebo strategy invests in an arbitrary sample of firms that will 
not go bankrupt in the following three months. We repeat the simulation 1000 times and collect 
the times series alphas from regressions of the value-weighted placebo strategy on the market 
benchmark to examine the strength of the bias. Figure 6 plots the distribution of t-stats. The 
average alpha in the simulation is 0.01% percent annually and it represents a tiny fraction of the 
voting period alphas. Naturally, the bias will be even smaller if we move closer to the month of 
the vote.   
 
5.3. Strategic information disclosure 
The abnormal shareholder support anomaly is consistent with strategic information disclosure 
by management. Intuitively, management has incentives to disclose positive information before 
meetings in order to avoid dissenting shareholder resolutions and votes (Dimitrov and Jain, 2011). 
Using analogous reasoning, management has incentives to delay disclosing negative information 
until after the meeting. This type of asymmetric information release should lead to positive stock 
market performance of firms before the meeting. We can also expect negative information to be 
released after the vote with additional negative information for firms with high shareholder 
support. Intuitively, the higher the support the more likely that management did not release 
negative information beforehand and the more leeway management has with shareholders. The 
hypothesis is broadly consistent with the data. We find positive alphas before meetings that are 
larger for firms with high abnormal shareholder support. Moreover, we find that after the meeting, 
firms with high abnormal shareholder support experience the biggest drop in performance.  
To further investigate this hypothesis, we recreate the abnormal shareholder support anomaly 
using only outcomes in management and shareholder sponsored resolutions; that is, the abnormal 
shareholder support signal for the subsamples assumes that a meeting only has management 
(shareholder) resolutions and constructs abnormal support by ignoring outcomes in shareholder 
(management) resolutions. This approach yields fewer signals and we, therefore, construct tercile 
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portfolios for the shareholder-sponsored portfolio. Moreover, the approach suffers from ‘omitted 
resolutions’ concerns given that only a subset of resolutions is considered when constructing the 
signal. Nevertheless, the approach allows us to examine if there are differences in pricing patterns 
across the subsamples. If management is strategically disclosing voting information to gain 
approval, we should notice a positive price response for both firms with high support in 
management-sponsored resolutions and low support for shareholder-sponsored resolutions (given 
that a large fraction of shareholder-sponsored resolutions receives negative voting 
recommendations from the board).  
The intuition of the strategic information disclosure hypothesis is supported by the data (Table 
17). Management-sponsored resolutions receive positive alphas for the high support portfolio in 
the period running up to the meeting and negative alphas in the period after the meeting which is 
consistent with positive news disclosure by management. In contrast, the firms with high support 
in shareholder-sponsored resolutions have much smaller alphas in the period running up to the 
meeting.   
 
5.4. Investor attention and divergence of opinions 
An alternative behavioral explanation is that shareholder meetings grab investor attention. In 
the presence of heterogeneous agents and short selling frictions (Miller, 1977), we can expect prices 
to reflect the views of more optimistic investors as negative views are not incorporated into prices. 
Even if the average price by all investors is ‘correct’, investor attention, in combination with short 
selling frictions, implies that the view of the most optimistic investors will be incorporated into 
prices. Investor attention is central to the explanation as it expands the set of investors for which 
the most optimistic valuation will be incorporated. In addition to the price response, we also know 
that stocks that are in the news will have high trading volume (Barber and Odean, 2007). To the 
extent that firms with a meeting are more likely to be in the spotlight, especially in proxy fights 
and special meetings with M&A activity, we can expect a similar pattern in returns and trading 
volume. 
Divergence of opinion can have the same effect as investor attention. Diverging views in the 
presence of short selling restrictions will raise prices as the view of more optimistic investors will 
be incorporated. In addition, the greater the disagreement among traders the larger the level of the 
trading volume; that is, high trading volume implies disagreement between heterogeneous 
investors (Kim & Verrecchia, 1997).  
Both explanations can account for the positive returns before and during shareholder meetings 
as investors focus on and disagree about the agenda items and voting outcomes. They are also 
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consistent with the finding that performance preceding shareholder meetings is stronger for small 
firms which are known to have high short selling costs (Bekjarovski, 2018). Higher short selling 
costs imply additional difficulty for investors to express pessimistic views. This implies that small 
firms will experience larger price appreciation in the presence of investor heterogeneity and 
increased attention which is consistent with the result that the voting period premium is stronger 
in equally weighted portfolios.  
 
5.5. Trading volume 
To further examine the validity of the various theories, we investigate trading volume around 
corporate votes. We define trading volume as shares traded divided by shares outstanding (we use 
CRSP/Compustat for constructing our measure). Panel A of Table 15 compares the average 
trading volume around voting dates only for companies that have a vote in month T. Panel B and 
Panel C show full sample regressions of trading volume on dummy variables capturing abnormal 
shareholder support. There are four main takeaways. 
First, based only on a sample of stocks that have a voting event at T, we see that average trading 
activity peaks in the month of the vote relative to months surrounding the vote (Table 15, Panel 
A). Second, lower abnormal shareholder support is associated with higher trading activity (Table 
15, Panel B). Third, high trading activity is not specific to the voting month, but it is also higher in 
the three months before and after the vote (Table 15, Panel C). The lead and lag dummies suggest 
that trading activity is higher than the sample average for an extended period surrounding the 
vote15. Forth, trading activity is highest for special meetings and proxy contests which are more 
contentious.  
The investor attention (and divergence of opinion) explanation for the voting period premium 
is in line with the trading volume results.  Shareholder meetings are associated with an increase in 
trading volume. Moreover, special meetings and proxy contests, which are arguably associated with 
the greatest divergence of opinions and investor attention, tend to produce the strongest pricing 
pattern for the voting period anomaly. An alternative rational explanation is that high trading 
volume is indicative of noise trader risk for which risk-averse investor demand a premium (Hong 
& Yu, 2006).  
Contrary to the abnormal support anomaly, we find that low abnormal support stocks have 
higher trading volume. According to the attention hypothesis, low support stocks should have 
                                                          
15 The higher before period trading can be associated with share recall by asset managers that are 




higher (and not lower) returns relative to high support stocks. Consequently, the investor attention 
and divergence of opinion theories do not fit the abnormal shareholder support anomaly well. 
Moreover, they cannot explain the post-meeting results such as the reversal pattern for high 
abnormal support firms and the fact that trading volume is still larger in the months following the 
meeting. A potential explanation for the persistent increase in trading volume after the meeting is 
given by Kim and Verrecvhia (1991) who hypothesize both higher pre-event trading on private 
information and higher post-event trading as event outcomes change trader’s beliefs.  
 
5.6. Demand effect 
Active owners interested in influencing firm votes or taking over the firm will seek to increase 
their share ownership before shareholder meetings. In the presence of slow-moving capital 
(Duffie, 2010), the extra demand can create temporary price distortions. For example, in an 
extreme process known as empty voting, investors can obtain significant voting rights by 
purchasing shares whilst simultaneously reducing price exposure through offsetting trades in the 
derivative market (Hu & Black, 2006).16 Such a process can create significant price distorting effects 
around shareholder meetings. Alternatively, if funds that hold voting stocks outperform in early 
months preceding the shareholder meeting, then fund inflows, which are persistent and follow 
good performance, will cause funds to increase their positions in existing stocks and therefore 
further push prices (Coval, & Stafford, 2007). Resultantly, good performance in the early months 
preceding the meeting (example at month t-3) would be followed by good performance in later 
months (example at t=0) due to the price pressure induced by fund flows. Either empty voting, 
fund flow persistence or active ownership can induce a demand effect consistent with the voting 
period premium.  
 
                                                          
16 This can potentially induce investors to vote in a manner that is not consistent with corporate 
interests and markedly different from the behavior of investors that are exposed to the price risk 
of bad decisions. 
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5.7. Agency costs and management response 
If expressing preferences or sending a signal (to management and markets) through voting has 
value, then the prices of stocks in the voting period should increase. In other words, the predictions 
of agency theory are consistent with the voting premium in the period preceding the shareholder 
meeting. The effect of shareholder support on valuation through the prism of agency theory is 
ambiguous.  
On the one hand, low shareholder support can be a source of new negative information that 
points out high agency costs and extensive shareholder disapproval of corporate decision making. 
If this were the case, we would expect poor stock market performance. of reprimanded firms. On 
the other hand, low shareholder support can induce a positive stock price response if the pressure 
of shareholders motivates management to take value increasing actions (even though a winning 
vote by shareholders is not necessarily legally binding). Similarly, high shareholder approval can be 
a positive signal insofar as it suggests alignment between corporate policy and shareholder 
preferences. Alternatively, it can be taken as a negative signal if it implies that management is given 
too much leeway.  In other words, the price response to shareholder support depends on the effect 
it has on management and the extent to which it conveys new information to markets with regards 
to agency costs.  
 
5.8. Errors in expectations 
Eades, Hess, and Kim (1985) propose underestimation of the probability of positive outcomes 
as an explanation for the high returns around dividend announcements. The explanation can be 
extended to the anomalous returns associated with the voting anomalies by arguing that investors 
have biased expectations with regards to shareholder support, shareholder meetings, strategic 
disclosure by management, demand effects or the effects of investor attention on valuation. When 
information gets revealed, investors get ‘surprised’ and update their beliefs. For example, investors 
can be surprised by the positive news disclosed by management before meetings. This causes a 
positive price response. The bias comes from the fact that investors did not properly anticipate 
the general pricing pattern whereby more good news is strategically disclosed before shareholder 
meetings. The consistency in ‘surprises’ leads to consistency in price behavior. The biggest 
challenge is that errors in expectation explanations are easily amendable to explain any pricing 




5.9. Time-varying risk loadings and premiums 
The voting anomalies are incompatible with static risk models. Intuitively, firm-specific events 
should not affect a stock’s expected returns in static models as they are unrelated to betas or risk 
premiums by construction. Consequently, a rational explanation to the voting anomalies must rely 
either on time-varying quantity of risk or a time-varying price of risk.  
A potential rational explanation is that firms in anomalous portfolios are riskier as the firm’s 
betas to unobserved factors with a positive premium are time-varying and higher in the 
investigated periods of outperformance. A narrative along these lines could claim that firms with 
high approval votes have negative alphas because their betas change in the month following the 
vote and are therefore not representative of their full sample counterparts.  
In general, however, high-frequency anomalies are more difficult to reconcile with rational 
explanations as they require risk to change rapidly; in our case, it would need to change on a 
monthly frequency. For example, high shareholder support firms would need to have higher betas 
before and during the meeting to justify their high returns. Then their beta would have to 
immediately drop after the meeting to justify their anomalously low returns. The betas estimated 
for a portfolio of voting firms over time (Table 16) suggests only modest variation in betas to 
observed factors. 
Alternatively, betas could be constant, but the premiums associated with a given quantity of 
risk can change through time. This form of argument was initially made by Robichek & Mayers 
(1966) and the trading of financial claims to cargo ships with an uncertain outcome and known 
date of arrival. Intuitively, the risk of the voyage is concentrated in the period when the ship is 
expected to return. At that moment, cash flow uncertainty is reduced. Intuitively, risk per unit of 
time need not be constant and can increase in periods when extensive new information gets 
released. If this risk is not diversifiable, risk-averse investors would require higher expected returns 
around information events. Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) find abnormal returns around dividend 
announcements and interpret the results as supportive of the idea that expected returns can 
increase around predictable events with high information content. The stock market also has much 
higher returns on days in which macroeconomic announcements are made (Savor & Wilson, 2013). 
Similarly, firms scheduled to report quarterly earnings have an abnormal annualized alpha (Beaver, 
1968; Lamont & Frazzini, 2007; Savor & Wilson, 2016). Savor and Wilson (2016) argue that 
covariance between firm-specific and market cash flow news is higher around announcements 
which makes these firms riskier. 
If announcements are expected and the risk associated with announcements is not diversifiable, 
then rational (mean-variance) investors should demand a premium for bearing announcement risk 
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(Cohen, Dey, Lys, & Sunder, 2007). Shareholder meetings are a predictable corporate event in 
which relevant information is released in markets. However, for the systematic announcement risk 
hypothesis to hold, this risk should not be diversifiable. This is harder to prove as the number of 
announcing firms can be small relative to the investment universe. For example, Cohen, Dey, Lys, 
and Sunder (2007) show that the risk associated with earnings announcements is diversifiable. The 
standard deviation of the portfolio of firms in the month of the vote is also quite small relative to 
periods before and after the vote (Table 16). Moreover, the voting anomalies tend to have negative 
betas across factors. Consequently, an increase in the price of risk should make them even more 
anomalous. 
The market beta of a portfolio of firms that have a shareholder meeting is the smallest relative 
to the beta in the months preceding and after the vote (Table 16). Similarly, the portfolio of firms 
that have a shareholder meeting has the lowest standard deviation of returns. Betas and standard 
deviations suggest that firms are least ‘risky’ in the month when they vote. The results do suggest 
that there is some variation to betas to observable factors (Figure 9 appendix), potentially giving 
rise to concerns that the beta to an omitted factor is also time-varying to an extent that it annuls 
anomaly alphas. While no anomaly paper can definitively exclude risk explanations, the structure 




We uncover two noteworthy price patterns. First, firms with a shareholder meeting have 
positive alphas in the month of the meeting as well as the months preceding the meeting. Second, 
firms with high abnormal shareholder support have negative alphas in the month after the vote. 
The attention hypothesis and divergence of opinions theories show the most promise in explaining 
the voting period premium while strategic information disclosure seems to be the most consistent 
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Figure 1. Shareholder Support and Participation. The figure shows the distribution of 
shareholder support and participation for management and shareholder sponsored resolutions. 
Support is defined as the number of votes in support of a proposal divided by the vote specific 
denominator as base. Voter participation is defined as the sum of votes in support and against a 




Figure 2. US Proxy Season. This figure shows the distribution of resolutions throughout the 
year in annual meetings (left-hand axis), proxy contest, and special shareholder meetings. 
Resolutions from annual meetings and proxy contests cluster around April, May, and June. 




Figure 3. Abnormal shareholder support. This figure displays the full sample pooled 
distribution of the abnormal shareholder support signal for management and shareholder 
sponsored resolutions. Shareholder support is the number of votes in support of a proposal 
relative to the vote specific denominator as base. The abnormal shareholder support signal is 
constructed as the firm-period average of the difference between shareholder support and a topic-
specific benchmark divided by the standard deviation of voting outcomes for the same topic. The 





Figure 4. Timeline. This figure gives an example of a timeline for an annual US shareholder 
meeting. Shareholders are required to submit proposals at least 120 days before the anniversary of 
the date at which proxy materials were mailed to shareholders. Companies are required to: (1) 
inform brokers at least 20 days before the record date, (2) mail proxy materials to shareholders at 
least 30 days before the meeting date, (3) set the record date at most 60 days before the meeting 
date, and (4) disclose results within four business days. Additional time restrictions can apply 




Figure 5. High shareholder support. Shows alphas (left-hand axis) and t-statistics (right hand 
axis) from time-series regressions of the high abnormal shareholder support decile on the Fama-
French five factor model augmented with momentum. The portfolio is constructed using value-
weights, NYSE breakpoints, stocks above the market capitalization median and monthly signal 




Figure 6. Alpha t-statistics distribution for portfolios with forward-looking bias. This 
figure shows the distribution of CAPM alpha t-statistics from 1000 simulations in which we 
construct a value weight portfolio from 10% of the securities in the universe with a pseudo 
shareholder meeting in three months. The strategy aims to select companies that will not go 
bankrupt within three months. The average alpha in the simulation is 0.01% annually 






Table 1. Data Summary. This table shows the most common characteristics across key measures 
in the full unfiltered voting sample (1/2003-12/2016). Descriptive statistics are displayed as 
percent of total resolutions. ‘Vote base’ is the denominator in the calculation of support rates. ‘F’ 
stands for support of a proposal, ‘A’ is against a proposal and ‘AB’ is abstain. ‘Outstanding’ is the 
total number of shares eligible to vote during a meeting. ‘Vote requirement’ is an indication of the 
kind of majority required for a proposal to pass. ‘Plurality vote’ refers to (elect director) votes 
where a majority is not required; obtaining more votes than the alternative is enough for the 
proposal to pass. The ISS recommendation comes from ISS’s proxy research report. ‘Vote result’ 
comes from the comparison of the support rate and the required support threshold disclosed by 
the company. Management recommendation is the board of director’s vote recommendation 
disclosed in the proxy card. Rare outcomes and missing data are included in ‘other’ for the sake of 
brevity. 
          
 Meetings 60268  Resolutions 437742 
Unique Firms 10767  Management 427558 
Unique Topics 409  Shareholder 10184 
         
Management-sponsored  Shareholder Sponsored 
Meeting Type  Meeting Type 
Annual 94.0%  Annual 79.7% 
   Proxy Contest    0.7%     Proxy Contest    19.7% 
Special 4.9%  Special 0.6% 
Other 0.4%  Other 0.1% 
Vote Requirement  Vote Requirement 
Plurality Vote 50.4%  Plurality Vote 83.3% 
0.5 38.9%  0.5 9.0% 
Other 10.7%  Other 7.7% 
Management Recommendation  Management Recommendation 
For 98.5%  For 16.8% 
Against 0.1%  Against 81.0% 
Other 1.4%  Other 2.2% 
ISS Recommendation  ISS Recommendation 
For 84.3%  For 60.2% 
Against 3.9%  Against 28.0% 
Withhold 9.0%  Withhold 1.6% 
Do not vote 0.4%  Do not vote 9.9% 
Other 2.4%  Other 0.4% 
Vote Base  Vote Base 
F+A 73.7%  F+A 48.4% 
F+A+AB 22.2%  F+A+AB 48.0% 
Outstanding 1.4%  Outstanding 2.1% 
Other 2.7%  Other 1.4% 
Vote Result  Vote Result 
Pass 84.4%  Pass 20.6% 
Fail 0.5%  Fail 67.0% 
Other 15.2%  Other 12.4% 
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Table 2. Evolution of Voting Behavior. Panel A displays descriptive statistics across years for 
management-sponsored proposals, while Panel B does so for shareholder-sponsored proposals. 
‘Firms’ is the number of unique firms with at least one proposal. ‘Proposed’ refers to the total 
number of resolutions. ‘P/F’ is the average number of proposals per firm. ‘Voted’ refers to 
proposals with valid vote data. Not all proposed resolutions are voted (as they can also be 
withdrawn). ‘Support’ is the average support rate calculated using the resolution specific 
denominator as the base. ‘SD’ is the standard deviation in support rates. ‘Participation’ is the 
average participation rate with shares outstanding as the denominator ((for+against)/outstanding). 
‘Mgmt. For’ is the average number of ‘for’ recommendations issued by the board of directors. ‘ISS 
For’ is the average ‘for’ recommendations issued in ISS proxy research reports. ‘Average’ is the 
average across years.  
 
Panel A: Management-sponsored Proposals 
Year Firms Proposed  P/F Voted  Support  SD  Participation  Management For  
ISS 
For  
2003 2761 18098 6.6 17187 97.7% 7.6% 84.0% 99.9% 81.7% 
2004 2740 19243 7.0 16993 97.3% 7.9% 85.4% 99.9% 86.5% 
2005 2614 18885 7.2 18608 94.0% 9.1% 87.7% 99.9% 87.8% 
2006 2822 20565 7.3 20016 94.6% 10.0% 87.3% 99.9% 89.3% 
2007 2890 21886 7.6 19566 94.5% 9.0% 87.1% 99.9% 89.2% 
2008 2893 22761 7.9 20071 94.3% 10.9% 86.7% 99.8% 89.5% 
2009 3022 24639 8.2 22723 92.7% 11.7% 89.3% 99.8% 84.2% 
2010 2971 24171 8.1 23508 93.8% 10.0% 76.7% 99.8% 87.1% 
2011 3473 35272 10.2 29209 93.9% 9.5% 75.5% 91.0% 80.6% 
2012 3882 36303 9.4 32887 93.9% 10.9% 75.5% 98.9% 84.4% 
2013 4434 46516 10.5 34299 94.4% 9.1% 73.7% 97.3% 81.9% 
2014 4507 47443 10.5 35347 95.0% 8.6% 74.0% 99.1% 83.6% 
2015 4564 46410 10.2 35914 94.9% 8.7% 74.3% 99.2% 82.7% 
2016 4553 45341 10.0 35050 94.8% 8.7% 76.2% 99.0% 82.2% 
Average 3438 30538 8.6 25813 94.7% 9.4% 81.0% 98.8% 85.1% 
                    
Panel B: Shareholder Sponsored Proposals 
Year Firms Proposed  P/F Voted  Support  SD  Participation Management For  
ISS 
For  
2003 295 579 2.0 571 30.6% 23.7% 69.7% 1.9% 50.3% 
2004 316 644 2.0 599 26.7% 24.1% 70.1% 1.1% 42.7% 
2005 269 568 2.1 550 28.7% 23.5% 70.0% 2.5% 52.1% 
2006 298 620 2.1 598 32.5% 23.4% 71.4% 1.3% 60.6% 
2007 308 678 2.2 643 30.7% 22.3% 70.0% 3.2% 58.7% 
2008 327 774 2.4 679 37.0% 28.2% 67.8% 18.9% 56.7% 
2009 349 835 2.4 726 42.5% 28.5% 66.9% 20.0% 65.4% 
2010 358 847 2.4 649 37.3% 25.1% 68.6% 24.0% 64.3% 
2011 290 599 2.1 538 41.2% 28.8% 68.3% 20.7% 67.3% 
2012 338 804 2.4 596 41.1% 29.5% 69.5% 25.9% 58.2% 
2013 344 837 2.4 669 45.0% 32.0% 67.5% 28.9% 62.6% 
2014 334 762 2.3 643 43.1% 31.3% 68.7% 27.2% 66.5% 
2015 393 871 2.2 678 37.9% 26.6% 70.5% 21.5% 67.2% 
2016 377 766 2.0 631 36.2% 28.6% 69.5% 22.1% 61.9% 




Table 3. Most common agenda items. Panel A exhibits the five most common voted resolution 
types for management and shareholder sponsored proposals. Panel B exhibits the most common 
voted resolution types in special meetings and proxy contests. ISS classifies resolutions into 410 
unique topics. ‘Voted’ is the number of remaining resolutions with disclosed voting outcomes in 
the post-processed data. ‘Average Support’ is the average support for resolutions on the same topic 
with the company-specific denominator as the base for each resolution. ‘SD Support’ is the 
standard deviation of vote support. ‘Omnibus stock plan’ resolutions encompass a range of 
performance-based incentives for employees, executives and board members. ‘Declassify the 
Board of Directors’ resolutions aim to prevent directors from serving different term lengths (which 
enables preventing takeovers). ‘Require a Majority Vote for the Election of Directors’ aims to end 
the practice whereby nominees receiving the most votes are elected even if the majority of the 
votes cast are not supportive of the appointment. ‘Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive 
Officers’ Compensation’ is say-on-pay. 'Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes' is a non-binding 
vote related to the approval of executive compensation arrangements in M&A arrangements.  
 
Panel A  
Management Resolutions Voted Average Support  SD  
'Elect Director' 240642 95% 8% 
'Ratify X as Auditors' 37076 98% 3% 
Advisory Vote to Ratify...Compensation' 17108 91% 12% 
'Amend Omnibus Stock Plan' 7095 83% 13% 
'Approve Omnibus Stock Plan' 4253 83% 13% 
       
Shareholder Resolutions Voted Average Support  SD 
'Require Independent Board Chairman' 590 30% 12% 
'Declassify the Board of Directors' 547 68% 18% 
'Elect Directors (Opposition Slate)' 535 89% 16% 
'Political Contributions Disclosure' 487 22% 12% 
'Require a Majority Vote for...Directors' 447 55% 18% 
        
Panel B 
Special Meeting Voted Average Support  SD 
'Approve Merger Agreement' 1030 89% 18% 
'Adjourn Meeting' 694 91% 10% 
'Advisory Vote on Golden Parachutes' 629 81% 17% 
        
Proxy Contest Voted Average Support  SD 
'Elect Director (Management)' 973 92% 12% 




Table 4. Baseline Anomaly. Panel A shows intercepts from time-series regressions of the voting 
strategy constructed using value-weighted decile portfolios with NYSE breakpoints, monthly 
rebalancing and one-month fading abnormal shareholder support signal on the CAPM, the Fama-
French three factor model (FF3), the Fama-French five factor model (FF5) and the Fama-French 
five factor model augmented with momentum (FF5+Mom). Panel B shows loadings and t-
statistics of the baseline anomaly on the augmented Fama-French five factor model. Portfolio 10 
is the high abnormal shareholder support portfolio. Alphas are monthly.  
 
Panel A 
Portfolio CAPM FF3 FF5 FF5+Mom 
  Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat 
10 -1.09% -3.36 -1.10% -3.45 -1.06% -3.21 -1.08% -3.28 
1 0.08% 0.25 0.05% 0.17 0.11% 0.33 0.12% 0.36 
LS 1.17% 2.44 1.15% 2.42 1.18% 2.37 1.20% 2.46 
 
Panel B 
Coeff MKT SMB HML RMW CMA  MOM 
10 1.04 0.20 0.39 -0.09 -0.21 0.15 
1 0.91 0.43 -0.21 -0.15 0.15 -0.13 
LS -0.13 0.24 -0.60 -0.06 0.36 -0.28 
              
t-stat MKT SMB HML RMW CMA  MOM 
10 10.65 1.27 2.45 -0.44 -0.81 1.91 
1 9.00 2.72 -1.30 -0.70 0.56 -1.59 





Table 5. Alternative strategies. This table shows time-series regressions of the CAPM, Fama-
French three factor model (FF3), the Fama-French five factor model (FF5) and the Fama-French 
five factor model augmented with momentum (FF5+Mom) on the voting strategy constructed 
using various methods. ‘Maximum’ refers to strategies where abnormal shareholder support is 
constructed using the average of the three most extreme support measures. Signal fading refers to 
the number of months a stock can remain in a portfolio. Portfolio 10 (1) is the high (low) abnormal 
shareholder support portfolio. Alphas are monthly.  
 
Two Months Fading  
Portfolio 
CAPM FF3 FF5 FF5+Mom 
Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat 
10 -0.54% -2.00 -0.56% -2.11 -0.45% -1.65 -0.47% -1.74 
1 0.43% 1.52 0.41% 1.47 0.50% 1.75 0.50% 1.76 
LS 0.97% 2.75 0.97% 2.74 0.95% 2.59 0.97% 2.68 
                  
Maximum 
10 -0.87% -3.01 -0.89% -3.09 -0.84% -2.83 -0.85% -2.83 
1 -0.34% -1.00 -0.35% -1.03 -0.21% -0.59 -0.20% -0.57 
LS 0.53% 1.17 0.53% 1.17 0.64% 1.35 0.65% 1.37 
         
Maximum-Two Months Fading 
10 -0.81% -3.40 -0.82% -3.45 -0.87% -3.52 -0.89% -3.69 
1 0.37% 1.37 0.36% 1.36 0.50% 1.80 0.51% 1.87 
LS 1.18% 3.30 1.19% 3.31 1.37% 3.73 1.40% 3.96 
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Table 6. Robustness checks. This table shows time-series regressions of the CAPM, Fama-
French three factor model (FF3), the Fama-French five factor model (FF5) and the Fama-French 
five factor model augmented with momentum (FF5+Mom) on the abnormal shareholder support 
anomaly constructed using various methods. Unless otherwise stated, strategies are constructed 
using value-weights, NYSE breakpoints, monthly rebalancing, and monthly fading signal. The 
‘without small’ strategy excludes all firms below the market capitalization median. ‘Newey West 
SE’ refers to t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
‘Two months fading’ refers sorts where stocks can remain in a portfolio for two months after the 




CAPM FF3 FF5 FF5+Mom 
Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat 
10 -1.17% -3.44 -1.18% -3.51 -1.13% -3.24 -1.14% -3.31 
1 -0.11% -0.31 -0.13% -0.36 -0.01% -0.02 -0.01% -0.03 
LS -1.06% -2.02 1.05% 2.01 1.12% 2.07 1.13% 2.10 
         
Two Months Fading-Without Small 
10 -0.71% -2.51 -0.73% -2.60 -0.60% -2.11 -0.62% -2.20 
1 0.63% 2.41 0.62% 2.37 0.72% 2.66 0.72% 2.68 
LS 1.34% 3.91 1.35% 3.92 1.32% 3.71 1.34% 3.83 
         
Newey-West SE 
10 -1.09% -3.13 -1.10% -3.26 -1.06% -3.16 -1.08% -3.25 
1 0.08% 0.24 0.05% 0.16 0.11% 0.32 0.12% 0.34 





Table 7. Subsamples. This table shows time-series regressions of the CAPM, Fama-French three 
factor model (FF3), the Fama-French five factor model (FF5) and the Fama-French five factor 
model augmented with momentum (FF5+Mom) on abnormal shareholder support sorted 
portfolios. Unless otherwise stated, portfolios are constructed using value-weights, NYSE 
breakpoints, monthly rebalancing, and a monthly fading signal. ‘Management’ constructs abnormal 
shareholder support using only management-sponsored resolutions. ‘Shareholder’ constructs 
abnormal shareholder support using only shareholder-sponsored resolutions and sorts assets into 
EW terciles due to the smaller amount of stocks. ‘Annual meeting’ constructs portfolios using 
signals only from annual meetings. ‘Meeting in the first half of the month’ constructs portfolios 
with signals from meetings that take place in the first half of the month. ‘Conditioned on 
management recommendation’ multiplies abnormal shareholder support measure with 1 when 
management is for and -1 when management is against (or when management recommends not 





CAPM FF3 FF5 FF5+Mom 
Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat 
10 -0.84% -2.30 -0.87% -2.42 -0.88% -2.37 -0.89% -2.40 
1 0.07% 0.20 0.04% 0.13 0.17% 0.50 0.17% 0.51 
LS 0.91% 1.90 0.91% 1.90 1.05% 2.12 1.06% 2.14 
         
Meetings only from the first half of the month 
10 -1.11% -2.49 -1.13% -2.58 -1.08% -2.37 -1.09% -2.41 
1 -0.59% -1.30 -0.60% -1.33 -0.57% -1.22 -0.58% -1.23 
LS 0.52% 0.84 0.53% 0.88 0.50% 0.81 0.51% 0.82 
         




Table 8. Abnormal support and period effects. Shows alphas and t-statistics of decile portfolios 
sorted on abnormal shareholder support regressed on the Fama-French five factor model 
augmented with momentum. The portfolios are constructed using value-weights, NYSE 
breakpoints, monthly rebalancing, and monthly signal fading. Period 0 is the month of the vote.    
 
Alpha 
Period -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
1 0.39% 0.23% 0.06% 0.05% 0.41% 0.12% 0.32% -0.09% 
10 0.43% 1.75% 1.02% 0.72% 0.47% -1.08% -0.65% -0.16% 
LS 0.04% 1.51% 0.97% 0.68% 0.06% -1.20% -0.96% -0.06% 
                  
t-stat 
Period -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
1 1.07 0.67 0.15 0.14 1.16 0.36 0.86 -0.24 
10 1.12 3.91 2.60 1.96 1.37 -3.28 -1.84 -0.48 







Table 9. The Dimensions of Disagreement. This table shows the dimension of disagreement 
for relevant stakeholders in the voting process. ISS For (Against) implies that the institutional 
shareholder services (ISS) recommend voting for (against) the proposal. Management For 
(Against) implies that the board of directors recommends voting For (Against) the proposal. 
Shareholders For (Against) implies that shareholders are in support of (against) the proposal. 
Shareholders views are reflected in the vote. Management and ISS recommendations precede the 
corporate vote.  
 
 









Management For Agreement Disagreement ISS Dissent Dissent 
Management 
Against 




Table 10. Voting support. This table shows results from regressing shareholder support on 
dummy variables for resolution sponsor (‘Shareholder’), management recommendation (‘MGMT 
For’), proxy advisory recommendation (‘ISS For’), meeting type, calendar year, month and topic. 
The sample covers the period from 01/2003 to 12/2016.  
 
Shareholder Support   Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
  MGMT For      8.5% 10.6 9.7% 12.1 
  ISS For      6.8% 5.6 6.7% 5.7 
MGMT For*ISS For  5.9% 4.8 6.4% 5.4 
Shareholder      -33.3% -37.9 -31.5% -36.1 
Shareholder*MGMT For  17.6% 16.3 16.8% 15.5 
Shareholder*ISS For  13.1% 10.5 13.5% 11.1 
Shareholder*ISS For*MGMT For   -4.9% -3.6 -6.2% -4.6 
Topic FE Yes Yes  Yes  
Month FE No No  Yes  
Year FE No No  Yes  
Meeting Type FE No No  Yes  
Industry FE No No   Yes   
NT 339289 338700  338700  
R2 Adj 57.4% 67.9%   69.8%   
 
 
Table 11. Sorts on residual vote support. Shows FF5 + Momentum time-series alphas and t-
statistics for value-weighted quintile portfolios. The portfolios are sorted on the residual from an 
in-sample vote forecasting regression using topics and voting recommendations as predictors 
(‘recommendation & Topic Res.’). ‘[-6,-4]’ (‘[4,6]’) captures alphas for stocks that fall in a particular 
quintile during the period from -6 to -4 (4 to 6) before (after) the month of the vote (used as a 
placebo/robustness check). ‘Topic Res.’ refers to sorts on residuals in regressions with only topics 
as predictors. Period 0 is the month of the vote and alphas showed for this period are for portfolios 
created at the end of the previous month. Portfolio 5 is the high abnormal support portfolio.  
                         
Recommendations & Topic Res.  Topic Res. 
Alpha  Alpha   Alpha 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3  [-6,-4]  [4,6]  1 
1 0.28% -0.30% 0.14% 0.26% 0.11% 0.16% 0.36%  -0.21% 0.12%  0.33% 
5 1.60% 1.70% 0.41% 0.85% -0.76% -0.36% -0.46%  0.16% -0.09%  -0.67% 
LS 1.33% 2.01% 0.27% 0.59% -0.87% -0.52% -0.82%  0.37% -0.21%  -1.01% 
                
T-stat  T-stat  T-stat 
1 0.78 -0.91 0.44 0.91 0.33 0.51 0.98  -0.92 0.48  1.09 
5 4.38 5.22 1.47 3.13 -2.59 -1.21 -1.43  0.71 -0.45  -2.21 







Table 12. Voting Period Anomaly. The table shows alpha and t-statistics form times series 
regressions of the returns of a value-weighted (VW) and equally weighted (VW) portfolio minus 
the risk-free rate regressed on the CAPM and Fama-French five factor model augmented with 
momentum. Period 0 is the month of the meeting.  
 
CAPM Alphas 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Alpha VW 0.54% 0.25% 0.23% 0.51% -0.04% -0.23% -0.15% 
t-stat 3.24 1.53 1.14 3.18 -0.20 -1.37 -0.77 
Alpha EW 1.21% 0.78% 0.58% 0.44% 0.15% 0.07% 0.30% 
t-stat 5.36 3.45 2.88 2.37 0.73 0.36 1.48 
                
FF5 + Mom Alphas 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Alpha VW 0.56% 0.23% 0.28% 0.54% -0.04% -0.24% -0.12% 
t-stat 3.25 1.42 1.38 3.18 -0.22 -1.35 -0.63 
Alpha EW 1.30% 0.89% 0.65% 0.53% 0.22% 0.11% 0.38% 




Table 13. Returns around shareholder meetings. This table shows average slopes (λ) and t-
statistics from monthly cross-sectional regressions to predict stock returns. The predictive 
variables are defined as: ‘MET(-3,-1)’ (meeting) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the 
three months before shareholder meetings, ‘MET(0)’ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in 
the month of the shareholder meeting, ‘MET(1,3)’ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in 
the three months after the shareholder meeting, ‘MC’ (market capitalization) is the natural log of 
market capitalization, ‘B/M’ (book-to-market) is book equity from last fiscal year divided by 
market equity in December, ‘Mom’ (momentum) is cumulative momentum from t-12 to t-2, ‘Inv’ 
(investment) is the change in total assets from the fiscal year ending in year t-2 to the fiscal year 
ending in t-1, ‘Op’ (operating profitability) is revenue minus cost of goods sold, interest expense, 
and selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by book equity, ‘Acc’ (accruals) is accruals 
following Sloan (1996), ‘Ni’ (net issuance) is the change in the natural log of split-adjusted shares 
outstanding between two fiscal years; ‘Annual’, ‘Proxy’ and ‘Special’ are dummy variables that take 
the value 1 for annual, special and proxy shareholder meeting in the three months before the 
meeting for (-3,1), the month of the meeting for (0) and the three months after the meeting for 
(1,3). ‘Int’ (intercept) is the (average) regression intercept. The full sample includes all US common 
stocks from 07/1963 to 12/2016. The restricted sample (Res. Sample) contains US common 
stocks that have voting data (restricts the universe from 8285 to 5921 firms in the period from 




Res. Sample Full Sample Res. Sample Res. Sample Res. Sample 
λ t-stat λ t-stat λ t-stat λ t-stat λ t-stat 
Int 1.05 2.48 1.30 3.22 2.44 3.48 2.40 3.36 1.20 1.06 
MET (-3,-1) 0.75 5.91     1.06 8.21   
MET (0) 0.37 2.61     0.54 3.78   
MET (1,3) 0.18 1.57         0.42 3.46     
MC   -0.18 -5.24 -0.16 -3.90 -0.21 -4.92 -0.09 -1.50 
B/M   0.12 2.09 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.38 -0.08 -0.46 
Mom   0.54 3.24 -0.43 -1.09 -0.42 -1.04 -0.92 -1.28 
Inv   -0.59 -6.62 -0.47 -3.38 -0.46 -3.24 -0.12 -0.59 
Op   0.49 4.55 -0.01 -0.08 -0.05 -0.29 0.15 0.76 
Acc   -1.19 -4.99 -0.31 -0.59 -0.22 -0.41 0.04 0.05 
NI     -1.27 -5.32 -0.47 -0.95 -0.38 -0.75 -1.69 -2.35 
Annual (-3,-1)         0.75 3.57 
Annual (0)         0.44 1.99 
Annual (1,3)                 0.37 1.83 
Proxy Contest (-3,-1)         2.07 2.38 
Proxy Contest (0)         -0.28 -0.24 
Proxy Contest (1,3)                 -1.13 -1.56 
Special (-3,-1)         3.69 8.46 
Special (0)         1.30 1.19 







Table 14. Voting anomaly independence. Panel A shows mean excess returns and intercepts 
in time-series regressions for the voting period premium (‘VP-Rf’), shareholder support premium 
(‘SMD.LS’), and the equity premium (‘MKT’). Controls include the FF5 + momentum factors. 
VP-Rf’ is the baseline value-weighted voting period premium whereby all stocks that have a 
meeting in the following month are held in a value-weighted portfolio. ‘SMD.LS’ is the support 
minus dissent long-short baseline investment strategy whereby stocks are sorted on average 
abnormal shareholder support at the end of the month of the vote and stocks with high support 
enter the short portfolio. Panel B shows the mixed strategy that is long stocks that will have a 
meeting next month and short stocks that had high abnormal shareholder support last month. 
‘Season’ is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the proxy season (April, May, and June). 
 
Panel A 
Strategy Intercept/Mean MKT VP-Rf SMD.LS Controls R2 Adj 
VP-Rf 
Coef. 1.11%      
t-stat 3.43           
SMD.LS 
Coef. 1.13%      
t-stat 2.41           
MKT 
Coef. 0.78%      
t-stat 2.47           
VP-Rf 
Coef. 0.55% 0.89  -0.03 No 76% 
t-stat 3.36 22.8   -1.22     
SMD.LS 
Coef. 1.28% 0.19 -0.27  No 0% 
t-stat 2.62 0.8 -1.16       
MKT 
Coef. 0.80%   -0.02 No 0% 
t-stat 2.5     -0.43     
MKT 
Coef. -0.17%  0.85  No 76% 
t-stat -1.05   23       
MKT 
Coef. -0.07%  0.76 0.02 Yes 78% 
t-stat -0.44   17.3 0.64     
 
Panel B 
Strategy Alpha Season MKT SMB HML RMW CMA  MOM R2 Adj 
VP-SMD.S 
Coef. 1.51%  -0.17 -0.2 -0.43 0.04 0.29 -0.19 7.30% 
t-stat 4.29   -1.63 -1.18 -2.51 0.19 1.04 -2.3   
VP-SMD.S 
Coef. 1.86% -1.37% -0.18 -0.18 -0.44 0.05 0.23 -0.21 8.40% 




 Table 15. Trading volume. Panel A shows the average trading activity (shares traded/shares 
outstanding) for stocks experiencing a vote in month t (and have trading data form t-3 to t+3). P-
values are calculated for differences between means relative to month t (the month of the vote). 
Panel B shows coefficient estimates for the full sample of firms from 01/2003 to 12/2016 with 
trading volume (share volume divided by shares outstanding) as the dependent variable. ‘Low 
(mid/high) before (after) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the company falls in the 
bottom (middle/top) tercile of the shareholder support signal in the three months before (after) 
the meeting. Panel C shows coefficients from regressing trading volume on dummy variables that 
capture proxy contests, special meetings, and annual meetings. ‘Proxy’ is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if there was a proxy contest. ‘Special’ (before/after) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if there was a special meeting. ‘Before’ (‘After’) indicates that a dummy variable 
takes the value 1 three months before (after) the meeting. Standard errors are clustered by year 
and industry. 
 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
shvol/shrout μ p-val  shvol/shrout b t-stat  shvol/shrout B t-stat 
t-3 19.5% 0.00  Low Before 5.2% 4.37  Special Before 10.5% 6.26 
t-2 19.6% 0.00  Low  6.0% 4.91  Special 5.6% 4.58 
t-1 19.4% 0.00  Low After 5.6% 4.51  Special After 4.7% 2.00 
T 20.2%   Mid Before 4.2% 3.79  Proxy Before 7.5% 2.98 
t+1 19.6% 0.00  Mid 4.5% 3.65  Proxy 9.2% 3.75 
t+2 19.6% 0.00  Mid After 4.0% 3.05  Proxy After 14.4% 1.57 
t+3 20.0% 0.21  High Before 3.0% 3.62  
Annual 
Before 3.3% 3.12 
    High 3.8% 3.65  Annual 4.2% 3.40 
    High After 3.1% 3.00  Annual After 3.6% 2.79 
    Year FE Yes    Year FE Yes   




Table 16. Risk measures for the portfolio of voting firms. This table shows the betas and 
standard deviation of a value-weighted (vw) and equally-weighted (ew) portfolio of firms that have 
a shareholder meeting in period t=0.  
 
Betas VW 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
MKT 0.98 1.09 0.94 0.87 1.04 1.11 1.10 
t-stat 19.10 22.50 15.56 17.28 18.10 21.35 18.91 
SMB 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.09 
t-stat 1.47 1.21 1.13 -0.02 0.69 0.98 0.95 
HML -0.02 -0.20 -0.02 -0.03 0.18 -0.15 0.00 
t-stat -0.24 -2.50 -0.17 -0.41 1.95 -1.79 0.00 
RMW -0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 
t-stat -0.68 0.03 -0.77 -0.50 0.10 0.16 0.07 
CMA  -0.09 0.02 -0.30 0.07 -0.17 -0.02 -0.20 
t-stat -0.64 0.13 -1.87 0.51 -1.12 -0.16 -1.28 
MOM 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.05 
t-stat 0.85 0.53 0.25 -1.04 1.30 -0.57 -1.13 
         
Betas EW 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
MKT 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.95 1.10 1.01 
t-stat 18.8 20.4 22.3 21.1 23.0 26.1 24.1 
SMB 0.69 0.80 0.75 0.61 0.80 0.71 0.75 
t-stat 8.10 10.7 10.9 9.2 12.2 10.7 11.3 
HML 0.07 -0.18 -0.03 0.02 0.14 -0.16 -0.01 
t-stat 0.77 -2.31 -0.39 0.31 2.11 -2.31 -0.17 
RMW -0.15 -0.35 -0.25 -0.26 -0.22 -0.16 -0.19 
t-stat -1.28 -3.43 -2.64 -2.89 -2.44 -1.75 -2.10 
CMA  -0.17 0.29 -0.05 -0.04 -0.14 0.08 -0.13 
t-stat -1.22 2.31 -0.42 -0.34 -1.31 0.73 -1.19 
MOM -0.24 -0.21 -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 -0.21 
t-stat -5.89 -5.79 -3.89 -4.15 -3.23 -4.46 -6.37 
                
SD  
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
VW 4.62% 4.83% 4.72% 4.17% 4.94% 5.00% 5.21% 




Table 17. Subsamples of management and shareholder sponsored resolutions. This table 
shows sorts on abnormal shareholder support constructed by using only outcomes in management 
and shareholder sponsored resolutions. Abnormal shareholder support in shareholder-sponsored 
resolutions is constructed in terciles due to the lower number of firms. Portfolio 10 (3) is high 
support while portfolio 1 is low support. Alphas are calculated relative to the FF five factor model 




Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
1 0.22% 0.41% 0.28% 0.23% 0.27% 0.71% 0.01% 
10 2.24% 1.79% 0.94% 0.46% -0.55% -0.35% -0.71% 
LS 2.02% 1.38% 0.65% 0.23% -0.82% -1.06% -0.73% 
                
t-stat 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
1 0.59 0.98 0.86 0.70 0.73 1.71 0.03 
10 4.67 4.46 2.77 1.39 -1.61 -1.06 -2.09 
LS 3.46 2.28 1.39 0.47 -1.56 -2.03 -1.29 
        
Shareholder Sponsored Resolutions 
Alpha 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
1 0.14% 1.50% 0.99% 0.87% 0.90% -0.68% 0.68% 
3 -0.29% 0.01% 0.52% 0.81% -0.91% -0.05% 0.63% 
LS -0.42% -1.50% -0.47% -0.06% -1.81% 0.62% -0.05% 
                
t-stat 
Period -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
1 0.26 2.30 1.91 1.79 1.56 -1.07 1.02 
3 -0.51 0.01 1.15 1.45 -1.77 -0.13 1.27 




Appendix - Additional tables and figures 
 
Figure 7. New signals across time. This figure shows the incidence of new monthly signals in 
the sample (y-axis). The average abnormal support across votes per firm in a month is a new signal. 





Figure 8. Distance between two consecutive shareholder meetings. This figure shows a 
histogram of the monthly distance between two consecutive shareholder meetings in the data. 
Annual meetings tend to occur within 11 to 13 months from the previous annual meeting. Special 




Figure 9. Beta variation for the abnormal shareholder support anomaly. This figure shows 
t-statistics from time-series regressions of the high minus low abnormal support portfolio at period 




Table 18. Fama-MacBeth abnormal support. Shows coeffects and t-stats from Fama-MacBeth 
regressions of stock returns on dummy variables capturing abnormal support deciles for big stocks. 
Period 0 is the month of the vote. Controls include market capitalization, book to market, 
investments, profitability and cumulative returns.  
 
  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 1.13 2.67 1.93 2.06 
Low -3 0.96 2.93 1.10 3.23 
Low -2 0.52 1.73 0.54 1.76 
Low -1 0.16 0.50 -0.06 -0.17 
Low 0 0.83 2.66 0.64 2.03 
Low 1 -0.39 -1.23 -0.45 -1.54 
Low 2 0.59 1.79 0.54 1.62 
Low 3 -0.31 -1.05 -0.54 -1.68 
High -3 2.02 4.69 1.83 4.25 
High -2 1.10 2.80 1.34 3.11 
High -1 0.75 2.57 0.38 1.28 
High 0 0.32 1.07 0.17 0.55 
High 1 -1.08 -3.42 -0.76 -2.33 
High 2 -0.18 -0.59 0.10 0.36 
High 3 -0.82 -2.35 -0.57 -1.70 
Controls No Yes 
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